Marco Vieira

Hrushitha Goud Tigulla, Marco Vieira

Malformed, missing, or boundary-value inputs in microservice APIs can cascade across dependent services, threatening reliability. Robustness testing systematically exercises such inputs to expose server-side failures, but generating diverse, effective tests remains challenging. Large Language Models can generate such tests from API specifications; however, it is unknown whether different models and prompt strategies produce diverse failure sets or converge on the same failures. We report a controlled experiment applying 7 prompt strategies to 3 open-source LLMs (14B-70B parameters) targeting 2 architecturally distinct microservice systems: one Java monolingual (6 services, 9 failure modes) and one polyglot (27 services, 14 failure modes), yielding 38 valid runs and 663 generated tests. We find that prompt strategy explains more variation in diversity than model size: a Structured prompt collapses diversity entirely, while a single model varied across three prompt strategies achieves complete failure-mode coverage on one system, outperforming any multi-model ensemble under a fixed prompt. We introduce two strategies, Guided and GuidedFewShot, that embed a mutation taxonomy from prior robustness testing research as domain context. GuidedFewShot achieves the highest single-run coverage on both systems (5 of 9 and 8 of 14 failure modes) while maintaining low cross-model similarity. A key lesson is that taxonomy rules alone are insufficient: LLMs cannot distinguish key-absent from value-empty mutations without concrete examples. Findings replicate across both systems.

Arastoo Zibaeirad, Marco Vieira

Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved. We present CWE-Trace, a framework for LLM vulnerability detection built from 834 manually curated Linux kernel samples spanning 74 CWEs. The framework enforces a strict temporal split (pre-2025 historical set / post-cutoff leakage-free set), preserves context-aware vulnerable--patched pairs, and introduces two diagnostic metrics: the Directional Failure Index (DFI) and Hierarchical Distance and Direction (HDD). We evaluate eight vanilla LLMs and 15 LoRA fine-tuned variants across non-targeted detection, targeted detection, and CWE classification. Our analysis yields two key results. First, data contamination provides no measurable advantage. Function-level analysis shows that 84% of nominally contaminated samples carry no usable memorization signal: vulnerable functions are absent or cross-mapped across datasets, and ~31% of contaminated samples carry CWE misclassification. Second, backbone directional priors dominate fine-tuning. Models exhibit stable, systematic failure modes (DFI ranging from -85.5 to +94.8 pp) that persist from historical to post-cutoff data and resist correction. Fine-tuning shifts the output threshold without changing the decision policy. This is calibration without comprehension: output distributions adapt to training data while the underlying security reasoning remains absent. The weakest backbone at binary detection (DeepSeek-R1) gains the most in coarse CWE classification, revealing that detection and understanding are decoupled capabilities. The best detection score reaches only 52.1% (+2.1 pp above chance); exact CWE ranking remains below 1.3% Top-1 accuracy, confirming that current LLMs lack reliable security reasoning for systems software, regardless of fine-tuning strategy.