Duc V. Le

Austin Bennett, Preston Vander Vos, Duc V. Le et al.

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) run protocol governance by letting token holders vote on proposals. The dominant rule, voting power proportional to wallet balance, concentrates control among a small number of large holders, fueling the token-control governance attacks that have already compromised real protocols. To counter this concentration, the community has turned to anti-plutocratic voting mechanisms such as Quadratic Voting (QV), which assign sublinear voting power per token with the goal of dampening the influence of large holders. We prove that no voting rule that derives power solely from wallet balance can succeed on a permissionless blockchain. Through a costed model of on-chain voting that captures realistic blockchain frictions -- including per-wallet splitting and voting costs, fixed setup costs, and minimum-balance requirements -- we show that whenever a wallet of any size yields nonzero voting power, a Sybil attacker who splits tokens across many wallets achieves total voting power that grows at least linearly in their token holdings. For concave rules actually proposed to dampen governance power -- those that are positive, increasing, and finite -- we show that the optimal strategy yields power that is asymptotically linear in token holdings, regardless of the cost scheme. Instantiating the model on real DAOs reveals attack costs orders of magnitude below the value at stake. Replaying the ten most recent finalized proposals of five major DAOs (ENS, Compound, Uniswap, Arbitrum, and ZKsync) under linear, quadratic, logarithmic, and power-($β= 0.25$) voting, we measure Sybil amplification factors between $1,172\times$ and $4,039\times$ under Quadratic Voting, and exceeding $229,000\times$ under steeper power rules.

Dat H. Do, Rushi Shah, Duc V. Le et al.

Compositionality is believed to be the foundation for generalization, enabling models to reuse meaningful primitives in novel combinations. Yet, models trained with standard gradient-based optimization rarely, and often only weakly, exhibit compositional internal structure, and it remains unclear how or why such compositionality forms. In this work, we show that compositionality emerges in a narrow connectivity-depth sweet spot. Along the connectivity axis, compositionality only appears in some specifically sparse networks, heavily depends on which connections remain rather than on weights' sparsity alone. Along the depth axis, compositionality emerges within a narrow, target-dependent regime, peaking at specific depths, while both shallower and deeper networks fail. When either the depth or connectivity condition is violated, gradient descent silently converges to fractured solutions rather than compositional ones. To discover and exploit this emergence, we introduce (i) similarity-based pruning (SP) to recover compositional connectivity and (ii) a heuristic depth predictor to estimate where compositionality is most likely to appear. Finally, we support these empirical findings with a theoretical framework based on compositional sparsity, volume-ratio arguments, and feature-interference bounds, explaining why compositional solutions are reachable only in a narrow depth-connectivity regime.