Zirui Lin

Xin-Cheng Wen, Zirui Lin, Cuiyun Gao et al.

Software vendors often silently release security patches without providing sufficient advisories (e.g., Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) or delayed updates via resources (e.g., National Vulnerability Database). Therefore, it has become crucial to detect these security patches to ensure secure software maintenance. However, existing methods face the following challenges: (1) They primarily focus on the information within the patches themselves, overlooking the complex dependencies in the repository. (2) Security patches typically involve multiple functions and files, increasing the difficulty in well learning the representations. To alleviate the above challenges, this paper proposes a Repository-level Security Patch Detection framework named RepoSPD, which comprises three key components: 1) a repository-level graph construction, RepoCPG, which represents software patches by merging pre-patch and post-patch source code at the repository level; 2) a structure-aware patch representation, which fuses the graph and sequence branch and aims at comprehending the relationship among multiple code changes; 3) progressive learning, which facilitates the model in balancing semantic and structural information. To evaluate RepoSPD, we employ two widely-used datasets in security patch detection: SPI-DB and PatchDB. We further extend these datasets to the repository level, incorporating a total of 20,238 and 28,781 versions of repository in C/C++ programming languages, respectively, denoted as SPI-DB* and PatchDB*. We compare RepoSPD with six existing security patch detection methods and five static tools. Our experimental results demonstrate that RepoSPD outperforms the state-of-the-art baseline, with improvements of 11.90%, and 3.10% in terms of accuracy on the two datasets, respectively.

Xin-Cheng Wen, Zirui Lin, Yijun Yang et al.

The exponential increase in software vulnerabilities has created an urgent need for automatic vulnerability repair (AVR) solutions. Recent research has formulated AVR as a sequence generation problem and has leveraged large language models (LLMs) to address this problem. Typically, these approaches prompt or fine-tune LLMs to generate repairs for vulnerabilities directly. Although these methods show state-of-the-art performance, they face the following challenges: (1) Lack of high-quality, vulnerability-related reasoning data. Current approaches primarily rely on foundation models that mainly encode general programming knowledge. Without vulnerability-related reasoning data, they tend to fail to capture the diverse vulnerability repair patterns. (2) Hard to verify the intermediate vulnerability repair process during LLM training. Existing reinforcement learning methods often leverage intermediate execution feedback from the environment (e.g., sandbox-based execution results) to guide reinforcement learning training. In contrast, the vulnerability repair process generally lacks such intermediate, verifiable feedback, which poses additional challenges for model training.