Leo Richter

2papers

2 Papers

7.5AIFeb 6
Agentic Uncertainty Reveals Agentic Overconfidence

Jean Kaddour, Srijan Patel, Gbètondji Dovonon et al.

Can AI agents predict whether they will succeed at a task? We study agentic uncertainty by eliciting success probability estimates before, during, and after task execution. All results exhibit agentic overconfidence: some agents that succeed only 22% of the time predict 77% success. Counterintuitively, pre-execution assessment with strictly less information tends to yield better discrimination than standard post-execution review, though differences are not always significant. Adversarial prompting reframing assessment as bug-finding achieves the best calibration.

7.3CRJul 15
Plausible Deniability Guarantees for Whistleblowers

Leo Richter, Matt J. Kusner

Whistleblowers are a key safeguard against organizational wrongdoing, but the threat of retaliation deters reporting. Existing whistleblower-protection proposals lack formal privacy guarantees, and existing differential privacy mechanisms do not directly target the natural threat model -- one in which the audited organization itself observes auditor selection decisions and uses them to identify reporters. We formalize protection against a strong-adversary threat model as per-report $(0, δ)$-differential privacy on the transcript of audit selections. Within this framework we prove that a natural approach -- randomized response applied at the selection step -- can never outperform uniform random auditing by more than $δ$ at any horizon. We then give a generic mechanism that reduces private auditing to private continual counting: any $(0, δ)$-DP continual counter plugs in by post-processing, and the audit transcript inherits the same per-report guarantee. Instantiating the reduction with a recent work in continual counting yields per-report $(0, δ)$-DP with noise scaling as $O(\sqrt{\log T})$ across a horizon of $T$ audit decisions. A utility theorem shows that the selection error vanishes whenever the noisy report gap between the most-reported organization and the runner-up grows faster than $\sqrt{\log T}$. Simulations show a substantial improvement over randomized response.