Argyrios Deligkas

Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Themistoklis Melissourgos

We study the computational complexity of finding a solution for the straight-cut and square-cut pizza sharing problems. We show that computing an $\varepsilon$-approximate solution is PPA-complete for both problems, while finding an exact solution for the square-cut problem is FIXP-hard. Our PPA-hardness results apply for any $\varepsilon < 1/5$, even when all mass distributions consist of non-overlapping axis-aligned rectangles or when they are point sets, and our FIXP-hardness result applies even when all mass distributions are unions of squares and right-angled triangles. We also prove that the decision variants of both approximate problems are NP-complete, while the decision variant for the exact version of square-cut pizza sharing is $\exists\mathbb{R}$-complete.

Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Alexandros Hollender et al.

We study the problem of computing approximate market equilibria in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions. In this setting, the problem was only known to be PPAD-complete for inverse-polynomial approximations. We strengthen this result by showing PPAD-hardness for constant approximations. This means that the problem does not admit a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) unless PPAD$=$P. In fact, we prove that computing any approximation better than $1/11$ is PPAD-complete. As a direct byproduct of our main result, we get the same inapproximability bound for Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with SPLC utility functions.

Argyrios Deligkas, Michelle Döring, Eduard Eiben et al.

We examine the problem of maximizing the reachability of a given source in temporal graphs that are given as the union of k temporal paths, i.e., every given path is a sequence of edges with strictly increasing labels that denote availability in time. This type of temporal graphs represent train networks. We consider shifting operations on the labels of the paths that maintain their temporal continuity. This means that we can move the availability of a temporal edge later or earlier in time, and propagate the shifts to all other affected edges of the path in order to preserve its temporal connectivity. We study the parameterized complexity of the problem with respect to the number of paths k, and the total budget b, where b is the maximum number of shifts we are allowed to perform. Our results reveal that fixed parameter tractability can be achieved (1) when parameterized both by k and b, and (2) when parameterized by k, and b is unconstrained. In almost every other case, e.g., parameterized by a single parameter or parameterized by k, while having a bound on b, we establish intractability lower bounds that are matched by XP algorithms.

Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Robert Ganian et al.

In the coordinated motion planning problem, we are given a graph together with the starting and destination vertices of $k$ robots. At each time step, any subset of robots may move, each traversing an edge of the graph, provided that no two robots collide. The goal is to compute a schedule that routes all robots to their destinations while minimizing some objective function. In this paper, we focus on the well-studied objective of minimizing the total travel length of all robots. This problem is known to be NP-hard, and it has been shown to be fixed-parameter tractable (FPT), when parameterized by the number $k$ of robots, on full grids (SoCG 2023) and on bounded-treewidth graphs (ICALP 2024). We present a fixed-parameter algorithm for coordinated motion planning, parameterized by the number $k$ of robots, on graphs arising from discretizations of simple polygons. Such graphs are of particular interest in real-world applications, where planar motion is often constrained to discretized representations of polygonal environments. Moreover, these graphs generalize rectangular grids; consequently, our result constitutes a significant step toward resolving the parameterized complexity of coordinated motion planning on subgrids and, ultimately, planar graphs -- two prominent open problems in the field.

Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Alexandros Hollender et al.

We study the problem of computing a competitive equilibrium with approximately optimal bundles in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions, meaning that every buyer receives a $(1-δ)$-optimal bundle, instead of a perfectly optimal one. We establish the first intractability result for the problem by showing that it is PPAD-hard for some constant $δ> 0$, assuming the PCP-for-PPAD conjecture. This hardness result holds even if all buyers have identical budgets (competitive equilibrium with equal incomes), linear capped utilities, and even if we also allow $\varepsilon$-approximate clearing instead of perfect clearing, for any constant $\varepsilon < 1/9$. Importantly, we show that the PCP-for-PPAD conjecture is in fact required to show hardness for constant $δ$: showing PPAD-hardness for finding such approximate market equilibria in a broad class of markets encompassing those generated by our hardness result would prove the conjecture. This is the first natural problem where the conjecture is provably required to establish hardness for it.

Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Robert Ganian et al.

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of heterogeneous divisible resources among agents with different preferences. We focus on the setting where the resources correspond to the edges of a connected graph, every agent must be assigned a connected piece of this graph, and the fairness notion considered is the classical envy freeness. The problem is NP-complete, and we analyze its complexity with respect to two natural complexity measures: the number of agents and the number of edges in the graph. While the problem remains NP-hard even for instances with 2 agents, we provide a dichotomy characterizing the complexity of the problem when the number of agents is constant based on structural properties of the graph. For the latter case, we design a polynomial-time algorithm when the graph has a constant number of edges.

Alon Cohen, Moran Koren, Argyrios Deligkas

In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions her wage only on possible outcomes. In this work, we consider a model in which the principal is unaware of the agent's utility and action space: she sequentially offers contracts to identical agents, and observes the resulting outcomes. We present an algorithm for learning the optimal contract under mild assumptions. We bound the number of samples needed for the principal to obtain a contract that is within $\eps$ of her optimal net profit for every $\eps>0$. Our results are robust even when considering risk-averse agents. Furthermore, we show that when there are only two possible outcomes or the agent is risk-neutral, the algorithm's outcome approximates the optimal contract described in the classical theory.