Shuo Ji

AI
h-index14
3papers
21citations
Novelty82%
AI Score57

3 Papers

90.4AIJun 4
Memory is Reconstructed, Not Retrieved: Graph Memory for LLM Agents

Shuo Ji, Yibo Li, Bryan Hooi

Despite recent progress, LLM agents still struggle with reasoning over long interaction histories. While current memory-augmented agents rely on a static retrieve-then-reason paradigm, this rigid pipeline design prevents them from dynamically adapting memory access to intermediate evidence discovered during inference. To bridge this gap, we propose MRAgent, a framework that combines an associative memory graph with an active reconstruction mechanism. We represent memory as a Cue-Tag-Content graph, where associative tags serve as semantic bridges connecting fine-grained cues to memory contents. Operating on this structure, our active reconstruction mechanism integrates LLM reasoning directly into memory access, allowing the agent to iteratively explore and prune retrieval paths based on accumulated evidence. This ensures that memory retrieval is dynamically adapted to the reasoning context while avoiding combinatorial explosion caused by unconstrained expansion. Experiments on the LoCoMo benchmark and LongMemEval benchmark demonstrate significant improvements over strong baselines (up to 23%), while substantially reducing token and runtime cost, highlighting the effectiveness of active and associative reconstruction for long-horizon memory reasoning.

LGJan 26Code
Just-In-Time Reinforcement Learning: Continual Learning in LLM Agents Without Gradient Updates

Yibo Li, Zijie Lin, Ailin Deng et al.

While Large Language Model (LLM) agents excel at general tasks, they inherently struggle with continual adaptation due to the frozen weights after deployment. Conventional reinforcement learning (RL) offers a solution but incurs prohibitive computational costs and the risk of catastrophic forgetting. We introduce Just-In-Time Reinforcement Learning (JitRL), a training-free framework that enables test-time policy optimization without any gradient updates. JitRL maintains a dynamic, non-parametric memory of experiences and retrieves relevant trajectories to estimate action advantages on-the-fly. These estimates are then used to directly modulate the LLM's output logits. We theoretically prove that this additive update rule is the exact closed-form solution to the KL-constrained policy optimization objective. Extensive experiments on WebArena and Jericho demonstrate that JitRL establishes a new state-of-the-art among training-free methods. Crucially, JitRL outperforms the performance of computationally expensive fine-tuning methods (e.g., WebRL) while reducing monetary costs by over 30 times, offering a scalable path for continual learning agents. The code is available at https://github.com/liushiliushi/JitRL.

CRFeb 17
Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections

Xianglin Yang, Yufei He, Shuo Ji et al.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.