Yutao Wu

Xingjun Ma, Yixu Wang, Hengyuan Xu et al.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has driven major gains in reasoning, perception, and generation across language and vision, yet whether these advances translate into comparable improvements in safety remains unclear, partly due to fragmented evaluations that focus on isolated modalities or threat models. In this report, we present an integrated safety evaluation of six frontier models--GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro, Qwen3-VL, Grok 4.1 Fast, Nano Banana Pro, and Seedream 4.5--assessing each across language, vision-language, and image generation using a unified protocol that combines benchmark, adversarial, multilingual, and compliance evaluations. By aggregating results into safety leaderboards and model profiles, we reveal a highly uneven safety landscape: while GPT-5.2 demonstrates consistently strong and balanced performance, other models exhibit clear trade-offs across benchmark safety, adversarial robustness, multilingual generalization, and regulatory compliance. Despite strong results under standard benchmarks, all models remain highly vulnerable under adversarial testing, with worst-case safety rates dropping below 6%. Text-to-image models show slightly stronger alignment in regulated visual risk categories, yet remain fragile when faced with adversarial or semantically ambiguous prompts. Overall, these findings highlight that safety in frontier models is inherently multidimensional--shaped by modality, language, and evaluation design--underscoring the need for standardized, holistic safety assessments to better reflect real-world risk and guide responsible deployment.

Yunhao Feng, Yige Li, Yutao Wu et al.

Large language model (LLM) agents execute tasks through multi-step workflows that combine planning, memory, and tool use. While this design enables autonomy, it also expands the attack surface for backdoor threats. Backdoor triggers injected into specific stages of an agent workflow can persist through multiple intermediate states and adversely influence downstream outputs. However, existing studies remain fragmented and typically analyze individual attack vectors in isolation, leaving the cross-stage interaction and propagation of backdoor triggers poorly understood from an agent-centric perspective. To fill this gap, we propose \textbf{BackdoorAgent}, a modular and stage-aware framework that provides a unified, agent-centric view of backdoor threats in LLM agents. BackdoorAgent structures the attack surface into three functional stages of agentic workflows, including \textbf{planning attacks}, \textbf{memory attacks}, and \textbf{tool-use attacks}, and instruments agent execution to enable systematic analysis of trigger activation and propagation across different stages. Building on this framework, we construct a standardized benchmark spanning four representative agent applications: \textbf{Agent QA}, \textbf{Agent Code}, \textbf{Agent Web}, and \textbf{Agent Drive}, covering both language-only and multimodal settings. Our empirical analysis shows that \textit{triggers implanted at a single stage can persist across multiple steps and propagate through intermediate states.} For instance, when using a GPT-based backbone, we observe trigger persistence in 43.58\% of planning attacks, 77.97\% of memory attacks, and 60.28\% of tool-stage attacks, highlighting the vulnerabilities of the agentic workflow itself to backdoor threats. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and benchmark are publicly available at GitHub.

Kaiyuan Cui, Yige Li, Yutao Wu et al.

Vision-language models (VLMs) extend large language models (LLMs) with vision encoders, enabling text generation conditioned on both images and text. However, this multimodal integration expands the attack surface by exposing the model to image-based jailbreaks crafted to induce harmful responses. Existing gradient-based jailbreak methods transfer poorly, as adversarial patterns overfit to a single white-box surrogate and fail to generalise to black-box models. In this work, we propose Universal and transferable jailbreak (UltraBreak), a framework that constrains adversarial patterns through transformations and regularisation in the vision space, while relaxing textual targets through semantic-based objectives. By defining its loss in the textual embedding space of the target LLM, UltraBreak discovers universal adversarial patterns that generalise across diverse jailbreak objectives. This combination of vision-level regularisation and semantically guided textual supervision mitigates surrogate overfitting and enables strong transferability across both models and attack targets. Extensive experiments show that UltraBreak consistently outperforms prior jailbreak methods. Further analysis reveals why earlier approaches fail to transfer, highlighting that smoothing the loss landscape via semantic objectives is crucial for enabling universal and transferable jailbreaks. The code is publicly available in our \href{https://github.com/kaiyuanCui/UltraBreak}{GitHub repository}.