Lena Libon

Daniel Yang, Samuel Stante, Florian Redhardt et al.

Reward models are central to aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Yet most approaches rely on pointwise reward estimates that overlook the epistemic uncertainty in reward models arising from limited human feedback. Recent work suggests that quantifying this uncertainty can reduce the costs of human annotation via uncertainty-guided active learning and mitigate reward overoptimization in LLM post-training. However, uncertainty-aware reward models have so far been adopted without thorough comparison, leaving them poorly understood. This work introduces a unified framework, RewardUQ, to systematically evaluate uncertainty quantification for reward models. We compare common methods along standard metrics measuring accuracy and calibration, and we propose a new ranking strategy incorporating both dimensions for a simplified comparison. Our experimental results suggest that model size and initialization have the most meaningful impact on performance, and most prior work could have benefited from alternative design choices. To foster the development and evaluation of new methods and aid the deployment in downstream applications, we release our open-source framework as a Python package. Our code is available at https://github.com/lasgroup/rewarduq.

Lena Libon, Pura Peetathawatchai, Michael Aerni et al.

Black-box LLMs (accessible only via API) are vulnerable to distillation attacks, in which an attacker queries the model and trains a student on its outputs. A recent line of work proposes output perturbation defenses that modify the teacher's output to reduce student performance while preserving utility for legitimate users. As a relatively new family of approaches, output perturbation defenses lack a shared threat model, making it difficult to compare them, reason about composing them with other attacks, or evaluate their robustness against realistic adversaries. This underspecification matters beyond technical evaluation: when defenses are deployed to protect intellectual property or justify regulatory compliance, an imprecise threat model can create a false sense of security. We propose a threat model framework that describes attackers along three dimensions: a query budget, a data budget, and an interface profile that captures how attackers interact with the API. Using antidistillation sampling as a case study, we show that whether the defense is considered effective depends on the assumed threat model. We argue that future work on distillation defenses, along with any governance or policy frameworks built around them, should explicitly specify and stress-test attacker capabilities along our three dimensions.