Shlomo Zilberstein

Mason Nakamura, Abhinav Kumar, Saswat Das et al.

Multi-agent systems, where LLM agents communicate through free-form language, enable sophisticated coordination for solving complex cooperative tasks. This surfaces a unique safety problem when individual agents form a coalition and \emph{collude} to pursue secondary goals and degrade the joint objective. In this paper, we present Colosseum, a framework for auditing LLM agents' collusive behavior in multi-agent settings. We ground how agents cooperate through a Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) and measure collusion via regret relative to the cooperative optimum. Colosseum tests each LLM for collusion under different objectives, persuasion tactics, and network topologies. Through our audit, we show that most out-of-the-box models exhibited a propensity to collude when a secret communication channel was artificially formed. Furthermore, we discover ``collusion on paper'' when agents plan to collude in text but would often pick non-collusive actions, thus providing little effect on the joint task. Colosseum provides a new way to study collusion by measuring communications and actions in rich yet verifiable environments.

Hyejun Jeong, Amir Houmansadr, Shlomo Zilberstein et al.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: What happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is exposed to user persuasion? Yet studying this possibility is challenging because long-running agent behavior is noisy and costly to reproduce, and it remains unclear which unique challenges emerge only in extended task execution. We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9% fewer searches and visit 16.9% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

Saaduddin Mahmud, Eugene Bagdasarian, Shlomo Zilberstein

Agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings where communication shapes high-stakes decisions, making a principled understanding of strategic communication essential. Prior work largely studies either unverifiable cheap-talk or fully verifiable disclosure, failing to capture realistic domains in which information has probabilistic credibility. We introduce MixTalk, a strategic communication game for LLM-to-LLM interaction that models information credibility. In MixTalk, a sender agent strategically combines verifiable and unverifiable claims to communicate private information, while a receiver agent allocates a limited budget to costly verification and infers the underlying state from prior beliefs, claims, and verification outcomes. We evaluate state-of-the-art LLM agents in large-scale tournaments across three realistic deployment settings, revealing their strengths and limitations in reasoning about information credibility and the explicit behavior that shapes these interactions. Finally, we propose Tournament Oracle Policy Distillation (TOPD), an offline method that distills tournament oracle policy from interaction logs and deploys it in-context at inference time. Our results show that TOPD significantly improves receiver robustness to persuasion.