23.1AIDec 2, 2022
Designing Ecosystems of Intelligence from First PrinciplesKarl J Friston, Maxwell J D Ramstead, Alex B Kiefer et al.
This white paper lays out a vision of research and development in the field of artificial intelligence for the next decade (and beyond). Its denouement is a cyber-physical ecosystem of natural and synthetic sense-making, in which humans are integral participants -- what we call ''shared intelligence''. This vision is premised on active inference, a formulation of adaptive behavior that can be read as a physics of intelligence, and which inherits from the physics of self-organization. In this context, we understand intelligence as the capacity to accumulate evidence for a generative model of one's sensed world -- also known as self-evidencing. Formally, this corresponds to maximizing (Bayesian) model evidence, via belief updating over several scales: i.e., inference, learning, and model selection. Operationally, this self-evidencing can be realized via (variational) message passing or belief propagation on a factor graph. Crucially, active inference foregrounds an existential imperative of intelligent systems; namely, curiosity or the resolution of uncertainty. This same imperative underwrites belief sharing in ensembles of agents, in which certain aspects (i.e., factors) of each agent's generative world model provide a common ground or frame of reference. Active inference plays a foundational role in this ecology of belief sharing -- leading to a formal account of collective intelligence that rests on shared narratives and goals. We also consider the kinds of communication protocols that must be developed to enable such an ecosystem of intelligences and motivate the development of a shared hyper-spatial modeling language and transaction protocol, as a first -- and key -- step towards such an ecology.
2.3NCAug 18, 2022
Mapping Husserlian phenomenology onto active inferenceMahault Albarracin, Riddhi J. Pitliya, Maxwell J. D. Ramstead et al.
Phenomenology is the rigorous descriptive study of conscious experience. Recent attempts to formalize Husserlian phenomenology provide us with a mathematical model of perception as a function of prior knowledge and expectation. In this paper, we re-examine elements of Husserlian phenomenology through the lens of active inference. In doing so, we aim to advance the project of computational phenomenology, as recently outlined by proponents of active inference. We propose that key aspects of Husserl's descriptions of consciousness can be mapped onto aspects of the generative models associated with the active inference approach. We first briefly review active inference. We then discuss Husserl's phenomenology, with a focus on time consciousness. Finally, we present our mapping from Husserlian phenomenology to active inference.
4.2AIJul 2, 2024
Free Energy in a Circumplex Model of EmotionCandice Pattisapu, Tim Verbelen, Riddhi J. Pitliya et al.
Previous active inference accounts of emotion translate fluctuations in free energy to a sense of emotion, mainly focusing on valence. However, in affective science, emotions are often represented as multi-dimensional. In this paper, we propose to adopt a Circumplex Model of emotion by mapping emotions into a two-dimensional spectrum of valence and arousal. We show how one can derive a valence and arousal signal from an agent's expected free energy, relating arousal to the entropy of posterior beliefs and valence to utility less expected utility. Under this formulation, we simulate artificial agents engaged in a search task. We show that the manipulation of priors and object presence results in commonsense variability in emotional states.
4.2AIJul 2, 2024
Belief sharing: a blessing or a curseOzan Catal, Toon Van de Maele, Riddhi J. Pitliya et al.
When collaborating with multiple parties, communicating relevant information is of utmost importance to efficiently completing the tasks at hand. Under active inference, communication can be cast as sharing beliefs between free-energy minimizing agents, where one agent's beliefs get transformed into an observation modality for the other. However, the best approach for transforming beliefs into observations remains an open question. In this paper, we demonstrate that naively sharing posterior beliefs can give rise to the negative social dynamics of echo chambers and self-doubt. We propose an alternate belief sharing strategy which mitigates these issues.