Zihan Zhang

Xiaomi LLM-Core Team, Dong Zhang, Gang Wang et al.

Existing audio language models typically rely on task-specific fine-tuning to accomplish particular audio tasks. In contrast, humans are able to generalize to new audio tasks with only a few examples or simple instructions. GPT-3 has shown that scaling next-token prediction pretraining enables strong generalization capabilities in text, and we believe this paradigm is equally applicable to the audio domain. By scaling MiMo-Audio's pretraining data to over one hundred million of hours, we observe the emergence of few-shot learning capabilities across a diverse set of audio tasks. We develop a systematic evaluation of these capabilities and find that MiMo-Audio-7B-Base achieves SOTA performance on both speech intelligence and audio understanding benchmarks among open-source models. Beyond standard metrics, MiMo-Audio-7B-Base generalizes to tasks absent from its training data, such as voice conversion, style transfer, and speech editing. MiMo-Audio-7B-Base also demonstrates powerful speech continuation capabilities, capable of generating highly realistic talk shows, recitations, livestreaming and debates. At the post-training stage, we curate a diverse instruction-tuning corpus and introduce thinking mechanisms into both audio understanding and generation. MiMo-Audio-7B-Instruct achieves open-source SOTA on audio understanding benchmarks (MMSU, MMAU, MMAR, MMAU-Pro), spoken dialogue benchmarks (Big Bench Audio, MultiChallenge Audio) and instruct-TTS evaluations, approaching or surpassing closed-source models. Model checkpoints and full evaluation suite are available at https://github.com/XiaomiMiMo/MiMo-Audio.

Shulun Chen, Runlong Zhou, Zihan Zhang et al. · tsinghua

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences has proven effective for enhancing model capabilities, yet standard preference modeling using the Bradley-Terry model assumes transitivity, overlooking the inherent complexity of human population preferences. Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF) addresses this by framing non-transitive preferences as a two-player zero-sum game, where alignment reduces to finding the Nash equilibrium (NE). However, existing algorithms typically rely on regularization, incurring unavoidable bias when computing the duality gap in the original game. In this work, we provide the first convergence guarantee for Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update ($\mathtt{OMWU}$) in NLHF, showing that it achieves last-iterate linear convergence after a burn-in phase whenever an NE with full support exists, with an instance-dependent linear convergence rate to the original NE, measured by duality gaps. Compared to prior results in Wei et al. (2020), we do not require the assumption of NE uniqueness. Our analysis identifies a novel marginal convergence behavior, where the probability of rarely played actions grows exponentially from exponentially small values, enabling exponentially better dependence on instance-dependent constants than prior results. Experiments corroborate the theoretical strengths of $\mathtt{OMWU}$ in both tabular and neural policy classes, demonstrating its potential for LLM applications.

Junyan Liu, Haipeng Luo, Zihan Zhang et al.

We study online learning in two-player uninformed Markov games, where the opponent's actions and policies are unobserved. In this setting, Tian et al. (2021) show that achieving no-external-regret is impossible without incurring an exponential dependence on the episode length $H$. They then turn to the weaker notion of Nash-value regret and propose a V-learning algorithm with regret $O(K^{2/3})$ after $K$ episodes. However, their algorithm and guarantee do not adapt to the difficulty of the problem: even in the case where the opponent follows a fixed policy and thus $O(\sqrt{K})$ external regret is well-known to be achievable, their result is still the worse rate $O(K^{2/3})$ on a weaker metric. In this work, we fully address both limitations. First, we introduce empirical Nash-value regret, a new regret notion that is strictly stronger than Nash-value regret and naturally reduces to external regret when the opponent follows a fixed policy. Moreover, under this new metric, we propose a parameter-free algorithm that achieves an $O(\min \{\sqrt{K} + (CK)^{1/3},\sqrt{LK}\})$ regret bound, where $C$ quantifies the variance of the opponent's policies and $L$ denotes the number of policy switches (both at most $O(K)$). Therefore, our results not only recover the two extremes -- $O(\sqrt{K})$ external regret when the opponent is fixed and $O(K^{2/3})$ Nash-value regret in the worst case -- but also smoothly interpolate between these extremes by automatically adapting to the opponent's non-stationarity. We achieve so by first providing a new analysis of the epoch-based V-learning algorithm by Mao et al. (2022), establishing an $O(ηC + \sqrt{K/η})$ regret bound, where $η$ is the epoch incremental factor. Next, we show how to adaptively restart this algorithm with an appropriate $η$ in response to the potential non-stationarity of the opponent, eventually achieving our final results.