Nathaniel Daw

Dharshan Kumaran, Viorica Patraucean, Simon Osindero et al.

Large language models can detect their own errors and sometimes correct them without external feedback, but the underlying mechanisms remain unknown. We investigate this through the lens of second-order models of confidence from decision neuroscience. In a first-order system, confidence derives from the generation signal itself and is therefore maximal for the chosen response, precluding error detection. Second-order models posit a partially independent evaluative signal that can disagree with the committed response, providing the basis for error detection. Kumaran et al. (2026) showed that LLMs cache a confidence representation at a token immediately following the answer (i.e. post-answer newline: PANL) -- that causally drives verbal confidence and dissociates from log-probabilities. Here we test whether this PANL signal extends beyond confidence to support error detection and self-correction. Here we test whether this signal supports error detection and self-correction, deriving predictions from the second-order framework. Using a verify-then-correct paradigm, we show that: (i) verbal confidence predicts error detection far beyond token log-probabilities, ruling out a first-order account; (ii) PANL activations predict error detection beyond verbal confidence itself; and (iii) PANL predicts which errors the model can correct -- where all behavioural signals fail. Causal interventions confirm that PANL signals rescue error detection behavior when answer information is corrupted. All findings replicate across models (Gemma 3 27B and Qwen 2.5 7B) and tasks (TriviaQA and MNLI). These results reveal that LLMs naturally implement a second-order confidence architecture whose internal evaluative signal encodes not only whether an answer is likely wrong but whether the model has the knowledge to fix it.

Dharshan Kumaran, Viorica Patraucean, Maks Ovsanikov et al.

Reliable confidence -- the probability that a model's own answer is correct -- is essential for the trustworthy deployment of language models. Existing work has largely evaluated confidence by how well it predicts correctness and whether it is calibrated, leaving open a more fundamental question: what does the confidence signal itself represent? Answer logits may reflect a latent decision variable sufficient to compute normative confidence, or instead a heuristic preference signal that combines the available evidence in a non-Bayesian manner. We address this using statistical decision confidence (SDC), a normative framework from computational neuroscience. Treating the answer-logit difference (LD) as a candidate readout of the latent decision variable, we test the qualitative signatures predicted by SDC. Across three perceptual discrimination tasks and a memory-based decision task, spanning three multimodal non-reasoning models and one reasoning model, LD satisfied these signatures -- including the diagnostic correct/error folded-X pattern -- showing that, in these settings, answer logits behave as monotonic readouts of a latent decision variable rather than heuristic preference scores. In complex visual reasoning, LD continued to predict correctness beyond objective task difficulty, but the full geometric signatures of SDC were absent, illustrating the current boundary of the framework when explicit normative process models are unavailable. These results provide a computational account of confidence in multimodal language models, delineate when answer logits behave as readouts of a latent decision variable, and establish SDC as a unifying framework for studying confidence across biological and artificial intelligence.