Kun Wang

Haolang Lu, Hongrui Peng, WeiYe Fu et al.

Failures in large language models (LLMs) are often analyzed from a behavioral perspective, where incorrect outputs in factual question answering are commonly associated with missing knowledge. In this work, focusing on entity-based factual queries, we suggest that such a view may conflate different failure mechanisms, and propose an internal, mechanism-oriented perspective that separates Knowledge Existence from Behavior Expression. Under this formulation, hallucination and deception correspond to two qualitatively different failure modes that may appear similar at the output level but differ in their underlying mechanisms. To study this distinction, we construct a controlled environment for entity-centric factual questions in which knowledge is preserved while behavioral expression is selectively altered, enabling systematic analysis of four behavioral cases. We analyze these failure modes through representation separability, sparse interpretability, and inference-time activation steering.

Jing Tang, Kun Wang, Haolang Lu et al.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) in long chain-of-thought reasoning often fail when different knowledge sources provide conflicting signals. We formalize these failures under a unified notion of knowledge conflict, distinguishing input-level objective conflict from process-level effective conflict. Through probing internal representations, we reveal that: (I) Linear Separability: different conflict types are explicitly encoded as linearly separable features rather than entangled; (II) Depth Localization: conflict signals concentrate in mid-to-late layers, indicating a distinct processing stage for conflict encoding; (III) Hierarchical Consistency: aggregating noisy token-level signals along trajectories robustly recovers input-level conflict types; and (IV) Directional Asymmetry: reinforcing the model's implicit source preference under conflict is far easier than enforcing the opposite source. Our findings provide a mechanism-level view of multimodal reasoning under knowledge conflict and enable principled diagnosis and control of long-CoT failures.

Zhenhong Zhou, Yuanhe Zhang, Hongwei Cai et al.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes tool use for LLM-based agents and enable third-party servers. This openness introduces a security misalignment: agents implicitly trust tools exposed by potentially untrusted MCP servers. However, despite its excellent utility, existing agents typically offer limited validation for third-party MCP servers. As a result, agents remain vulnerable to MCP-based attacks that exploit the misalignment between agents and servers throughout the tool invocation lifecycle. In this paper, we propose MCPShield as a plug-in security cognition layer that mitigates this misalignment and ensures agent security when invoking MCP-based tools. Drawing inspiration from human experience-driven tool validation, MCPShield assists agent forms security cognition with metadata-guided probing before invocation. Our method constrains execution within controlled boundaries while cognizing runtime events, and subsequently updates security cognition by reasoning over historical traces after invocation, building on human post-use reflection on tool behavior. Experiments demonstrate that MCPShield exhibits strong generalization in defending against six novel MCP-based attack scenarios across six widely used agentic LLMs, while avoiding false positives on benign servers and incurring low deployment overhead. Overall, our work provides a practical and robust security safeguard for MCP-based tool invocation in open agent ecosystems.