Xiwen Chen

Yanxi Chen, Wenhui Zhu, Xiwen Chen et al.

Although Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) deliver state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance, they frequently suffer from hallucinations, e.g. generating text not grounded in the audio input. We analyze these grounding failures and identify a distinct taxonomy: Event Omission, False Event Identity, Temporal Relation Error, and Quantitative Temporal Error. To address this, we introduce the AHA (Audio Hallucination Alignment) framework. By leveraging counterfactual hard negative mining, our pipeline constructs a high-quality preference dataset that forces models to distinguish strict acoustic evidence from linguistically plausible fabrications. Additionally, we establish AHA-Eval, a diagnostic benchmark designed to rigorously test these fine-grained temporal reasoning capabilities. We apply this data to align Qwen2.5-Omni. The resulting model, Qwen-Audio-AHA, achieves a 13.7% improvement on AHA-Eval. Crucially, this benefit generalizes beyond our diagnostic set. Our model shows substantial gains on public benchmarks, including 1.3% on MMAU-Test and 1.6% on MMAR, outperforming latest SOTA methods. The model and dataset are open-sourced at https://github.com/LLM-VLM-GSL/AHA.

Wenhui Zhu, Xuanzhao Dong, Xiwen Chen et al.

The rapid deployment of open-source frameworks has significantly advanced the development of modern multi-agent systems. However, expanded action spaces, including uncontrolled privilege exposure and hidden inter-system interactions, pose severe security challenges. Specifically, Indirect Prompt Injections (IPI), which conceal malicious instructions within third-party content, can trigger unauthorized actions such as data exfiltration during normal operations. While current security evaluations predominantly rely on isolated single-turn benchmarks, the systemic vulnerabilities of these agents within complex dynamic environments remain critically underexplored. To bridge this gap, we systematically evaluate six defense strategies against four sophisticated IPI attack vectors across nine LLM backbones. Crucially, we conduct our evaluation entirely within dynamic multi-step tool-calling environments to capture the true attack surface of modern autonomous agents. Moving beyond binary success rates, our multidimensional analysis reveals a pronounced fragility. Advanced injections successfully bypass nearly all baseline defenses, and some surface-level mitigations even produce counterproductive side effects. Furthermore, while agents execute malicious instructions almost instantaneously, their internal states exhibit abnormally high decision entropy. Motivated by this latent hesitation, we investigate Representation Engineering (RepE) as a robust detection strategy. By extracting hidden states at the tool-input position, we revealed that the RepE-based circuit breaker successfully identifies and intercepts unauthorized actions before the agent commits to them, achieving high detection accuracy across diverse LLM backbones. This study exposes the limitations of current IPI defenses and provides a highly practical paradigm for building resilient multi-agent architectures.