Oliver Sourbut

Advait Yadav, Sid Black, Oliver Sourbut

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly coordinate in multi-agent systems, yet we lack an understanding of where and why cooperation failures may arise. In many real-world coordination problems, from knowledge sharing in organizations to code documentation, helping others carries negligible personal cost while generating substantial collective benefits. However, whether LLM agents cooperate when helping neither benefits nor harms the helper, while being given explicit instructions to do so, remains unknown. We build a multi-agent setup designed to study cooperative behavior in a frictionless environment, removing all strategic complexity from cooperation. We find that capability does not predict cooperation: OpenAI o3 achieves only 17% of optimal collective performance while OpenAI o3-mini reaches 50%, despite identical instructions to maximize group revenue. Through a causal decomposition that automates one side of agent communication, we separate cooperation failures from competence failures, tracing their origins through agent reasoning analysis. Testing targeted interventions, we find that explicit protocols double performance for low-competence models, and tiny sharing incentives improve models with weak cooperation. Our findings suggest that scaling intelligence alone will not solve coordination problems in multi-agent systems and will require deliberate cooperative design, even when helping others costs nothing.

Casey O. Barkan, Sid Black, Oliver Sourbut

We investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can predict whether they will succeed on a given task and whether their predictions improve as they progress through multi-step tasks. We also investigate whether LLMs can learn from in-context experiences to make better decisions about whether to pursue a task in scenarios where failure is costly. All LLMs we tested are overconfident, but most predict their success with better-than-random discriminatory power. We find that newer and larger LLMs generally do not have greater discriminatory power, though Claude models do show such a trend. On multi-step agentic tasks, the overconfidence of several frontier LLMs worsens as they progress through the tasks, and reasoning LLMs perform comparably to or worse than non-reasoning LLMs. With in-context experiences of failure, some but not all LLMs reduce their overconfidence leading to significantly improved decision making, while others do not. Interestingly, all LLMs' decisions are approximately rational given their estimated probabilities of success, yet their overly-optimistic estimates result in poor decision making. These results suggest that current LLM agents are hindered by their lack of awareness of their own capabilities. We discuss the implications of LLMs' awareness of their capabilities for AI misuse and misalignment risks.