Zekeriya Erkin

Florine W. Dekker, Zekeriya Erkin, Mauro Conti

Decentralised learning has recently gained traction as an alternative to federated learning in which both data and coordination are distributed. To preserve the confidentiality of users' data, decentralised learning relies on differential privacy, multi-party computation, or both. However, running multiple privacy-preserving summations in sequence may allow adversaries to perform reconstruction attacks. Current reconstruction countermeasures either cannot trivially be adapted to the distributed setting, or add excessive amounts of noise. In this work, we first show that passive honest-but-curious adversaries can infer other users' private data after several privacy-preserving summations. For example, in subgraphs with 18 users, we show that only three passive honest-but-curious adversaries succeed at reconstructing private data 11.0% of the time, requiring an average of 8.8 summations per adversary. The success rate depends only on the adversaries' direct neighbourhood, and is independent of the size of the full network. We consider weak adversaries that do not control the graph topology, cannot exploit the summation's inner workings, and do not have auxiliary knowledge; and show that these adversaries can still infer private data. We analyse how reconstruction relates to topology and propose the first topology-based decentralised defence against reconstruction attacks. We show that reconstruction requires a number of adversaries linear in the length of the network's shortest cycle. Consequently, exact attacks over privacy-preserving summations are impossible in acyclic networks. Our work is a stepping stone for a formal theory of topology-based decentralised reconstruction defences. Such a theory would generalise our countermeasure beyond summation, define confidentiality in terms of entropy, and describe the interactions with (topology-aware) differential privacy.

Daniël Vos, Jelle Vos, Tianyu Li et al.

Decision trees are interpretable models that are well-suited to non-linear learning problems. Much work has been done on extending decision tree learning algorithms with differential privacy, a system that guarantees the privacy of samples within the training data. However, current state-of-the-art algorithms for this purpose sacrifice much utility for a small privacy benefit. These solutions create random decision nodes that reduce decision tree accuracy or spend an excessive share of the privacy budget on labeling leaves. Moreover, many works do not support continuous features or leak information about them. We propose a new method called PrivaTree based on private histograms that chooses good splits while consuming a small privacy budget. The resulting trees provide a significantly better privacy-utility trade-off and accept mixed numerical and categorical data without leaking information about numerical features. Finally, while it is notoriously hard to give robustness guarantees against data poisoning attacks, we demonstrate bounds for the expected accuracy and success rates of backdoor attacks against differentially-private learners. By leveraging the better privacy-utility trade-off of PrivaTree we are able to train decision trees with significantly better robustness against backdoor attacks compared to regular decision trees and with meaningful theoretical guarantees.

Oguzhan Ersoy, Stefanie Roos, Zekeriya Erkin

Payment channel networks like Bitcoin's Lightning network are an auspicious approach for realizing high transaction throughput and almost-instant confirmations in blockchain networks. However, the ability to successfully make payments in such networks relies on the willingness of participants to lock collateral in the network. In Lightning, the key financial incentive is to lock collateral are small fees for routing payments for other participants. While users can choose these fees, currently, they mainly stick to the default fees. By providing insights on beneficial choices for fees, we aim to incentivize users to lock more collateral and improve the effectiveness of the network. In this paper, we consider a node $\mathbf{A}$ that given the network topology and the channel details selects where to establish channels and how much fee to charge such that its financial gain is maximized. We formalize the optimization problem and show that it is NP-hard. We design a greedy algorithm to approximate the optimal solution. In each step, our greedy algorithm selects a node which maximizes the total reward concerning the number of shortest paths passing through $\mathbf{A}$ and channel fees. Our simulation study leverages real-world data set to quantify the impact of our gain optimization and indicates that our strategy is at least a factor two better than other strategies.

Daniël Vos, Leon Overweel, Wouter Raateland et al.

Millions of shipping containers filled with goods move around the world every day. Before such a container may enter a trade bloc, the customs agency of the goods' destination country must ensure that it does not contain illegal or mislabeled goods. Due to the high volume of containers, customs agencies make a selection of containers to audit through a risk analysis procedure. Customs agencies perform risk analysis using data sourced from a centralized system that is potentially vulnerable to manipulation and malpractice. Therefore we propose an alternative: DEFenD, a decentralized system that stores data about goods and containers in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. In our system, economic operators make claims to the network about goods they insert into or remove from containers, and encrypt these claims so that they can only be read by the destination country's customs agency. Economic operators also make unencrypted claims about containers with which they interact. Unencrypted claims can be validated by the entire network of customs agencies. Our key contribution is a data partitioning scheme and several protocols that enable such a system to utilize blockchain and its powerful validation principle, while also preserving the privacy of the involved economic operators. Using our protocol, customs agencies can improve their risk analysis and economic operators can get through customs with less delay. We also present a reference implementation built with Hyperledger Fabric and analyze to what extent our implementation meets the requirements in terms of privacy-preservation, security, scalability, and decentralization.

Oguzhan Ersoy, Zhijie Ren, Zekeriya Erkin et al.

Existing permissionless blockchain solutions rely on peer-to-peer propagation mechanisms, where nodes in a network transfer transaction they received to their neighbors. Unfortunately, there is no explicit incentive for such transaction propagation. Therefore, existing propagation mechanisms will not be sustainable in a fully decentralized blockchain with rational nodes. In this work, we formally define the problem of incentivizing nodes for transaction propagation. We propose an incentive mechanism where each node involved in the propagation of a transaction receives a share of the transaction fee. We also show that our proposal is Sybil-proof. Furthermore, we combine the incentive mechanism with smart routing to reduce the communication and storage costs at the same time. The proposed routing mechanism reduces the redundant transaction propagation from the size of the network to a factor of average shortest path length. The routing mechanism is built upon a specific type of consensus protocol where the round leader who creates the transaction block is known in advance. Note that our routing mechanism is a generic one and can be adopted independently from the incentive mechanism.