Defu Cao

Muyan Weng, Defu Cao, Wei Yang et al.

It is unclear whether strong forecasting performance reflects genuine temporal understanding or the ability to reason under contextual and event-driven conditions. We introduce TemporalBench, a multi-domain benchmark designed to evaluate temporal reasoning behavior under progressively richer informational settings. TemporalBench adopts a four-tier task taxonomy that examines historical structure interpretation, context-free forecasting, contextual temporal reasoning, and event-conditioned prediction across four real-world domains: retail, healthcare, energy, and physical systems. By controlling access to future targets and contextual information, the benchmark enables a diagnostic analysis of whether models can correctly interpret temporal patterns, align them with external context, and adapt predictions when conditions change. Extensive baseline experiments show that strong numerical forecasting accuracy does not reliably translate into robust contextual or event-aware temporal reasoning; instead, existing agent frameworks exhibit fragmented strengths and systematic failure modes that remain largely hidden under forecasting-only benchmarks. The TemporalBench dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Melady/TemporalBench, and we additionally provide a public leaderboard at https://huggingface.co/spaces/Melady/TemporalBench_Leaderboard.

Jiate Li, Defu Cao, Li Li et al.

Large language models (LLMs) have been serving as effective backbones for retrieval systems, including Retrieval-Augmentation-Generation (RAG), Dense Information Retriever (IR), and Agent Memory Retrieval. Recent studies have demonstrated that such LLM-based Retrieval (LLMR) is vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which manipulates documents by token-level injections and enables adversaries to either boost or diminish these documents in retrieval tasks. However, existing attack studies mainly (1) presume a known query is given to the attacker, and (2) highly rely on access to the victim model's parameters or interactions, which are hardly accessible in real-world scenarios, leading to limited validity. To further explore the secure risks of LLMR, we propose a practical black-box attack method that generates transferable injection tokens based on zero-shot surrogate LLMs without need of victim queries or victim models knowledge. The effectiveness of our attack raises such a robustness issue that similar effects may arise from benign or unintended document edits in the real world. To achieve our attack, we first establish a theoretical framework of LLMR and empirically verify it. Under the framework, we simulate the transferable attack as a min-max problem, and propose an adversarial learning mechanism that finds optimal adversarial tokens with learnable query samples. Our attack is validated to be effective on benchmark datasets across popular LLM retrievers.