Yuxin Chen

Jingnan Zheng, Yanzhen Luo, Jingjun Xu et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that operate in real-world environments, introducing safety risks beyond linguistic harm. Existing agent safety evaluations rely on risk-oriented tasks tailored to specific agent settings, resulting in limited coverage of safety risk space and failing to assess agent safety behavior during long-horizon, interactive task execution in complex real-world deployments. Moreover, their specialization to particular agent settings limits adaptability across diverse agent configurations. To address these limitations, we propose Risky-Bench, a framework that enables systematic agent safety evaluation grounded in real-world deployment. Risky-Bench organizes evaluation around domain-agnostic safety principles to derive context-aware safety rubrics that delineate safety space, and systematically evaluates safety risks across this space through realistic task execution under varying threat assumptions. When applied to life-assist agent settings, Risky-Bench uncovers substantial safety risks in state-of-the-art agents under realistic execution conditions. Moreover, as a well-structured evaluation pipeline, Risky-Bench is not confined to life-assist scenarios and can be adapted to other deployment settings to construct environment-specific safety evaluations, providing an extensible methodology for agent safety assessment.

Mengxuan Wang, Yuxin Chen, Gang Xu et al.

Vision language models (VLMs) extend the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to cross-modal settings, yet remain highly vulnerable to multimodal jailbreak attacks. Existing defenses predominantly rely on safety fine-tuning or aggressive token manipulations, incurring substantial training costs or significantly degrading utility. Recent research shows that LLMs inherently recognize unsafe content in text, and the incorporation of visual inputs in VLMs frequently dilutes risk-related signals. Motivated by this, we propose Risk Awareness Injection (RAI), a lightweight and training-free framework for safety calibration that restores LLM-like risk recognition by amplifying unsafe signals in VLMs. Specifically, RAI constructs an Unsafe Prototype Subspace from language embeddings and performs targeted modulation on selected high-risk visual tokens, explicitly activating safety-critical signals within the cross-modal feature space. This modulation restores the model's LLM-like ability to detect unsafe content from visual inputs, while preserving the semantic integrity of original tokens for cross-modal reasoning. Extensive experiments across multiple jailbreak and utility benchmarks demonstrate that RAI substantially reduces attack success rate without compromising task performance.

Zhiyuan Yao, Yi-Kai Zhang, Yuxin Chen et al.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a key approach for enhancing LLM reasoning. However, standard frameworks like Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) typically employ a uniform rollout budget, leading to resource inefficiency. Moreover, existing adaptive methods often rely on instance-level metrics, such as task pass rates, failing to capture the model's dynamic learning state. To address these limitations, we propose CoBA-RL, a reinforcement learning algorithm designed to adaptively allocate rollout budgets based on the model's evolving capability. Specifically, CoBA-RL utilizes a Capability-Oriented Value function to map tasks to their potential training gains and employs a heap-based greedy strategy to efficiently self-calibrate the distribution of computational resources to samples with high training value. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach effectively orchestrates the trade-off between exploration and exploitation, delivering consistent generalization improvements across multiple challenging benchmarks. These findings underscore that quantifying sample training value and optimizing budget allocation are pivotal for advancing LLM post-training efficiency.