Omer Madmon

Eilam Shapira, Omer Madmon, Reut Apel et al.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have spurred interest in designing LLM-based agents for tasks that involve interaction with human and artificial agents. This paper addresses a key aspect in the design of such agents: predicting human decisions in off-policy evaluation (OPE). We focus on language-based persuasion games, where an expert aims to influence the decision-maker through verbal messages. In our OPE framework, the prediction model is trained on human interaction data collected from encounters with one set of expert agents, and its performance is evaluated on interactions with a different set of experts. Using a dedicated application, we collected a dataset of 87K decisions from humans playing a repeated decision-making game with artificial agents. To enhance off-policy performance, we propose a simulation technique involving interactions across the entire agent space and simulated decision-makers. Our learning strategy yields significant OPE gains, e.g., improving prediction accuracy in the top 15% challenging cases by 7.1%. Our code and the large dataset we collected and generated are submitted as supplementary material and publicly available in our GitHub repository: https://github.com/eilamshapira/HumanChoicePrediction

Eilam Shapira, Omer Madmon, Roi Reichart et al.

Human choice prediction in economic contexts is crucial for applications in marketing, finance, public policy, and more. This task, however, is often constrained by the difficulties in acquiring human choice data. With most experimental economics studies focusing on simple choice settings, the AI community has explored whether LLMs can substitute for humans in these predictions and examined more complex experimental economics settings. However, a key question remains: can LLMs generate training data for human choice prediction? We explore this in language-based persuasion games, a complex economic setting involving natural language in strategic interactions. Our experiments show that models trained on LLM-generated data can effectively predict human behavior in these games and even outperform models trained on actual human data. Beyond data generation, we investigate the dual role of LLMs as both data generators and predictors, introducing a comprehensive empirical study on the effectiveness of utilizing LLMs for data generation, human choice prediction, or both. We then utilize our choice prediction framework to analyze how strategic factors shape decision-making, showing that interaction history (rather than linguistic sentiment alone) plays a key role in predicting human decision-making in repeated interactions. Particularly, when LLMs capture history-dependent decision patterns similarly to humans, their predictive success improves substantially. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our findings across alternative persuasion-game settings, highlighting the broader potential of using LLM-generated data to model human decision-making.

Boaz Taitler, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz et al.

As GenAI platforms grow, their dependence on content from competing providers, combined with access to alternative data sources, creates new challenges for data-sharing decisions. In this paper, we provide a model of data sharing between a content creation firm and a GenAI platform that can also acquire content from third-party experts. The interaction is modeled as a Stackelberg game: the firm first decides how much of its proprietary dataset to share with GenAI, and GenAI subsequently determines how much additional data to acquire from external experts. Their utilities depend on user traffic, monetary transfers, and the cost of acquiring additional data from external experts. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and uncover a surprising phenomenon: The firm may be willing to pay GenAI to share the firm's own data, leading to a costly data-sharing equilibrium. We further characterize the set of Pareto improving data prices, and show that such improvements occur only when the firm pays to share data. Finally, we study how the price can be set to optimize different design objectives, such as promoting firm data sharing, expert data acquisition, or a balance of both. Our results shed light on the economic forces shaping data-sharing partnerships in the age of GenAI, and provide guidance for platforms, regulators and policymakers seeking to design effective data exchange mechanisms.

Tommy Mordo, Sagie Dekel, Omer Madmon et al.

Competitive search is a setting where document publishers modify them to improve their ranking in response to a query. Recently, publishers have increasingly leveraged LLMs to generate and modify competitive content. We introduce Reinforcement Learning from Ranker Feedback (RLRF), a framework that trains LLMs using preference datasets derived from ranking competitions. The goal of a publisher (LLM-based) agent is to optimize content for improved ranking while accounting for the strategies of competing agents. We generate the datasets using approaches that do not rely on human-authored data. We show that our proposed agents consistently and substantially outperform previously suggested approaches for LLM-based competitive document modification. We further show that our agents are effective with ranking functions they were not trained for (i.e., out of distribution) and they adapt to strategic opponents. These findings provide support to the significant potential of using reinforcement learning in competitive search.