Mario Giulianelli

Raghu Arghal, Fade Chen, Niall Dalton et al.

Understanding an agent's goals helps explain and predict its behaviour, yet there is no established methodology for reliably attributing goals to agentic systems. We propose a framework for evaluating goal-directedness that integrates behavioural evaluation with interpretability-based analyses of models' internal representations. As a case study, we examine an LLM agent navigating a 2D grid world toward a goal state. Behaviourally, we evaluate the agent against an optimal policy across varying grid sizes, obstacle densities, and goal structures, finding that performance scales with task difficulty while remaining robust to difficulty-preserving transformations and complex goal structures. We then use probing methods to decode the agent's internal representations of the environment state and its multi-step action plans. We find that the LLM agent non-linearly encodes a coarse spatial map of the environment, preserving approximate task-relevant cues about its position and the goal location; that its actions are broadly consistent with these internal representations; and that reasoning reorganises them, shifting from broader environment structural cues toward information supporting immediate action selection. Our findings support the view that introspective examination is required beyond behavioural evaluations to characterise how agents represent and pursue their objectives.

Gonçalo Guiomar, Elia Torre, Pehuen Moure et al.

Do language models make decisions under uncertainty like humans do, and what role does chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning play in the underlying decision process? We introduce an active probabilistic reasoning task that cleanly separates sampling (actively acquiring evidence) from inference (integrating evidence toward a decision). Benchmarking humans and a broad set of contemporary large language models against near-optimal reference policies reveals a consistent pattern: extended reasoning is the key determinant of strong performance, driving large gains in inference and producing belief trajectories that become strikingly human-like, while yielding only modest improvements in active sampling. To explain these differences, we fit a mechanistic model that captures systematic deviations from optimal behavior via four interpretable latent variables: memory, strategy, choice bias, and occlusion awareness. This model places humans and models in a shared low-dimensional cognitive space, reproduces behavioral signatures across agents, and shows how chain-of-thought shifts language models toward human-like regimes of evidence accumulation and belief-to-choice mapping, tightening alignment in inference while leaving a persistent gap in information acquisition.