Chris Hays

Chris Hays, Rachel Li, Bailey Flanigan et al.

AI arenas, which rank generative models from pairwise preferences of users, are a popular method for measuring the relative performance of models in the course of their organic use. Because rankings are computed from noisy preferences, there is a concern that model producers can exploit this randomness by submitting many models (e.g., multiple variants of essentially the same model) and thereby artificially improve the rank of their top models. This can lead to degradations in the quality, and therefore the usefulness, of the ranking. In this paper, we begin by establishing, both theoretically and in simulations calibrated to data from the platform Arena (formerly LMArena, Chatbot Arena), conditions under which producers can benefit from submitting clones when their goal is to be ranked highly. We then propose a new mechanism for ranking models from pairwise comparisons, called You-Rank-We-Rank (YRWR). It requires that producers submit rankings over their own models and uses these rankings to correct statistical estimates of model quality. We prove that this mechanism is approximately clone-robust, in the sense that a producer cannot improve their rank much by doing anything other than submitting each of their unique models exactly once. Moreover, to the extent that model producers are able to correctly rank their own models, YRWR improves overall ranking accuracy. In further simulations, we show that indeed the mechanism is approximately clone-robust and quantify improvements to ranking accuracy, even under producer misranking.

Chris Hays, Ben Laufer, Solon Barocas et al.

Recent scholarship has argued that firms building data-driven decision systems in high-stakes domains like employment, credit, and housing should search for "less discriminatory algorithms" (LDAs) (Black et al., 2024). That is, for a given decision problem, firms considering deploying a model should make a good-faith effort to find equally performant models with lower disparate impact across social groups. Evidence from the literature on model multiplicity shows that randomness in training pipelines can lead to multiple models with the same performance, but meaningful variations in disparate impact. This suggests that developers can find LDAs simply by randomly retraining models. Firms cannot continue retraining forever, though, which raises the question: What constitutes a good-faith effort? In this paper, we formalize LDA search via model multiplicity as an optimal stopping problem, where a model developer with limited information wants to produce strong evidence that they have sufficiently explored the space of models. Our primary contribution is an adaptive stopping algorithm that yields a high-probability upper bound on the gains achievable from a continued search, allowing the developer to certify (e.g., to a court) that their search was sufficient. We provide a framework under which developers can impose stronger assumptions about the distribution of models, yielding correspondingly stronger bounds. We validate the method on real-world credit, employment and housing datasets.