Di Feng

Yuzhen Shi, Huanghai Liu, Yiran Hu et al.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to legal domain-specific tasks, evaluating their ability to perform legal work in real-world settings has become essential. However, existing legal benchmarks rely on simplified and highly standardized tasks, failing to capture the ambiguity, complexity, and reasoning demands of real legal practice. Moreover, prior evaluations often adopt coarse, single-dimensional metrics and do not explicitly assess fine-grained legal reasoning. To address these limitations, we introduce PLawBench, a Practical Law Benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs in realistic legal practice scenarios. Grounded in real-world legal workflows, PLawBench models the core processes of legal practitioners through three task categories: public legal consultation, practical case analysis, and legal document generation. These tasks assess a model's ability to identify legal issues and key facts, perform structured legal reasoning, and generate legally coherent documents. PLawBench comprises 850 questions across 13 practical legal scenarios, with each question accompanied by expert-designed evaluation rubrics, resulting in approximately 12,500 rubric items for fine-grained assessment. Using an LLM-based evaluator aligned with human expert judgments, we evaluate 10 state-of-the-art LLMs. Experimental results show that none achieves strong performance on PLawBench, revealing substantial limitations in the fine-grained legal reasoning capabilities of current LLMs and highlighting important directions for future evaluation and development of legal LLMs. Data is available at: https://github.com/skylenage/PLawbench.

Di Feng, Chenhao Zhang, Zhanzhan Zhao

The continued improvement of large language models (LLMs) increasingly depends on eliciting high-quality, user-generated data, yet such data are costly to provide and often withheld due to privacy and effort concerns. This creates a fundamental design challenge: how to incentivize data contribution when model improvements require coordinated, threshold-level inputs, while contributions remain privately costly and partially reversible. We develop and theoretically analyze incentive mechanisms for user data contribution that explicitly account for threshold effects and reversibility, focusing on how subsidies and withdrawal rights can be jointly designed to overcome coordination failure. As a natural benchmark, we first consider subsidy-based incentives, under which users respond to posted payments with privately optimal floor contributions. These decentralized responses may fall below the improvement threshold, resulting in subsidy expenditure without model improvements. We then analyze mechanisms with withdrawal rights, in which users report costs, the provider centrally assigns contribution burdens, and users may withdraw before training. We prove that combining cost reporting with personalized assignment can eliminate inefficient provision by ensuring that data are collected only when improvement is sustainable, converting infeasible instances into a null outcome rather than subsidy leakage. Finally, we compare two withdrawal protocols. The simultaneous protocol can achieve lower total cost, while the small-first sequential protocol better incentivizes participation, encouraging greater data provision and thereby increasing the probability of crossing the improvement threshold.