James J. Gross

2papers

2 Papers

12.1AIMay 16
CAREBench: Evaluating LLMs' Emotion Understanding by Assessing Cognitive Appraisal Reasoning

Zhaoyue Sun, Hainiu Xu, Andero Uusberg et al.

Emotion understanding is a core capability for LLMs to interact effectively with humans, yet existing evaluation paradigms rely on discrete emotion label prediction and fail to capture the cognitive processes underlying emotion generation. Grounded in appraisal theory, we introduce CAREBench, the first benchmark with complete inferential chain annotations from both first- and third-person perspectives on real-world narratives, spanning appraisal reasoning, appraisal ratings, and multi-label emotion annotation. We propose a process-level evaluation framework and conduct systematic experiments across six LLMs organized around four research questions. We find that stronger models match or surpass human observers on certain tasks, yet fall short on appraisal reasoning and positive emotion recognition; performance across chain steps and sensitivity to appraisal interventions exhibit dissociations across models; and current models have not internalized the mechanisms needed to capture human subjective heterogeneity. These findings suggest that downstream emotion prediction metrics may overestimate LLMs' true emotion understanding, and CAREBench provides a foundation for more diagnostically informative evaluation of LLMs' affective cognitive capabilities.

2.7NCJun 3
Do Large Language Models Have Emotions?

Amit Goldenberg, James J. Gross

Do LLMs have emotions? A recent paper from Anthropic reports finding internal representations of emotion concepts in Claude Sonnet 4.5, concluding that the LLM has 'functional emotions.' We evaluate this claim against what is known about how emotions actually function in biological systems. We argue that emotions serve two core functions: the context-sensitive interpretation of situations, and the reorganization of processing across multiple systems in response to those interpretations. The Anthropic findings offer partial support for the first function, though the consistent, discrete emotional representations identified in Claude sit uneasily with affective neuroscience findings that human emotion is characterized by variable rather than uniform neural signatures. On the second function, the evidence is mixed: Claude's representations modulate output without producing the dynamic reorganization of attention, decision speed, and motivational state that defines emotion in biological systems. We close by proposing what it would take for an LLM to have emotions.