Zenghao Duan

Zenghao Duan, Zhiyi Yin, Zhichao Shi et al.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit exceptional performance but pose inherent risks of generating toxic content, restricting their safe deployment. While traditional methods (e.g., alignment) adjust output preferences, they fail to eliminate underlying toxic regions in parameters, leaving models vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Prior mechanistic studies characterize toxic regions as "toxic vectors" or "layer-wise subspaces", yet our analysis identifies critical limitations: i) Removed toxic vectors can be reconstructed via linear combinations of non-toxic vectors, demanding targeting of entire toxic subspace; ii) Contrastive objective over limited samples inject noise into layer-wise subspaces, hindering stable extraction. These highlight the challenge of identifying robust toxic subspace and removing them. Therefore, we propose GLOSS (GLobal tOxic Subspace Suppression), a lightweight method that mitigates toxicity by identifying and eliminating this global subspace from FFN parameters. Experiments on LLMs (e.g., Qwen3) show GLOSS achieves SOTA detoxification while preserving general capabilities without requiring large-scale retraining. WARNING: This paper contains context which is toxic in nature.

Zenghao Duan, Yuxin Tian, Zhiyi Yin et al.

LLM-based agent systems increasingly rely on agent skills sourced from open registries to extend their capabilities, yet the openness of such ecosystems makes skills difficult to thoroughly vet. Existing attacks rely on injecting malicious instructions into skills, making them easily detectable by static auditing. However, non-malicious skills may also harbor latent vulnerabilities that an attacker can exploit solely through adversarial prompting, without modifying the skill itself. We introduce SkillAttack, a red-teaming framework that dynamically verifies skill vulnerability exploitability through adversarial prompting. SkillAttack combines vulnerability analysis, surface-parallel attack generation, and feedback-driven exploit refinement into a closed-loop search that progressively converges toward successful exploitation. Experiments across 10 LLMs on 71 adversarial and 100 real-world skills show that SkillAttack outperforms all baselines by a wide margin (ASR 0.73--0.93 on adversarial skills, up to 0.26 on real-world skills), revealing that even well-intended skills pose serious security risks under realistic agent interactions.