N. Benjamin Erichson

Soon Hoe Lim, Shizheng Lin, Michael W. Mahoney et al.

Flow matching (FM) is increasingly used for time-series generation, but it is not well understood whether it learns a general dynamical structure or simply performs an effective "trajectory replay". We study this question by deriving the velocity field targeted by the empirical FM objective on sequential data, in the limit of perfect function approximation. For the Gaussian conditional paths commonly used in practice, we show that the implied sampler is an ODE whose dynamics constitutes a nonparametric, memory-augmented continuous-time dynamical system. The optimal field admits a closed-form expression as a similarity-weighted mixture of instantaneous velocities induced by past transitions, making the dataset dependence explicit and interpretable. This perspective positions neural FM models trained by stochastic optimization as parametric surrogates of an ideal nonparametric solution. Using the structure of the optimal field, we study sampling and approximation schemes that improve the efficiency and numerical robustness of ODE-based generation. On nonlinear dynamical system benchmarks, the resulting closed-form sampler yields strong probabilistic forecasts directly from historical transitions, without training.

Yu Fu, Haz Sameen Shahgir, Huanli Gong et al.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly combine long-context processing with advanced reasoning, enabling them to retrieve and synthesize information distributed across tens of thousands of tokens. A hypothesis is that stronger reasoning capability should improve safety by helping models recognize harmful intent even when it is not stated explicitly. We test this hypothesis in long-context settings where harmful intent is implicit and must be inferred through reasoning, and find that it does not hold. We introduce compositional reasoning attacks, a new threat model in which a harmful query is decomposed into incomplete fragments that scattered throughout a long context. The model is then prompted with a neutral reasoning query that induces retrieval and synthesis, causing the harmful intent to emerge only after composition. Evaluating 14 frontier LLMs on contexts up to 64k tokens, we uncover three findings: (1) models with stronger general reasoning capability are not more robust to compositional reasoning attacks, often assembling the intent yet failing to refuse; (2) safety alignment consistently degrades as context length increases; and (3) inference-time reasoning effort is a key mitigating factor: increasing inference-time compute reduces attack success by over 50 percentage points on GPT-oss-120b model. Together, these results suggest that safety does not automatically scale with reasoning capability, especially under long-context inference.