Punya Syon Pandey

Saad Hossain, Tom Tseng, Punya Syon Pandey et al.

As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks. However, there is no standard approach to evaluate tamper resistance. Varied data sets, metrics, and tampering configurations make it difficult to compare safety, utility, and robustness across different models and defenses. To this end, we introduce TamperBench, the first unified framework to systematically evaluate the tamper resistance of LLMs. TamperBench (i) curates a repository of state-of-the-art weight-space fine-tuning attacks and latent-space representation attacks; (ii) enables realistic adversarial evaluation through systematic hyperparameter sweeps per attack-model pair; and (iii) provides both safety and utility evaluations. TamperBench requires minimal additional code to specify any fine-tuning configuration, alignment-stage defense method, and metric suite while ensuring end-to-end reproducibility. We use TamperBench to evaluate 21 open-weight LLMs, including defense-augmented variants, across nine tampering threats using standardized safety and capability metrics with hyperparameter sweeps per model-attack pair. This yields novel insights, including effects of post-training on tamper resistance, that jailbreak-tuning is typically the most severe attack, and that Triplet emerges as a leading alignment-stage defense. Code is available at: https://github.com/criticalml-uw/TamperBench

Daniel Vennemeyer, Punya Syon Pandey, Phan Anh Duong et al.

Fine-tuning LLMs on benign data can still degrade alignment and adversarial robustness, yet direct analysis of the role of fine-tuning objectives in shaping these safety outcomes remain limited. We present a controlled comparison of six fine-tuning objectives -- Supervised Fine-Tuning, Direct Preference Optimization, Conditional Fine-Tuning, Inoculation Prompting, Odds Ratio Preference Optimization, and KL-regularized fine-tuning -- holding data, domain, architecture, and optimization fixed. Across closed-form reasoning and open-ended generation tasks, we find that objective choice induces systematic, scale-dependent shifts along the safety-capability frontier. At small training budgets, robustness is similar across objectives but capability differs. At larger budgets, objectives diverge sharply: supervised and preference-based tuning tightly couple capability gains to increased adversarial vulnerability and persona drift, while objectives that constrain learning signals -- especially ORPO and KL-regularization -- substantially mitigate both. Fine-tuning objectives therefore matter little for safety at small scales but become a primary driver of adversarial robustness and latent persona stability as training scale increases.