Hachem Madmoun

Zhuohan Xie, Daniil Orel, Rushil Thareja et al.

Multi-step symbolic reasoning is essential for robust financial analysis; yet, current benchmarks largely overlook this capability. Existing datasets such as FinQA and ConvFinQA emphasize final numerical answers while neglecting the intermediate reasoning required for transparency and verification. To address this gap, we introduce FinChain, the first benchmark specifically designed for verifiable Chain-of-Thought (CoT) evaluation in finance. FinChain spans 58 topics across 12 financial domains, each represented by parameterized symbolic templates with executable Python traces that enable fully machine-verifiable reasoning and scalable, contamination-free data generation. To assess reasoning capacity, we propose ChainEval, a dynamic alignment metric that jointly evaluates both the final-answer correctness and the step-level reasoning consistency. Evaluating 26 leading LLMs reveals that even frontier proprietary systems exhibit clear limitations in symbolic financial reasoning, while domain-adapted and math-enhanced fine-tuned models substantially narrow this gap. Overall, FinChain exposes persistent weaknesses in multi-step financial reasoning and provides a foundation for developing trustworthy, interpretable, and verifiable financial AI.

Hachem Madmoun, Salem Lahlou

Eliciting cooperation in multi-agent LLM systems is critical for AI alignment. We investigate two approaches: direct communication and curriculum learning. In a 4-player Stag Hunt, a one-word "cheap talk" channel increases cooperation from 0% to 48.3%, demonstrating communication as a robust coordination mechanism. In contrast, we find that curriculum learning is highly sensitive to design choices: our pedagogical curriculum through progressively complex games reduced agent payoffs by 27.4% in an Iterated Public Goods Game with Punishment. Qualitative analysis reveals that curricula emphasizing defection-equilibrium games can induce "learned pessimism" in agents. These findings suggest that for coordination problems, simple communication protocols may be more reliable than experience-based training, and that curriculum design for social dilemmas requires careful attention to the strategic lessons embedded in game sequences.