Zheng-Xin Yong

CL
h-index1
5papers
441citations
Novelty51%
AI Score43

5 Papers

28.0CLOct 3, 2023
Low-Resource Languages Jailbreak GPT-4

Zheng-Xin Yong, Cristina Menghini, Stephen H. Bach

AI safety training and red-teaming of large language models (LLMs) are measures to mitigate the generation of unsafe content. Our work exposes the inherent cross-lingual vulnerability of these safety mechanisms, resulting from the linguistic inequality of safety training data, by successfully circumventing GPT-4's safeguard through translating unsafe English inputs into low-resource languages. On the AdvBenchmark, GPT-4 engages with the unsafe translated inputs and provides actionable items that can get the users towards their harmful goals 79% of the time, which is on par with or even surpassing state-of-the-art jailbreaking attacks. Other high-/mid-resource languages have significantly lower attack success rate, which suggests that the cross-lingual vulnerability mainly applies to low-resource languages. Previously, limited training on low-resource languages primarily affects speakers of those languages, causing technological disparities. However, our work highlights a crucial shift: this deficiency now poses a risk to all LLMs users. Publicly available translation APIs enable anyone to exploit LLMs' safety vulnerabilities. Therefore, our work calls for a more holistic red-teaming efforts to develop robust multilingual safeguards with wide language coverage.

16.2CLFeb 21, 2024Code
LexC-Gen: Generating Data for Extremely Low-Resource Languages with Large Language Models and Bilingual Lexicons

Zheng-Xin Yong, Cristina Menghini, Stephen H. Bach

Data scarcity in low-resource languages can be addressed with word-to-word translations from labeled task data in high-resource languages using bilingual lexicons. However, bilingual lexicons often have limited lexical overlap with task data, which results in poor translation coverage and lexicon utilization. We propose lexicon-conditioned data generation LexC-Gen, a method that generates low-resource-language classification task data at scale. Specifically, LexC-Gen first uses high-resource-language words from bilingual lexicons to generate lexicon-compatible task data, and then it translates them into low-resource languages with bilingual lexicons via word translation. Across 17 extremely low-resource languages, LexC-Gen generated data is competitive with expert-translated gold data, and yields on average 5.6 and 8.9 points improvement over existing lexicon-based word translation methods on sentiment analysis and topic classification tasks respectively. Through ablation study, we show that conditioning on bilingual lexicons is the key component of LexC-Gen. LexC-Gen serves as a potential solution to close the performance gap between open-source multilingual models, such as BLOOMZ and Aya-101, and state-of-the-art commercial models like GPT-4o on low-resource-language tasks.

18.7CLOct 23, 2024
Towards Understanding the Fragility of Multilingual LLMs against Fine-Tuning Attacks

Samuele Poppi, Zheng-Xin Yong, Yifei He et al.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked widespread concerns about their safety. Recent work demonstrates that safety alignment of LLMs can be easily removed by fine-tuning with a few adversarially chosen instruction-following examples, i.e., fine-tuning attacks. We take a further step to understand fine-tuning attacks in multilingual LLMs. We first discover cross-lingual generalization of fine-tuning attacks: using a few adversarially chosen instruction-following examples in one language, multilingual LLMs can also be easily compromised (e.g., multilingual LLMs fail to refuse harmful prompts in other languages). Motivated by this finding, we hypothesize that safety-related information is language-agnostic and propose a new method termed Safety Information Localization (SIL) to identify the safety-related information in the model parameter space. Through SIL, we validate this hypothesis and find that only changing 20% of weight parameters in fine-tuning attacks can break safety alignment across all languages. Furthermore, we provide evidence to the alternative pathways hypothesis for why freezing safety-related parameters does not prevent fine-tuning attacks, and we demonstrate that our attack vector can still jailbreak LLMs adapted to new languages.

20.9CLFeb 18, 2025
Sailor2: Sailing in South-East Asia with Inclusive Multilingual LLMs

Longxu Dou, Qian Liu, Fan Zhou et al.

Sailor2 is a family of cutting-edge multilingual language models for South-East Asian (SEA) languages, available in 1B, 8B, and 20B sizes to suit diverse applications. Building on Qwen2.5, Sailor2 undergoes continuous pre-training on 500B tokens (400B SEA-specific and 100B replay tokens) to support 13 SEA languages while retaining proficiency in Chinese and English. Sailor2-20B model achieves a 50-50 win rate against GPT-4o across SEA languages. We also deliver a comprehensive cookbook on how to develop the multilingual model in an efficient manner, including five key aspects: data curation, pre-training, post-training, model customization and evaluation. We hope that Sailor2 model (Apache 2.0 license) will drive language development in the SEA region, and Sailor2 cookbook will inspire researchers to build more inclusive LLMs for other under-served languages.

19.4CLJul 16, 2025
Can We Predict Alignment Before Models Finish Thinking? Towards Monitoring Misaligned Reasoning Models

Yik Siu Chan, Zheng-Xin Yong, Stephen H. Bach

Reasoning language models improve performance on complex tasks by generating long chains of thought (CoTs), but this process can also increase harmful outputs in adversarial settings. In this work, we ask whether the long CoTs can be leveraged for predictive safety monitoring: do the reasoning traces provide early signals of final response alignment that could enable timely intervention? We evaluate a range of monitoring methods using either CoT text or activations, including highly capable large language models, fine-tuned classifiers, and humans. First, we find that a simple linear probe trained on CoT activations significantly outperforms all text-based baselines in predicting whether a final response is safe or unsafe, with an average absolute increase of 13 in F1 scores over the best-performing alternatives. CoT texts are often unfaithful and misleading, while model latents provide a more reliable predictive signal. Second, the probe can be applied to early CoT segments before the response is generated, showing that alignment signals appear before reasoning completes. Error analysis reveals that the performance gap between text classifiers and the linear probe largely stems from a subset of responses we call performative CoTs, where the reasoning consistently contradicts the final response as the CoT progresses. Our findings generalize across model sizes, families, and safety benchmarks, suggesting that lightweight probes could enable real-time safety monitoring and early intervention during generation.