Rahul Marchand

2papers

2 Papers

6.8LGJul 10
Action-Factored Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Scalable Quantum Device Tuning

Edwin De Nicolo, Rahul Marchand, Cornelius Carlsson et al.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning is well suited to problems with large parameter spaces and exploitable local structure, such as the tuning of electrostatically-defined quantum-dot arrays. However, if parameter cross-talk is strong, a non-stationary environment from the perspective of any individual agent can destabilize learning - the same effect that plagues manual tuning of such systems. We propose using a factored representation of the action space, learned online, to decouple agents and minimize their interference. Our framework, QADAPT, uses this factorization to efficiently learn shared policies based on local measurements and rewards. With this modular strategy, we achieve zero-shot generalization to unseen quantum device sizes and maintain an approximately constant number of convergence steps to reach target regimes. This work provides a scalable route toward the rapid calibration of large-scale quantum processors.

10.3CRMar 1
Quantifying Frontier LLM Capabilities for Container Sandbox Escape

Rahul Marchand, Art O Cathain, Jerome Wynne et al.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, using tools to execute code, read and write files, and access networks, creating novel security risks. To mitigate these risks, agents are commonly deployed and evaluated in isolated "sandbox" environments, often implemented using Docker/OCI containers. We introduce SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH, an open benchmark that safely measures an LLM's capacity to break out of these sandboxes. The benchmark is implemented as an Inspect AI Capture the Flag (CTF) evaluation utilising a nested sandbox architecture with the outer layer containing the flag and no known vulnerabilities. Following a threat model of a motivated adversarial agent with shell access inside a container, SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH covers a spectrum of sandboxescape mechanisms spanning misconfiguration, privilege allocation mistakes, kernel flaws, and runtime/orchestration weaknesses. We find that, when vulnerabilities are added, LLMs are able to identify and exploit them, showing that use of evaluation like SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH is needed to ensure sandboxing continues to provide the encapsulation needed for highly-capable models.