Ai Han

Weiting Liu, Jieyi Bi, Wanqi Zhou et al.

Tool-augmented large language model agents excel at long-horizon tasks, yet they are typically post-trained on fixed toolsets. When tasks demand new tools, these agents struggle to incorporate them effectively, and retraining from scratch is often impractical. We identify the core obstacle in such toolset expansion problem as behavioral inertia: the tendency of agents to fall back on familiar tools and established reasoning patterns despite having access to new ones. We demonstrate that injecting counterfactual anchor contexts at critical decision points can break this inertia, recovering failed trajectories by eliciting suppressed agent capabilities. To scale this insight, we propose ToolAnchor, a framework that uses teacher models to hypothesize these counterfactual contexts, verifies them via student rollouts, and internalizes the successful interventions through agentic post-training. Extensive evaluations across general AI assistant (GAIA), textual search (BrowseComp), and visual search (VDR-Bench) tasks demonstrate that ToolAnchor consistently exhibits competitive performance under expanded toolsets. Our work bridges the gap between static post-training and dynamic adaptation, charting a new path for scalable agentic reinforcement learning.

Hao Zhou, Tiru Wu, Yan Jiang et al.

Multi-modal multi-agent systems (MM-MAS) have gained increasing attention for their capacity to enable complex reasoning and coordination across diverse modalities. As these systems continue to expand in scale and functionality, investigating their potential vulnerabilities has become increasingly important. However, existing studies on adversarial attacks in multi-agent systems primarily focus on isolated agents or unimodal settings, leaving the vulnerabilities of MM-MAS largely underexplored. To bridge this gap, we introduce HAM$^{3}$, a Hierarchical Attack framework for multi-modal multi-agent systems that decomposes attacks into three interconnected layers. Specifically, at the perception layer, HAM$^{3}$ mounts attacks by perturbing visual inputs, textual inputs, and their fused visual-textual representations. At the communication layer, it performs communication-level attacks that corrupt message content and interaction topology, such as manipulating shared context or communication links to distort collective information flow. At the reasoning layer, it conducts reasoning-level attacks that interfere with each agent's cognitive pipeline, biasing reasoning trajectories and ultimately compromising final decisions. We evaluate HAM$^{3}$ on the GQA benchmark through multi-agent systems built on distinct reasoning paradigms including ReAct, Plan-and-Solve, and Reflexion. Experiments demonstrate that our framework achieves an Attack Success Rate of up to 78.3%, with reasoning-layer attacks being the most effective. More than half of the successful attacks lead multiple agents to produce consistent errors. These findings offer valuable insights for building more robust and interpretable multi-agent intelligence.