CRFeb 3Code
WebSentinel: Detecting and Localizing Prompt Injection Attacks for Web AgentsXilong Wang, Yinuo Liu, Zhun Wang et al.
Prompt injection attacks manipulate webpage content to cause web agents to execute attacker-specified tasks instead of the user's intended ones. Existing methods for detecting and localizing such attacks achieve limited effectiveness, as their underlying assumptions often do not hold in the web-agent setting. In this work, we propose WebSentinel, a two-step approach for detecting and localizing prompt injection attacks in webpages. Given a webpage, Step I extracts \emph{segments of interest} that may be contaminated, and Step II evaluates each segment by checking its consistency with the webpage content as context. We show that WebSentinel is highly effective, substantially outperforming baseline methods across multiple datasets of both contaminated and clean webpages that we collected. Our code is available at: https://github.com/wxl-lxw/WebSentinel.
CRMar 26, 2024Code
Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attack to LLM-as-a-JudgeJiawen Shi, Zenghui Yuan, Yinuo Liu et al.
LLM-as-a-Judge uses a large language model (LLM) to select the best response from a set of candidates for a given question. LLM-as-a-Judge has many applications such as LLM-powered search, reinforcement learning with AI feedback (RLAIF), and tool selection. In this work, we propose JudgeDeceiver, an optimization-based prompt injection attack to LLM-as-a-Judge. JudgeDeceiver injects a carefully crafted sequence into an attacker-controlled candidate response such that LLM-as-a-Judge selects the candidate response for an attacker-chosen question no matter what other candidate responses are. Specifically, we formulate finding such sequence as an optimization problem and propose a gradient based method to approximately solve it. Our extensive evaluation shows that JudgeDeceive is highly effective, and is much more effective than existing prompt injection attacks that manually craft the injected sequences and jailbreak attacks when extended to our problem. We also show the effectiveness of JudgeDeceiver in three case studies, i.e., LLM-powered search, RLAIF, and tool selection. Moreover, we consider defenses including known-answer detection, perplexity detection, and perplexity windowed detection. Our results show these defenses are insufficient, highlighting the urgent need for developing new defense strategies. Our implementation is available at this repository: https://github.com/ShiJiawenwen/JudgeDeceiver.
CLFeb 7, 2024
MLLM-as-a-Judge: Assessing Multimodal LLM-as-a-Judge with Vision-Language BenchmarkDongping Chen, Ruoxi Chen, Shilin Zhang et al.
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have gained significant attention recently, showing remarkable potential in artificial general intelligence. However, assessing the utility of MLLMs presents considerable challenges, primarily due to the absence of multimodal benchmarks that align with human preferences. Drawing inspiration from the concept of LLM-as-a-Judge within LLMs, this paper introduces a novel benchmark, termed MLLM-as-a-Judge, to assess the ability of MLLMs in assisting judges across diverse modalities, encompassing three distinct tasks: Scoring Evaluation, Pair Comparison, and Batch Ranking. Our study reveals that, while MLLMs demonstrate remarkable human-like discernment in Pair Comparison, there is a significant divergence from human preferences in Scoring Evaluation and Batch Ranking. Furthermore, a closer examination reveals persistent challenges in the judgment capacities of LLMs, including diverse biases, hallucinatory responses, and inconsistencies in judgment, even in advanced models such as GPT-4V. These findings emphasize the pressing need for enhancements and further research efforts to be undertaken before regarding MLLMs as fully reliable evaluators. In light of this, we advocate for additional efforts dedicated to supporting the continuous development within the domain of MLLM functioning as judges. The code and dataset are publicly available at our project homepage: \url{https://mllm-judge.github.io/}.
AIMar 31Code
ATP-Bench: Towards Agentic Tool Planning for MLLM Interleaved GenerationYinuo Liu, Zi Qian, Heng Zhou et al.
Interleaved text-and-image generation represents a significant frontier for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), offering a more intuitive way to convey complex information. Current paradigms rely on either image generation or retrieval augmentation, yet they typically treat the two as mutually exclusive paths, failing to unify factuality with creativity. We argue that the next milestone in this field is Agentic Tool Planning, where the model serves as a central controller that autonomously determines when, where, and which tools to invoke to produce interleaved responses for visual-critical queries. To systematically evaluate this paradigm, we introduce ATP-Bench, a novel benchmark comprising 7,702 QA pairs (including 1,592 VQA pairs) across eight categories and 25 visual-critical intents, featuring human-verified queries and ground truths. Furthermore, to evaluate agentic planning independent of end-to-end execution and changing tool backends, we propose a Multi-Agent MLLM-as-a-Judge (MAM) system. MAM evaluates tool-call precision, identifies missed opportunities for tool use, and assesses overall response quality without requiring ground-truth references. Our extensive experiments on 10 state-of-the-art MLLMs reveal that models struggle with coherent interleaved planning and exhibit significant variations in tool-use behavior, highlighting substantial room for improvement and providing actionable guidance for advancing interleaved generation. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Qwen-Applications/ATP-Bench.
CROct 1, 2025Code
WAInjectBench: Benchmarking Prompt Injection Detections for Web AgentsYinuo Liu, Ruohan Xu, Xilong Wang et al.
Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.
CLJan 9
Evaluating Large Language Models for Abstract Evaluation Tasks: An Empirical StudyYinuo Liu, Emre Sezgin, Eric A. Youngstrom
Introduction: Large language models (LLMs) can process requests and generate texts, but their feasibility for assessing complex academic content needs further investigation. To explore LLM's potential in assisting scientific review, this study examined ChatGPT-5, Gemini-3-Pro, and Claude-Sonnet-4.5's consistency and reliability in evaluating abstracts compared to one another and to human reviewers. Methods: 160 abstracts from a local conference were graded by human reviewers and three LLMs using one rubric. Composite score distributions across three LLMs and fourteen reviewers were examined. Inter-rater reliability was calculated using intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) for within-AI reliability and AI-human concordance. Bland-Altman plots were examined for visual agreement patterns and systematic bias. Results: LLMs achieved good-to-excellent agreement with each other (ICCs: 0.59-0.87). ChatGPT and Claude reached moderate agreement with human reviewers on overall quality and content-specific criteria, with ICCs ~.45-.60 for composite, impression, clarity, objective, and results. They exhibited fair agreement on subjective dimensions, with ICC ranging from 0.23-0.38 for impact, engagement, and applicability. Gemini showed fair agreement on half criteria and no reliability on impact and applicability. Three LLMs showed acceptable or negligible mean difference (ChatGPT=0.24, Gemini=0.42, Claude=-0.02) from the human mean composite scores. Discussion: LLMs could process abstracts in batches with moderate agreement with human experts on overall quality and objective criteria. With appropriate process architecture, they can apply a rubric consistently across volumes of abstracts exceeding feasibility for a human rater. The weaker performance on subjective dimensions indicates that AI should serve a complementary role in evaluation, while human expertise remains essential.
CRMar 8, 2025
Poisoned-MRAG: Knowledge Poisoning Attacks to Multimodal Retrieval Augmented GenerationYinuo Liu, Zenghui Yuan, Guiyao Tie et al.
Multimodal retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) enhances the visual reasoning capability of vision-language models (VLMs) by dynamically accessing information from external knowledge bases. In this work, we introduce \textit{Poisoned-MRAG}, the first knowledge poisoning attack on multimodal RAG systems. Poisoned-MRAG injects a few carefully crafted image-text pairs into the multimodal knowledge database, manipulating VLMs to generate the attacker-desired response to a target query. Specifically, we formalize the attack as an optimization problem and propose two cross-modal attack strategies, dirty-label and clean-label, tailored to the attacker's knowledge and goals. Our extensive experiments across multiple knowledge databases and VLMs show that Poisoned-MRAG outperforms existing methods, achieving up to 98\% attack success rate with just five malicious image-text pairs injected into the InfoSeek database (481,782 pairs). Additionally, We evaluate 4 different defense strategies, including paraphrasing, duplicate removal, structure-driven mitigation, and purification, demonstrating their limited effectiveness and trade-offs against Poisoned-MRAG. Our results highlight the effectiveness and scalability of Poisoned-MRAG, underscoring its potential as a significant threat to multimodal RAG systems.