Anshuman Suri

Yulong Tian, Fnu Suya, Anshuman Suri et al.

Transfer learning is a popular method for tuning pretrained (upstream) models for different downstream tasks using limited data and computational resources. We study how an adversary with control over an upstream model used in transfer learning can conduct property inference attacks on a victim's tuned downstream model. For example, to infer the presence of images of a specific individual in the downstream training set. We demonstrate attacks in which an adversary can manipulate the upstream model to conduct highly effective and specific property inference attacks (AUC score $> 0.9$), without incurring significant performance loss on the main task. The main idea of the manipulation is to make the upstream model generate activations (intermediate features) with different distributions for samples with and without a target property, thus enabling the adversary to distinguish easily between downstream models trained with and without training examples that have the target property. Our code is available at https://github.com/yulongt23/Transfer-Inference.

Anshuman Suri, Yifu Lu, Yanjin Chen et al.

A distribution inference attack aims to infer statistical properties of data used to train machine learning models. These attacks are sometimes surprisingly potent, but the factors that impact distribution inference risk are not well understood and demonstrated attacks often rely on strong and unrealistic assumptions such as full knowledge of training environments even in supposedly black-box threat scenarios. To improve understanding of distribution inference risks, we develop a new black-box attack that even outperforms the best known white-box attack in most settings. Using this new attack, we evaluate distribution inference risk while relaxing a variety of assumptions about the adversary's knowledge under black-box access, like known model architectures and label-only access. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of previously proposed defenses and introduce new defenses. We find that although noise-based defenses appear to be ineffective, a simple re-sampling defense can be highly effective. Code is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/dissecting_distribution_inference

Christina Baek, Ricardo Pio Monti, David Schwab et al.

Real-world model deployments demand strong performance on narrow domains where data is often scarce. Typically, practitioners finetune models to specialize them, but this risks overfitting to the domain and forgetting general knowledge. We study a simple strategy, specialized pretraining (SPT), where a small domain dataset, typically reserved for finetuning, is repeated starting from pretraining as a fraction of the total tokens. Across three specialized domains (ChemPile, MusicPile, and ProofPile), SPT improves domain performance and preserves general capabilities after finetuning compared to standard pretraining. In our experiments, SPT reduces the pretraining tokens needed to reach a given domain performance by up to 1.75x. These gains grow when the target domain is underrepresented in the pretraining corpus: on domains far from web text, a 1B SPT model outperforms a 3B standard pretrained model. Beyond these empirical gains, we derive overfitting scaling laws to guide practitioners in selecting the optimal domain-data repetition for a given pretraining compute budget. Our observations reveal the finetuner's fallacy: while finetuning may appear to be the cheapest path to domain adaptation, introducing specialized domain data during pretraining stretches its utility. SPT yields better specialized domain performance (via reduced overfitting across repeated exposures) and better general domain performance (via reduced forgetting during finetuning), ultimately achieving stronger results with fewer parameters and less total compute when amortized over inference. To get the most out of domain data, incorporate it as early in training as possible.

Anshuman Suri, Pallika Kanani, Virendra J. Marathe et al.

Privacy attacks on Machine Learning (ML) models often focus on inferring the existence of particular data points in the training data. However, what the adversary really wants to know is if a particular individual's (subject's) data was included during training. In such scenarios, the adversary is more likely to have access to the distribution of a particular subject than actual records. Furthermore, in settings like cross-silo Federated Learning (FL), a subject's data can be embodied by multiple data records that are spread across multiple organizations. Nearly all of the existing private FL literature is dedicated to studying privacy at two granularities -- item-level (individual data records), and user-level (participating user in the federation), neither of which apply to data subjects in cross-silo FL. This insight motivates us to shift our attention from the privacy of data records to the privacy of data subjects, also known as subject-level privacy. We propose two novel black-box attacks for subject membership inference, of which one assumes access to a model after each training round. Using these attacks, we estimate subject membership inference risk on real-world data for single-party models as well as FL scenarios. We find our attacks to be extremely potent, even without access to exact training records, and using the knowledge of membership for a handful of subjects. To better understand the various factors that may influence subject privacy risk in cross-silo FL settings, we systematically generate several hundred synthetic federation configurations, varying properties of the data, model design and training, and the federation itself. Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of Differential Privacy in mitigating this threat.

Ahmed Salem, Giovanni Cherubin, David Evans et al.

Deploying machine learning models in production may allow adversaries to infer sensitive information about training data. There is a vast literature analyzing different types of inference risks, ranging from membership inference to reconstruction attacks. Inspired by the success of games (i.e., probabilistic experiments) to study security properties in cryptography, some authors describe privacy inference risks in machine learning using a similar game-based style. However, adversary capabilities and goals are often stated in subtly different ways from one presentation to the other, which makes it hard to relate and compose results. In this paper, we present a game-based framework to systematize the body of knowledge on privacy inference risks in machine learning. We use this framework to (1) provide a unifying structure for definitions of inference risks, (2) formally establish known relations among definitions, and (3) to uncover hitherto unknown relations that would have been difficult to spot otherwise.

Valentin Hartmann, Anshuman Suri, Vincent Bindschaedler et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are advancing at a remarkable pace, with myriad applications under development. Unlike most earlier machine learning models, they are no longer built for one specific application but are designed to excel in a wide range of tasks. A major part of this success is due to their huge training datasets and the unprecedented number of model parameters, which allow them to memorize large amounts of information contained in the training data. This memorization goes beyond mere language, and encompasses information only present in a few documents. This is often desirable since it is necessary for performing tasks such as question answering, and therefore an important part of learning, but also brings a whole array of issues, from privacy and security to copyright and beyond. LLMs can memorize short secrets in the training data, but can also memorize concepts like facts or writing styles that can be expressed in text in many different ways. We propose a taxonomy for memorization in LLMs that covers verbatim text, facts, ideas and algorithms, writing styles, distributional properties, and alignment goals. We describe the implications of each type of memorization - both positive and negative - for model performance, privacy, security and confidentiality, copyright, and auditing, and ways to detect and prevent memorization. We further highlight the challenges that arise from the predominant way of defining memorization with respect to model behavior instead of model weights, due to LLM-specific phenomena such as reasoning capabilities or differences between decoding algorithms. Throughout the paper, we describe potential risks and opportunities arising from memorization in LLMs that we hope will motivate new research directions.

Michael Duan, Anshuman Suri, Niloofar Mireshghallah et al.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) attempt to predict whether a particular datapoint is a member of a target model's training data. Despite extensive research on traditional machine learning models, there has been limited work studying MIA on the pre-training data of large language models (LLMs). We perform a large-scale evaluation of MIAs over a suite of language models (LMs) trained on the Pile, ranging from 160M to 12B parameters. We find that MIAs barely outperform random guessing for most settings across varying LLM sizes and domains. Our further analyses reveal that this poor performance can be attributed to (1) the combination of a large dataset and few training iterations, and (2) an inherently fuzzy boundary between members and non-members. We identify specific settings where LLMs have been shown to be vulnerable to membership inference and show that the apparent success in such settings can be attributed to a distribution shift, such as when members and non-members are drawn from the seemingly identical domain but with different temporal ranges. We release our code and data as a unified benchmark package that includes all existing MIAs, supporting future work.

Luze Sun, Anshuman Suri, Harsh Chaudhari et al.

When practitioners fine-tune LLMs on unvetted datasets, an adversary can exploit the data supply chain through task-level poisoning: inserting a small number of crafted instruction-response pairs that cause the model to embed attacker-specified entities, such as a country, in outputs for a targeted task family while behaving normally elsewhere. We introduce PoisonForge, a benchmark that parameterizes this threat along four dimensions (bias type, poisoning mode, appearance count, and target output length) and evaluates 12 open-weight models (from 2B to 32B parameters) across five families under a primarily 1% poison budget. With only 10 poisoned examples among 1,000 fine-tuning examples, 11 of 12 models exceed a 70% attack success rate (ASR) in their most vulnerable configuration. Meanwhile, unintended leakage to non-target tasks remains below 0.5%, and models perform well on standard benchmarks. We analyze in detail the factors contributing to attack success. We observe that multiple appearances of an entity increase the ASR, the optimal poisoning mode depends on the semantic structure of the target entity, and ASR drops monotonically with the task output length. A correlation analysis and risk prediction model confirm that poisoning design choices, rather than model scale, are the primary causes of attack success, and that these patterns generalize to predict attack success on new tasks. We release all configurations, pipelines, and analysis code to support reproducible comparisons.

Fnu Suya, Anshuman Suri, Tingwei Zhang et al.

Numerous works study black-box attacks on image classifiers. However, these works make different assumptions on the adversary's knowledge and current literature lacks a cohesive organization centered around the threat model. To systematize knowledge in this area, we propose a taxonomy over the threat space spanning the axes of feedback granularity, the access of interactive queries, and the quality and quantity of the auxiliary data available to the attacker. Our new taxonomy provides three key insights. 1) Despite extensive literature, numerous under-explored threat spaces exist, which cannot be trivially solved by adapting techniques from well-explored settings. We demonstrate this by establishing a new state-of-the-art in the less-studied setting of access to top-k confidence scores by adapting techniques from well-explored settings of accessing the complete confidence vector, but show how it still falls short of the more restrictive setting that only obtains the prediction label, highlighting the need for more research. 2) Identification the threat model of different attacks uncovers stronger baselines that challenge prior state-of-the-art claims. We demonstrate this by enhancing an initially weaker baseline (under interactive query access) via surrogate models, effectively overturning claims in the respective paper. 3) Our taxonomy reveals interactions between attacker knowledge that connect well to related areas, such as model inversion and extraction attacks. We discuss how advances in other areas can enable potentially stronger black-box attacks. Finally, we emphasize the need for a more realistic assessment of attack success by factoring in local attack runtime. This approach reveals the potential for certain attacks to achieve notably higher success rates and the need to evaluate attacks in diverse and harder settings, highlighting the need for better selection criteria.

DatologyAI, Aldo Gael Carranza, Kaleigh Mentzer et al.

Multilinguality is a core capability for modern foundation models, yet training high-quality multilingual models remains challenging due to uneven data availability across languages. A further challenge is the performance interference that can arise from joint multilingual training, commonly referred to as the "curse of multilinguality". We study multilingual data curation across thirteen languages and find that many reported regressions are not inherent to multilingual scaling but instead stem from correctable deficiencies in data quality and composition rather than fundamental capacity limits. In controlled bilingual experiments, improving data quality for any single language benefits others: curating English improves non-English performance in 12 of 13 languages, while curating non-English yields reciprocal improvements in English. Bespoke per-language curation produces substantially larger within-language improvements. Extending these findings to large-scale general-purpose training mixtures, we show that curated multilingual allocations comprising under 8% of total tokens remain remarkably effective. We operationalize this approach within an effort that produced a 20T-token pretraining corpus derived entirely from public sources. Models with 3B and 8B parameters trained on a 1T-token random subset achieve competitive multilingual accuracy with 4-10x fewer training FLOPs than strong public baselines, establishing a new Pareto frontier in multilingual performance versus compute. Moreover, these benefits extend to frontier model scale: the 20T-token corpus served as part of the pretraining dataset for Trinity Large (400B/A13B), which exhibits strong multilingual performance relative to its training FLOPs. These results show that targeted, per-language data curation mitigates multilingual interference and enables compute-efficient multilingual scaling.

Ali Naseh, Yuefeng Peng, Anshuman Suri et al.

Text-to-image (T2I) models are increasingly popular, producing a large share of AI-generated images online. To compare model quality, voting-based leaderboards have become the standard, relying on anonymized model outputs for fairness. In this work, we show that such anonymity can be easily broken. We find that generations from each T2I model form distinctive clusters in the image embedding space, enabling accurate deanonymization without prompt control or training data. Using 22 models and 280 prompts (150K images), our centroid-based method achieves high accuracy and reveals systematic model-specific signatures. We further introduce a prompt-level distinguishability metric and conduct large-scale analyses showing how certain prompts can lead to near-perfect distinguishability. Our findings expose fundamental security flaws in T2I leaderboards and motivate stronger anonymization defenses.

Siddharth Joshi, Haoli Yin, Rishabh Adiga et al.

Data curation has shifted the quality-compute frontier for language-model and contrastive image-text pretraining, but its role for vision-language models (VLMs) is far less established. We ask how far data curation alone can take VLM performance, holding architecture, training recipe, and compute fixed and varying only the training data. Our pipeline, applied to the MAmmoTH-VL single-image subset, lifts performance by +11.7pp on average across 20 public VLM benchmarks (spanning grounding, VQA, OCR/documents, captioning, spatial/3D, counting, charts, math, brand-ID, and multi-image reasoning) and by +11.3pp on average across all nine capability axes of DatBench, our high-fidelity VLM eval suite. At 2B, our curated model surpasses InternVL3.5-2B by 9.9pp at ~17x less training compute and closes the gap to Qwen3-VL-2B to within 1.8pp at ~87x less compute, from pretraining alone. Beyond accuracy, curation delivers four further properties: (1) Reliability: per-capability std across training seeds drops by ~67% and the lift survives a 4k-to-16k context-length sweep; (2) OOD generalization: the 9-eval OOD average rises by +7.2pp, and multi-image BLINK rises by +3.09pp despite single-image-only training, with Visual Correspondence gaining +11.8pp; (3) Behavioral gains beyond benchmarks: across ~1,100 open-ended queries the curated 2B is more honest and more specific than the matched-compute baseline, and more concise and less refusal-prone than a frontier 2B reference; (4) Pareto-dominance on inference cost: at every scale (1B, 2B, 4B) the curated model raises accuracy while lowering response FLOPs vs. the matched-compute baseline, and the curated 4B matches near-frontier accuracy at 3.3x lower response FLOPs than Qwen3-VL-4B. Data curation is a high-leverage tool for building better VLMs, reaching near-frontier accuracy at up to ~150x less training compute.

Anshuman Suri, David Evans

Distribution inference, sometimes called property inference, infers statistical properties about a training set from access to a model trained on that data. Distribution inference attacks can pose serious risks when models are trained on private data, but are difficult to distinguish from the intrinsic purpose of statistical machine learning -- namely, to produce models that capture statistical properties about a distribution. Motivated by Yeom et al.'s membership inference framework, we propose a formal definition of distribution inference attacks that is general enough to describe a broad class of attacks distinguishing between possible training distributions. We show how our definition captures previous ratio-based property inference attacks as well as new kinds of attack including revealing the average node degree or clustering coefficient of a training graph. To understand distribution inference risks, we introduce a metric that quantifies observed leakage by relating it to the leakage that would occur if samples from the training distribution were provided directly to the adversary. We report on a series of experiments across a range of different distributions using both novel black-box attacks and improved versions of the state-of-the-art white-box attacks. Our results show that inexpensive attacks are often as effective as expensive meta-classifier attacks, and that there are surprising asymmetries in the effectiveness of attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/FormEstDistRisks

Anshuman Suri, David Evans

Despite vast research in adversarial examples, the root causes of model susceptibility are not well understood. Instead of looking at attack-specific robustness, we propose a notion that evaluates the sensitivity of individual neurons in terms of how robust the model's output is to direct perturbations of that neuron's output. Analyzing models from this perspective reveals distinctive characteristics of standard as well as adversarially-trained robust models, and leads to several curious results. In our experiments on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, we find that attacks using a loss function that targets just a single sensitive neuron find adversarial examples nearly as effectively as ones that target the full model. We analyze the properties of these sensitive neurons to propose a regularization term that can help a model achieve robustness to a variety of different perturbation constraints while maintaining accuracy on natural data distributions. Code for all our experiments is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/sauron .

Parag Agrawal, Anshuman Suri

Existing Machine Learning techniques yield close to human performance on text-based classification tasks. However, the presence of multi-modal noise in chat data such as emoticons, slang, spelling mistakes, code-mixed data, etc. makes existing deep-learning solutions perform poorly. The inability of deep-learning systems to robustly capture these covariates puts a cap on their performance. We propose NELEC: Neural and Lexical Combiner, a system which elegantly combines textual and deep-learning based methods for sentiment classification. We evaluate our system as part of the third task of 'Contextual Emotion Detection in Text' as part of SemEval-2019. Our system performs significantly better than the baseline, as well as our deep-learning model benchmarks. It achieved a micro-averaged F1 score of 0.7765, ranking 3rd on the test-set leader-board. Our code is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/nelec

Shuyi Lin, Anshuman Suri, Alina Oprea et al.

LLM agents emit actions, not just text, and once taken, those actions often cannot be undone. Yet today's agent-safety evaluations run greedy or a few sampled rollouts and report a single safe/unsafe rate -- blind to the long-tail trajectories where unsafe behavior may arise from low-probability but non-negligible actions. We argue agent safety should be measured by search, not sampling. We apply BOA, a framework that, given a deployment configuration (model, decoder, prompt, environment, judger, likelihood budget), searches the in-budget trajectory space and reports a safety score: the probability the agent stays safe under the configuration. BOA searches both within a single LLM round and across the agent-environment interaction tree under a given likelihood budget, and makes search practical via batched decoding/judging, prefix caching, and chunked tree expansion. On agent-safety workloads, BOA discovers unsafe trajectories that greedy and sampled evaluations miss. BOA can additionally be used for ranking models, defenses, and attacks, all on the same scale, with manageable GPU costs.

Ali Naseh, Yuefeng Peng, Anshuman Suri et al.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate grounded responses by leveraging external knowledge databases without altering model parameters. Although the absence of weight tuning prevents leakage via model parameters, it introduces the risk of inference adversaries exploiting retrieved documents in the model's context. Existing methods for membership inference and data extraction often rely on jailbreaking or carefully crafted unnatural queries, which can be easily detected or thwarted with query rewriting techniques common in RAG systems. In this work, we present Interrogation Attack (IA), a membership inference technique targeting documents in the RAG datastore. By crafting natural-text queries that are answerable only with the target document's presence, our approach demonstrates successful inference with just 30 queries while remaining stealthy; straightforward detectors identify adversarial prompts from existing methods up to ~76x more frequently than those generated by our attack. We observe a 2x improvement in TPR@1%FPR over prior inference attacks across diverse RAG configurations, all while costing less than $0.02 per document inference.

Georgios Syros, Anshuman Suri, Jacob Ginesin et al.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents increasingly interact, collaborate, and delegate tasks to one another autonomously with minimal human interaction. Industry guidelines for agentic system governance emphasize the need for users to maintain comprehensive control over their agents, mitigating potential damage from malicious agents. Several proposed agentic system designs address agent identity, authorization, and delegation, but remain purely theoretical, without concrete implementation and evaluation. Most importantly, they do not provide user-controlled agent management. To address this gap, we propose SAGA, a scalable Security Architecture for Governing Agentic systems, that offers user oversight over their agents' lifecycle. In our design, users register their agents with a central entity, the Provider, that maintains agent contact information, user-defined access control policies, and helps agents enforce these policies on inter-agent communication. We introduce a cryptographic mechanism for deriving access control tokens, that offers fine-grained control over an agent's interaction with other agents, providing formal security guarantees. We evaluate SAGA on several agentic tasks, using agents in different geolocations, and multiple on-device and cloud LLMs, demonstrating minimal performance overhead with no impact on underlying task utility in a wide range of conditions. Our architecture enables secure and trustworthy deployment of autonomous agents, accelerating the responsible adoption of this technology in sensitive environments.

Anshuman Suri, Harsh Chaudhari, Yuefeng Peng et al.

While poisoning attacks on machine learning models have been extensively studied, the mechanisms by which adversaries can distribute poisoned models at scale remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we shed light on how model leaderboards -- ranked platforms for model discovery and evaluation -- can serve as a powerful channel for adversaries for stealthy large-scale distribution of poisoned models. We present TrojanClimb, a general framework that enables injection of malicious behaviors while maintaining competitive leaderboard performance. We demonstrate its effectiveness across four diverse modalities: text-embedding, text-generation, text-to-speech and text-to-image, showing that adversaries can successfully achieve high leaderboard rankings while embedding arbitrary harmful functionalities, from backdoors to bias injection. Our findings reveal a significant vulnerability in the machine learning ecosystem, highlighting the urgent need to redesign leaderboard evaluation mechanisms to detect and filter malicious (e.g., poisoned) models, while exposing broader security implications for the machine learning community regarding the risks of adopting models from unverified sources.

Shuyi Lin, Anshuman Suri, Alina Oprea et al.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, the lack of systematic methods to assess their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks presents a critical security gap. We introduce the jailbreak oracle problem: given a model, prompt, and decoding strategy, determine whether a jailbreak response can be generated with likelihood exceeding a specified threshold. This formalization enables a principled study of jailbreak vulnerabilities. Answering the jailbreak oracle problem poses significant computational challenges -- the search space grows exponentially with the length of the response tokens. We present Boa, the first efficient algorithm for solving the jailbreak oracle problem. Boa employs a three-phase search strategy: (1) constructing block lists to identify refusal patterns, (2) breadth-first sampling to identify easily accessible jailbreaks, and (3) depth-first priority search guided by fine-grained safety scores to systematically explore promising low-probability paths. Boa enables rigorous security assessments including systematic defense evaluation, standardized comparison of red team attacks, and model certification under extreme adversarial conditions.

Georgios Syros, Anshuman Suri, Farinaz Koushanfar et al.

Federated Learning is vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, where malicious clients can inject poisoned updates to influence the global model's behavior. While existing defense mechanisms have made notable progress, they fail to protect against adversaries that aim to induce targeted backdoors under different learning and attack configurations. To address this limitation, we introduce DROP (Distillation-based Reduction Of Poisoning), a novel defense mechanism that combines clustering and activity-tracking techniques with extraction of benign behavior from clients via knowledge distillation to tackle stealthy adversaries that manipulate low data poisoning rates and diverse malicious client ratios within the federation. Through extensive experimentation, our approach demonstrates superior robustness compared to existing defenses across a wide range of learning configurations. Finally, we evaluate existing defenses and our method under the challenging setting of non-IID client data distribution and highlight the challenges of designing a resilient FL defense in this setting.

Ali Naseh, Anshuman Suri, Yuefeng Peng et al.

Generative AI leaderboards are central to evaluating model capabilities, but remain vulnerable to manipulation. Among key adversarial objectives is rank manipulation, where an attacker must first deanonymize the models behind displayed outputs -- a threat previously demonstrated and explored for large language models (LLMs). We show that this problem can be even more severe for text-to-image leaderboards, where deanonymization is markedly easier. Using over 150,000 generated images from 280 prompts and 19 diverse models spanning multiple organizations, architectures, and sizes, we demonstrate that simple real-time classification in CLIP embedding space identifies the generating model with high accuracy, even without prompt control or historical data. We further introduce a prompt-level separability metric and identify prompts that enable near-perfect deanonymization. Our results indicate that rank manipulation in text-to-image leaderboards is easier than previously recognized, underscoring the need for stronger defenses.

Anshuman Suri, Xiao Zhang, David Evans

Membership inference attacks are used as a key tool for disclosure auditing. They aim to infer whether an individual record was used to train a model. While such evaluations are useful to demonstrate risk, they are computationally expensive and often make strong assumptions about potential adversaries' access to models and training environments, and thus do not provide tight bounds on leakage from potential attacks. We show how prior claims around black-box access being sufficient for optimal membership inference do not hold for stochastic gradient descent, and that optimal membership inference indeed requires white-box access. Our theoretical results lead to a new white-box inference attack, IHA (Inverse Hessian Attack), that explicitly uses model parameters by taking advantage of computing inverse-Hessian vector products. Our results show that both auditors and adversaries may be able to benefit from access to model parameters, and we advocate for further research into white-box methods for membership inference.

Anshuman Suri, David Evans

Property inference attacks reveal statistical properties about a training set but are difficult to distinguish from the primary purposes of statistical machine learning, which is to produce models that capture statistical properties about a distribution. Motivated by Yeom et al.'s membership inference framework, we propose a formal and generic definition of property inference attacks. The proposed notion describes attacks that can distinguish between possible training distributions, extending beyond previous property inference attacks that infer the ratio of a particular type of data in the training data set. In this paper, we show how our definition captures previous property inference attacks as well as a new attack that reveals the average degree of nodes of a training graph and report on experiments giving insight into the potential risks of property inference attacks.

Fnu Suya, Saeed Mahloujifar, Anshuman Suri et al.

In a poisoning attack, an adversary with control over a small fraction of the training data attempts to select that data in a way that induces a corrupted model that misbehaves in favor of the adversary. We consider poisoning attacks against convex machine learning models and propose an efficient poisoning attack designed to induce a specified model. Unlike previous model-targeted poisoning attacks, our attack comes with provable convergence to {\it any} attainable target classifier. The distance from the induced classifier to the target classifier is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of poisoning points. We also provide a lower bound on the minimum number of poisoning points needed to achieve a given target classifier. Our method uses online convex optimization, so finds poisoning points incrementally. This provides more flexibility than previous attacks which require a priori assumption about the number of poisoning points. Our attack is the first model-targeted poisoning attack that provides provable convergence for convex models, and in our experiments, it either exceeds or matches state-of-the-art attacks in terms of attack success rate and distance to the target model.

Parag Agrawal, Tulasi Menon, Aya Kamel et al.

Having a bot for seamless conversations is a much-desired feature that products and services today seek for their websites and mobile apps. These bots help reduce traffic received by human support significantly by handling frequent and directly answerable known questions. Many such services have huge reference documents such as FAQ pages, which makes it hard for users to browse through this data. A conversation layer over such raw data can lower traffic to human support by a great margin. We demonstrate QnAMaker, a service that creates a conversational layer over semi-structured data such as FAQ pages, product manuals, and support documents. QnAMaker is the popular choice for Extraction and Question-Answering as a service and is used by over 15,000 bots in production. It is also used by search interfaces and not just bots.

Parag Agrawal, Anshuman Suri, Tulasi Menon

Most often, chat-bots are built to solve the purpose of a search engine or a human assistant: Their primary goal is to provide information to the user or help them complete a task. However, these chat-bots are incapable of responding to unscripted queries like "Hi, what's up", "What's your favourite food". Human evaluation judgments show that 4 humans come to a consensus on the intent of a given query which is from chat domain only 77% of the time, thus making it evident how non-trivial this task is. In our work, we show why it is difficult to break the chitchat space into clearly defined intents. We propose a system to handle this task in chat-bots, keeping in mind scalability, interpretability, appropriateness, trustworthiness, relevance and coverage. Our work introduces a pipeline for query understanding in chitchat using hierarchical intents as well as a way to use seq-seq auto-generation models in professional bots. We explore an interpretable model for chat domain detection and also show how various components such as adult/offensive classification, grammars/regex patterns, curated personality based responses, generic guided evasive responses and response generation models can be combined in a scalable way to solve this problem.

Deepak Vijaykeerthy, Anshuman Suri, Sameep Mehta et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to malicious inputs crafted by an adversary to produce erroneous outputs. Works on securing neural networks against adversarial examples achieve high empirical robustness on simple datasets such as MNIST. However, these techniques are inadequate when empirically tested on complex data sets such as CIFAR-10 and SVHN. Further, existing techniques are designed to target specific attacks and fail to generalize across attacks. We propose the Adversarial Model Cascades (AMC) as a way to tackle the above inadequacies. Our approach trains a cascade of models sequentially where each model is optimized to be robust towards a mixture of multiple attacks. Ultimately, it yields a single model which is secure against a wide range of attacks; namely FGSM, Elastic, Virtual Adversarial Perturbations and Madry. On an average, AMC increases the model's empirical robustness against various attacks simultaneously, by a significant margin (of 6.225% for MNIST, 5.075% for SVHN and 2.65% for CIFAR10). At the same time, the model's performance on non-adversarial inputs is comparable to the state-of-the-art models.