Leonardo Bertolazzi

Leonardo Bertolazzi, Katya Tentori, Raffaella Bernardi

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in scientific tasks. Yet whether these systems can effectively engage in forms of inductive reasoning relevant to scientific discovery remains an open question. In this work, we introduce FALSIFYBENCH, an evaluation framework for hypothesis-driven reasoning inspired by the classic Wason 2-4-6 task, in which agents must discover hidden semantic properties by iteratively proposing examples and receiving feedback. This task captures key elements of scientific reasoning: hypothesis generation, evidence gathering, and belief revision in response to both confirming and disconfirming evidence. Our evaluation of 12 LLMs across model families and scales shows that reasoning models are generally stronger scientific reasoners than instruction-tuned models, although no model comes close to optimal performance. The primary driver of success is the capacity for negative testing: models that actively seek to falsify their hypotheses consistently outperform those that primarily seek confirmation. Moreover, a fine-grained turn-level analysis, neglected in previous work, reveals that failure is tied to identifiable patterns in how models navigate the hypothesis space.

Leonardo Bertolazzi, Philipp Mondorf, Barbara Plank et al.

The ability of large language models (LLMs) to validate their output and identify potential errors is crucial for ensuring robustness and reliability. However, current research indicates that LLMs struggle with self-correction, encountering significant challenges in detecting errors. While studies have explored methods to enhance self-correction in LLMs, relatively little attention has been given to understanding the models' internal mechanisms underlying error detection. In this paper, we present a mechanistic analysis of error detection in LLMs, focusing on simple arithmetic problems. Through circuit analysis, we identify the computational subgraphs responsible for detecting arithmetic errors across four smaller-sized LLMs. Our findings reveal that all models heavily rely on $\textit{consistency heads}$--attention heads that assess surface-level alignment of numerical values in arithmetic solutions. Moreover, we observe that the models' internal arithmetic computation primarily occurs in higher layers, whereas validation takes place in middle layers, before the final arithmetic results are fully encoded. This structural dissociation between arithmetic computation and validation seems to explain why smaller-sized LLMs struggle to detect even simple arithmetic errors.

Leonardo Bertolazzi, Sandro Pezzelle, Raffaelle Bernardi

Both humans and large language models (LLMs) exhibit content effects: biases in which the plausibility of the semantic content of a reasoning problem influences judgments regarding its logical validity. While this phenomenon in humans is best explained by the dual-process theory of reasoning, the mechanisms behind content effects in LLMs remain unclear. In this work, we address this issue by investigating how LLMs encode the concepts of validity and plausibility within their internal representations. We show that both concepts are linearly represented and strongly aligned in representational geometry, leading models to conflate plausibility with validity. Using steering vectors, we demonstrate that plausibility vectors can causally bias validity judgements, and vice versa, and that the degree of alignment between these two concepts predicts the magnitude of behavioral content effects across models. Finally, we construct debiasing vectors that disentangle these concepts, reducing content effects and improving reasoning accuracy. Our findings advance understanding of how abstract logical concepts are represented in LLMs and highlight representational interventions as a path toward more logical systems.

Leonardo Bertolazzi, Manuel Vargas Guzmán, Raffaella Bernardi et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated on reasoning tasks, yet their logical abilities remain contested. To address this, we study LLMs' reasoning in a well-defined fragment of logic: syllogistic reasoning. We cast the problem as premise selection and construct controlled datasets to isolate logical competence. Beyond evaluation, an open challenge is enabling LLMs to acquire abstract inference patterns that generalize to novel structures. We propose to apply few-shot meta-learning to this domain, thereby encouraging models to extract rules across tasks rather than memorize patterns within tasks. Although meta-learning has been little explored in the context of logic learnability, our experiments show that it is effective: small models (1.5B-7B) fine-tuned with meta-learning demonstrate strong gains in generalization, with especially pronounced benefits in low-data regimes. These meta-learned models outperform GPT-4o and o3-mini on our syllogistic reasoning task.

Anna Bavaresco, Raffaella Bernardi, Leonardo Bertolazzi et al.

There is an increasing trend towards evaluating NLP models with LLMs instead of human judgments, raising questions about the validity of these evaluations, as well as their reproducibility in the case of proprietary models. We provide JUDGE-BENCH, an extensible collection of 20 NLP datasets with human annotations covering a broad range of evaluated properties and types of data, and comprehensively evaluate 11 current LLMs, covering both open-weight and proprietary models, for their ability to replicate the annotations. Our evaluations show substantial variance across models and datasets. Models are reliable evaluators on some tasks, but overall display substantial variability depending on the property being evaluated, the expertise level of the human judges, and whether the language is human or model-generated. We conclude that LLMs should be carefully validated against human judgments before being used as evaluators.

Leonardo Bertolazzi, Albert Gatt, Raffaella Bernardi

The reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are becoming a central focus of study in NLP. In this paper, we consider the case of syllogistic reasoning, an area of deductive reasoning studied extensively in logic and cognitive psychology. Previous research has shown that pre-trained LLMs exhibit reasoning biases, such as $\textit{content effects}$, avoid answering that $\textit{no conclusion follows}$, display human-like difficulties, and struggle with multi-step reasoning. We contribute to this research line by systematically investigating the effects of chain-of-thought reasoning, in-context learning (ICL), and supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on syllogistic reasoning, considering syllogisms with conclusions that support or violate world knowledge, as well as ones with multiple premises. Crucially, we go beyond the standard focus on accuracy, with an in-depth analysis of the conclusions generated by the models. Our results suggest that the behavior of pre-trained LLMs can be explained by heuristics studied in cognitive science and that both ICL and SFT improve model performance on valid inferences, although only the latter mitigates most reasoning biases without harming model consistency.