Aranyak Mehta

Kaiwen Wang, Rahul Kidambi, Ryan Sullivan et al.

Reward-based finetuning is crucial for aligning language policies with intended behaviors (e.g., creativity and safety). A key challenge is to develop steerable language models that trade-off multiple (conflicting) objectives in a flexible and efficient manner. This paper presents Conditional Language Policy (CLP), a general framework for finetuning language models on multiple objectives. Building on techniques from multi-task training and parameter-efficient finetuning, CLP learn steerable models that effectively trade-off conflicting objectives at inference time. Notably, this does not require training or maintaining multiple models to achieve different trade-offs between the objectives. Through extensive experiments and ablations on two summarization datasets, we show that CLP learns steerable language models that outperform and Pareto-dominate the existing approaches for multi-objective finetuning.

Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Di Wang et al.

Revenue-optimal auction design is a challenging problem with significant theoretical and practical implications. Sequential auction mechanisms, known for their simplicity and strong strategyproofness guarantees, are often limited by theoretical results that are largely existential, except for certain restrictive settings. Although traditional reinforcement learning methods such as Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and Soft Actor-Critic (SAC) are applicable in this domain, they struggle with computational demands and convergence issues when dealing with large and continuous action spaces. In light of this and recognizing that we can model transitions differentiable for our settings, we propose using a new reinforcement learning framework tailored for sequential combinatorial auctions that leverages first-order gradients. Our extensive evaluations show that our approach achieves significant improvement in revenue over both analytical baselines and standard reinforcement learning algorithms. Furthermore, we scale our approach to scenarios involving up to 50 agents and 50 items, demonstrating its applicability in complex, real-world auction settings. As such, this work advances the computational tools available for auction design and contributes to bridging the gap between theoretical results and practical implementations in sequential auction design.

Yang Cai, Zhe Feng, Christopher Liaw et al.

We propose a new Markov Decision Process (MDP) model for ad auctions to capture the user response to the quality of ads, with the objective of maximizing the long-term discounted revenue. By incorporating user response, our model takes into consideration all three parties involved in the auction (advertiser, auctioneer, and user). The state of the user is modeled as a user-specific click-through rate (CTR) with the CTR changing in the next round according to the set of ads shown to the user in the current round. We characterize the optimal mechanism for this MDP as a Myerson's auction with a notion of modified virtual value, which relies on the value distribution of the advertiser, the current user state, and the future impact of showing the ad to the user. Leveraging this characterization, we design a sample-efficient and computationally-efficient algorithm which outputs an approximately optimal policy that requires only sample access to the true MDP and the value distributions of the bidders. Finally, we propose a simple mechanism built upon second price auctions with personalized reserve prices and show it can achieve a constant-factor approximation to the optimal long term discounted revenue.

Somnath Basu Roy Chowdhury, Rahul Kidambi, Avinava Dubey et al.

Machine unlearning is the process of efficiently removing specific information from a trained machine learning model without retraining from scratch. Existing unlearning methods, which often provide provable guarantees, typically involve retraining a subset of model parameters based on a forget set. While these approaches show promise in certain scenarios, their underlying assumptions are often challenged in real-world applications -- particularly when applied to generative models. Furthermore, updating parameters using these unlearning procedures often degrades the general-purpose capabilities the model acquired during pre-training. Motivated by these shortcomings, this paper considers the paradigm of inference time unlearning -- wherein, the generative model is equipped with an (approximately correct) verifier that judges whether the model's response satisfies appropriate unlearning guarantees. This paper introduces a framework that iteratively refines the quality of the generated responses using feedback from the verifier without updating the model parameters. The proposed framework leverages conformal prediction to reduce computational overhead and provide distribution-free unlearning guarantees. This paper's approach significantly outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods, reducing unlearning error by up to 93% across challenging unlearning benchmarks.

Yanchen Jiang, Zhe Feng, Christopher P. Mah et al.

Generative Recommender Systems using semantic ids, such as TIGER (Rajput et al., 2023), have emerged as a widely adopted competitive paradigm in sequential recommendation. However, existing architectures are designed solely for semantic retrieval and do not address concerns such as monetization via ad revenue and incorporation of bids for commercial retrieval. We propose GEM-Rec, a unified framework that integrates commercial relevance and monetization objectives directly into the generative sequence. We introduce control tokens to decouple the decision of whether to show an ad from which item to show. This allows the model to learn valid placement patterns directly from interaction logs, which inherently reflect past successful ad placements. Complementing this, we devise a Bid-Aware Decoding mechanism that handles real-time pricing, injecting bids directly into the inference process to steer the generation toward high-value items. We prove that this approach guarantees allocation monotonicity, ensuring that higher bids weakly increase an ad's likelihood of being shown without requiring model retraining. Experiments demonstrate that GEM-Rec allows platforms to dynamically optimize for semantic relevance and platform revenue.

Kumar Avinava Dubey, Zhe Feng, Rahul Kidambi et al.

We study an auction setting in which bidders bid for placement of their content within a summary generated by a large language model (LLM), e.g., an ad auction in which the display is a summary paragraph of multiple ads. This generalizes the classic ad settings such as position auctions to an LLM generated setting, which allows us to handle general display formats. We propose a novel factorized framework in which an auction module and an LLM module work together via a prediction model to provide welfare maximizing summary outputs in an incentive compatible manner. We provide a theoretical analysis of this framework and synthetic experiments to demonstrate the feasibility and validity of the system together with welfare comparisons.

Yanchen Jiang, Zhe Feng, Aranyak Mehta

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in modern search and answer systems to synthesize multiple, sometimes conflicting, texts into a single response, yet current pipelines offer weak incentives for sources to be accurate and are vulnerable to adversarial content. We introduce Truthful Text Summarization (TTS), an incentive-aligned framework that improves factual robustness without ground-truth labels. TTS (i) decomposes a draft synthesis into atomic claims, (ii) elicits each source's stance on every claim, (iii) scores sources with an adapted multi-task peer-prediction mechanism that rewards informative agreement, and (iv) filters unreliable sources before re-summarizing. We establish formal guarantees that align a source's incentives with informative honesty, making truthful reporting the utility-maximizing strategy. Experiments show that TTS improves factual accuracy and robustness while preserving fluency, aligning exposure with informative corroboration and disincentivizing manipulation.

Goran Zuzic, Di Wang, Aranyak Mehta et al.

We address the challenge of finding algorithms for online allocation (i.e. bipartite matching) using a machine learning approach. In this paper, we focus on the AdWords problem, which is a classical online budgeted matching problem of both theoretical and practical significance. In contrast to existing work, our goal is to accomplish algorithm design {\em tabula rasa}, i.e., without any human-provided insights or expert-tuned training data beyond specifying the objective and constraints of the optimization problem. We construct a framework based on insights and ideas from game theory, adversarial training and GANs Key to our approach is to generate adversarial examples that expose the weakness of any given algorithm. A unique challenge in our context is to generate complete examples from scratch rather than perturbing given examples and we demonstrate this can be accomplished for the Adwords problem. We use this framework to co-train an algorithm network and an adversarial network against each other until they converge to an equilibrium. This approach finds algorithms and adversarial examples that are consistent with known optimal results. Secondly, we address the question of robustness of the algorithm, namely can we design algorithms that are both strong under practical distributions, as well as exhibit robust performance against adversarial instances. To accomplish this, we train algorithm networks using a mixture of adversarial and practical distributions like power-laws; the resulting networks exhibit a smooth trade-off between the two input regimes.