Kristian Gjøsteen

Marte Eggen, Eirik Reiestad, Kristian Gjøsteen et al.

Recent cryptographic results establish that neural networks can be backdoored such that no efficient algorithm can distinguish them from a clean model. These guarantees, however, have been confined to stylised architectures of limited practical relevance, leaving open whether comparable undetectability extends to modern, end-to-end trained networks. We construct such an attack mechanism for state-of-the-art architectures, closely aligned to the cryptographic notion of undetectability, by identifying backdoor channels as learned latent directions, and show that the question of undetectability reduces to a hypothesis test between two unknown distributions over model parameters, which we conjecture to be intractable in practice. The consequence of this reframing is significant: if exploitable channels within a network's latent space are statistically indistinguishable from naturally learned directions, an attacker need not introduce foreign structure but can instead exploit the geometry the network already possesses. Demonstrating the approach on ResNet and Vision Transformer architectures trained on standard image classification datasets, the attack achieves both consistently high success rates with negligible clean accuracy degradation, and resists a comprehensive suite of post-training defences, none of which neutralise the backdoor without rendering the model unusable. Our results establish that cryptographic backdoors need not be artefacts requiring exotic architectures or artificial constructions, but identifiable as latent properties inherent to the geometry of learned representations.

Eleanor McMurtry, Xavier Boyen, Chris Culnane et al.

We propose a protocol for verifiable remote voting with paper assurance. It is intended to augment existing postal voting procedures, allowing a ballot to be electronically constructed, printed on paper, then returned in the post. It allows each voter to verify that their vote has been correctly cast, recorded and tallied by the Electoral Commission. The system is not end-to-end verifiable, but does allow voters to detect manipulation by an adversary who controls either the voting device, or (the postal service and electoral commission) but not both. The protocol is not receipt-free, but if the client honestly follows the protocol (including possibly remembering everything), they cannot subsequently prove how they voted. Our proposal is the first to combine plain paper assurance with cryptographic verification in a (passively) receipt-free manner.

Herman Galteland, Kristian Gjøsteen

We model and analyze passive adversaries that monitors Tor traffic crossing the border of a jurisdiction an adversary is controlling. We show that a single adversary is able to connect incoming and outgoing traffic of their border, tracking the traffic, and cooperating adversaries are able to reconstruct parts of the Tor network, revealing user-server relationships. In our analysis we created two algorithms to estimate the capabilities of the adversaries. The first generates Tor-like traffic and the second analyzes and reconstructs the simulated data.

Danilo Gligoroski, Kristian Gjosteen, Katina Kralevska

Orthogonal and quasi-orthogonal matrices have a long history of use in digital image processing, digital and wireless communications, cryptography and many other areas of computer science and coding theory. The practical benefits of using orthogonal matrices come from the fact that the computation of inverse matrices is avoided, by simply using the transpose of the orthogonal matrix. In this paper, we introduce a new family of matrices over finite fields that we call \emph{Quasi-Binary and Quasi-Orthogonal Matrices}. We call the matrices quasi-binary due to the fact that matrices have only two elements $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q$, but those elements are not $0$ and $1$. In addition, the reason why we call them quasi-orthogonal is due to the fact that their inverses are obtained not just by a simple transposition, but there is a need for an additional operation: a replacement of $a$ and $b$ by two other values $c$ and $d$. We give a simple relation between the values $a, b, c$ and $d$ for any finite field and especially for finite fields with characteristic 2. Our construction is based on incident matrices from cyclic Latin Rectangles and the efficiency of the proposed algorithm comes from the avoidance of matrix-matrix or matrix-vector multiplications.