Roy Fairstein

Roy Fairstein, Harper Lyon, Oshri Damty et al.

Peer-evaluation and selection systems are used when sets of agents evaluate each other in order to select the best $k$ among them. These are commonly used in real-world settings, including academic conferences where those reviewing papers are often the set of submitters. Conferences have attempted to better allocate their reviewing resources by moving to a two-stage mechanism, in which some papers are eliminated after a first stage of review and remaining papers receive additional reviewers. We investigate how two major strategyproof peer selection mechanisms, Partition and ExactDollarPartition, perform when adapted to a two-stage system, in order to try and understand the effect of the two-stage mechanism on which agents get selected. We also examine how the various parameters of the two-stage mechanism influence the outcome. We provide a theoretical basis by showing how a particular setting is influenced by the two stages. However, solving for the general case seems implausible at the moment, and we use extensive simulations of different scenarios and settings to observe which agents benefit and which are harmed by adopting two-stage mechanisms (and we vary this mechanisms parameters as well). We show that the two-stage mechanism's advantage depends the noisiness of reviewer beliefs. Borderline agents benefit most in a low noise environment, while high rank agents benefit more in noisy environments. We show that the effectiveness of these mechanisms is highly dependent on the number of chosen agents, the number of reviews requested from agents, and reviewers' correlation, indicating that organizers need to exercise caution when selecting these parameters for a reviewing process.

Roy Fairstein, Dan Vilenchik, Kobi Gal

Participatory Budgeting (PB) offers a democratic process for communities to allocate public funds across various projects through voting. In practice, PB organizers face challenges in selecting aggregation rules either because they are not familiar with the literature and the exact details of every existing rule or because no existing rule echoes their expectations. This paper presents a novel data-driven approach utilizing machine learning to address this challenge. By training neural networks on PB instances, our approach learns aggregation rules that balance social welfare, representation, and other societal beneficial goals. It is able to generalize from small-scale synthetic PB examples to large, real-world PB instances. It is able to learn existing aggregation rules but also generate new rules that adapt to diverse objectives, providing a more nuanced, compromise-driven solution for PB processes. The effectiveness of our approach is demonstrated through extensive experiments with synthetic and real-world PB data, and can expand the use and deployment of PB solutions.