CVSep 14, 2023Code
Semantic Adversarial Attacks via Diffusion ModelsChenan Wang, Jinhao Duan, Chaowei Xiao et al.
Traditional adversarial attacks concentrate on manipulating clean examples in the pixel space by adding adversarial perturbations. By contrast, semantic adversarial attacks focus on changing semantic attributes of clean examples, such as color, context, and features, which are more feasible in the real world. In this paper, we propose a framework to quickly generate a semantic adversarial attack by leveraging recent diffusion models since semantic information is included in the latent space of well-trained diffusion models. Then there are two variants of this framework: 1) the Semantic Transformation (ST) approach fine-tunes the latent space of the generated image and/or the diffusion model itself; 2) the Latent Masking (LM) approach masks the latent space with another target image and local backpropagation-based interpretation methods. Additionally, the ST approach can be applied in either white-box or black-box settings. Extensive experiments are conducted on CelebA-HQ and AFHQ datasets, and our framework demonstrates great fidelity, generalizability, and transferability compared to other baselines. Our approaches achieve approximately 100% attack success rate in multiple settings with the best FID as 36.61. Code is available at https://github.com/steven202/semantic_adv_via_dm.
CVOct 3, 2025
Unmasking Puppeteers: Leveraging Biometric Leakage to Disarm Impersonation in AI-based VideoconferencingDanial Samadi Vahdati, Tai Duc Nguyen, Ekta Prashnani et al.
AI-based talking-head videoconferencing systems reduce bandwidth by sending a compact pose-expression latent and re-synthesizing RGB at the receiver, but this latent can be puppeteered, letting an attacker hijack a victim's likeness in real time. Because every frame is synthetic, deepfake and synthetic video detectors fail outright. To address this security problem, we exploit a key observation: the pose-expression latent inherently contains biometric information of the driving identity. Therefore, we introduce the first biometric leakage defense without ever looking at the reconstructed RGB video: a pose-conditioned, large-margin contrastive encoder that isolates persistent identity cues inside the transmitted latent while cancelling transient pose and expression. A simple cosine test on this disentangled embedding flags illicit identity swaps as the video is rendered. Our experiments on multiple talking-head generation models show that our method consistently outperforms existing puppeteering defenses, operates in real-time, and shows strong generalization to out-of-distribution scenarios.