Haolang Lu

Zhongxiang Sun, Qipeng Wang, Weijie Yu et al.

Deep search agents powered by large language models have demonstrated strong capabilities in multi-step retrieval, reasoning, and long-horizon task execution. However, their practical failures often stem from the lack of mechanisms to monitor and regulate reasoning and retrieval states as tasks evolve under uncertainty. Insights from cognitive neuroscience suggest that human metacognition is hierarchically organized, integrating fast anomaly detection with selectively triggered, experience-driven reflection. In this work, we propose Deep Search with Meta-Cognitive Monitoring (DS-MCM), a deep search framework augmented with an explicit hierarchical metacognitive monitoring mechanism. DS-MCM integrates a Fast Consistency Monitor, which performs lightweight checks on the alignment between external evidence and internal reasoning confidence, and a Slow Experience-Driven Monitor, which is selectively activated to guide corrective intervention based on experience memory from historical agent trajectories. By embedding monitoring directly into the reasoning-retrieval loop, DS-MCM determines both when intervention is warranted and how corrective actions should be informed by prior experience. Experiments across multiple deep search benchmarks and backbone models demonstrate that DS-MCM consistently improves performance and robustness.

Gongli Xi, Kun Wang, Zeming Gao et al.

Large multimodal reasoning models solve challenging visual problems via explicit long-chain inference: they gather visual clues from images and decode clues into textual tokens. Yet this capability also increases hallucinations, where the model generates content that is not supported by the input image or the question. To understand this failure mode, we identify \emph{reasoning drift}: during clue gathering, the model over-focuses on question-irrelevant entities, diluting focus on task-relevant cues and gradually decoupling the reasoning trace from visual grounding. As a consequence, many inference-time localization or intervention methods developed for non-reasoning models fail to pinpoint the true clues in reasoning settings. Motivated by these insights, we introduce ClueRecall, a metric for assessing visual clue retrieval, and present ClueTracer, a training-free, parameter-free, and architecture-agnostic plugin for hallucination suppression. ClueTracer starts from the question and traces how key clues propagate along the model's reasoning pathway (question $\rightarrow$ outputs $\rightarrow$ visual tokens), thereby localizing task-relevant patches while suppressing spurious attention to irrelevant regions. Remarkably, \textbf{without any additional training}, ClueTracer improves all \textbf{reasoning} architectures (including \texttt{R1-OneVision}, \texttt{Ocean-R1}, \texttt{MM-Eureka}, \emph{etc}.) by $\mathbf{1.21\times}$ on reasoning benchmarks. When transferred to \textbf{non-reasoning} settings, it yields a $\mathbf{1.14\times}$ gain.

Haolang Lu, Hongrui Peng, WeiYe Fu et al.

Failures in large language models (LLMs) are often analyzed from a behavioral perspective, where incorrect outputs in factual question answering are commonly associated with missing knowledge. In this work, focusing on entity-based factual queries, we suggest that such a view may conflate different failure mechanisms, and propose an internal, mechanism-oriented perspective that separates Knowledge Existence from Behavior Expression. Under this formulation, hallucination and deception correspond to two qualitatively different failure modes that may appear similar at the output level but differ in their underlying mechanisms. To study this distinction, we construct a controlled environment for entity-centric factual questions in which knowledge is preserved while behavioral expression is selectively altered, enabling systematic analysis of four behavioral cases. We analyze these failure modes through representation separability, sparse interpretability, and inference-time activation steering.

Jing Tang, Kun Wang, Haolang Lu et al.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) in long chain-of-thought reasoning often fail when different knowledge sources provide conflicting signals. We formalize these failures under a unified notion of knowledge conflict, distinguishing input-level objective conflict from process-level effective conflict. Through probing internal representations, we reveal that: (I) Linear Separability: different conflict types are explicitly encoded as linearly separable features rather than entangled; (II) Depth Localization: conflict signals concentrate in mid-to-late layers, indicating a distinct processing stage for conflict encoding; (III) Hierarchical Consistency: aggregating noisy token-level signals along trajectories robustly recovers input-level conflict types; and (IV) Directional Asymmetry: reinforcing the model's implicit source preference under conflict is far easier than enforcing the opposite source. Our findings provide a mechanism-level view of multimodal reasoning under knowledge conflict and enable principled diagnosis and control of long-CoT failures.