Bilal Chughtai

Joshua Engels, Callum McDougall, Bilal Chughtai et al.

LLM reasoning transparency is a critical affordance for understanding model decisions, mitigating misuse and misalignment, and debugging surprising model behaviors. However, DiffusionGemma performs a larger fraction of its computation in a continuous latent space; does this make its reasoning less transparent? We study this question by decomposing transparency into two components: variable transparency, whether we understand intermediate snapshots of a model's computational state; and algorithmic transparency, whether we can use these snapshots to reconstruct the process by which the model arrived at its outputs. Naively, DiffusionGemma has poor variable transparency: its opaque serial depth, the amount of serial computation that occurs in between interpretable model states, seems at first 28.6X higher than the corresponding autoregressive Gemma 4 model. However, we show that we can map the information flowing between denoising steps through an interpretable token bottleneck with no decrease in downstream performance. Treating these intermediate states as interpretable reduces the opaque serial depth to just 1.1X that of Gemma 4. Algorithmic transparency is harder for diffusion models than for autoregressive models because all token predictions in the canvas can change at every denoising step, giving the model the power to implement complicated distributed algorithms during the denoising process. To begin bridging this gap, we conduct a suite of interpretability case studies, uncovering initial evidence of novel diffusion-specific phenomena such as non-chronological reasoning, token and sequence smearing, and intermediate-context reasoning. Finally, we test monitorability, a key application of transparency that measures whether model outputs are useful for downstream tasks. We find that DiffusionGemma is similarly monitorable to Gemma 4.

Reilly Haskins, Bilal Chughtai, Joshua Engels

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is one of the most promising tools we have for detecting model misbehavior, but its effectiveness depends on models faithfully externalizing their reasoning. Motivated by this vulnerability, we study whether monitor-aware models are capable of obfuscating their reasoning to evade detection. We use synthetic document finetuning to expose eight models to realistic pre-training-style documents describing a CoT monitor and find that monitor-aware models consistently achieve higher rates of undetected misbehavior compared to unaware controls. This effect is weaker but still present on a harder agentic task. We also show that CoT controllability, a model's ability to reshape its own reasoning trace under an imposed constraint, is closely correlated with obfuscation success across the eight models studied ($r=0.800$, $p=0.017$). Monitor-aware models placed under equal reinforcement learning optimization pressure also learn to reward-hack without triggering a CoT monitor substantially faster than unaware controls. Together, these results suggest that knowledge of monitoring combined with high CoT controllability poses a risk to CoT-based monitoring.