Zhenqian Zhu

Kesheng Chen, Yamin Hu, Qi Zhou et al.

Vision-language models (VLMs) achieve strong performance on many benchmarks, yet a basic reliability question remains underexplored: when visual evidence conflicts with commonsense, do models follow what is shown or what commonsense suggests? A characteristic failure in this setting is that the model overrides visual evidence and outputs the commonsense alternative. We term this phenomenon \textbf{commonsense-driven hallucination} (CDH). To evaluate it, we introduce \textbf{CDH-Bench}, a benchmark designed to create explicit \textbf{visual evidence--commonsense conflicts}. CDH-Bench covers three dimensions: \textit{counting anomalies}, \textit{relational anomalies}, and \textit{attribute anomalies}. We evaluate frontier VLMs under \textit{binary Question Answering (QA)} and \textit{multiple-choice QA}, and report metrics including \textit{Counterfactual Accuracy} (CF-Acc), \textit{Commonsense Accuracy} (CS-Acc), \textit{Counterfactual Accuracy Drop} (CFAD), \textit{Commonsense Collapse Rate} (CCR), and \textit{Relative Prior Dependency} (RPD). Results show that even strong models remain vulnerable to prior-driven normalization under visual evidence--commonsense conflict. CDH-Bench provides a controlled diagnostic of visual fidelity under visual evidence--commonsense conflict.

Zhenqian Zhu, Yamin Hu, Yujiang Liu et al.

Existing studies reveal that current backdoor defenses exhibit limited robustness and often fail against specific types of attacks. More concerningly, prevailing safety tuning strategies tend to provide only superficial safety protection, as they fall short of completely eliminating the backdoor effects. In this work, we present a novel formulation of backdoor learning and unlearning as a sequential, three-stage process from a continual learning perspective. Within this framework, we formally define complete backdoor unlearning and further derive the necessary conditions for achieving it based on the mechanism of catastrophic forgetting. Guided by these insights, we propose Blind Inversion-Backdoor Adversarial Unlearning (BI-BAU), which formulates the generation of adversarial examples satisfying the unlearning conditions as a blind inversion problem. We solve this by integrating the bi-level optimization process of adversarial training into an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm framework to optimize the maximum a posteriori (MAP) objective. Furthermore, BI-BAU is extended to untargeted adversarial scenarios with unknown target classes, as well as to multi-modal contrastive learning tasks, enhancing its applicability to real-world deployment scenarios where pre-trained models may be compromised. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method exhibits general applicability across a wide spectrum of backdoor attacks and can effectively and thoroughly eliminate the backdoor effects from a backdoor model.

Zhenqian Zhu, Yamin Hu, Yiya Diao et al.

Model merging (MM) has gained significant attention as a cost-effective approach to integrate multiple task-specific models into a unified model. However, recent work reveals that MM is highly susceptible to backdoor attacks. Existing defenses based on task arithmetic often fail to eliminate backdoors without substantially degrading clean-task performance, owing to their reliance on direct parameter-space editing. To address this gap, we propose Linear Feature Path Minimization (LFPM), a backdoor mitigation framework for model merging, which introduces an anti-backdoor task vector into the backdoored merged model. Unlike prior approaches, LFPM formulates the backdoor robustness of the merged model from a unified feature-space perspective under the Cross-Task Linearity (CTL) framework, which leverages the approximate linearity of features across tasks. This perspective guides the optimization of the anti-backdoor task to suppress backdoors while preserving clean-task performance. Furthermore, we introduce an effective optimization mechanism based on gradient accumulation and loss path-integral, ensuring robust backdoor suppression along the interpolation path. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LFPM consistently exhibits strong robustness against backdoor attacks in both full fine-tuning and Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) settings.