Zijia Liu

Kunlun Zhu, Jiaxun Zhang, Ziheng Qi et al.

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM) agents have significantly accelerated scientific discovery automation, yet concurrently raised critical ethical and safety concerns. To systematically address these challenges, we introduce \textbf{SafeScientist}, an innovative AI scientist framework explicitly designed to enhance safety and ethical responsibility in AI-driven scientific exploration. SafeScientist proactively refuses ethically inappropriate or high-risk tasks and rigorously emphasizes safety throughout the research process. To achieve comprehensive safety oversight, we integrate multiple defensive mechanisms, including prompt monitoring, agent-collaboration monitoring, tool-use monitoring, and an ethical reviewer component. Complementing SafeScientist, we propose \textbf{SciSafetyBench}, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate AI safety in scientific contexts, comprising 240 high-risk scientific tasks across 6 domains, alongside 30 specially designed scientific tools and 120 tool-related risk tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeScientist significantly improves safety performance by 35\% compared to traditional AI scientist frameworks, without compromising scientific output quality. Additionally, we rigorously validate the robustness of our safety pipeline against diverse adversarial attack methods, further confirming the effectiveness of our integrated approach. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/SafeScientist. \textcolor{red}{Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.}

Peixuan Han, Zijia Liu, Jiaxuan You

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising potential in persuasion, but existing works on training LLM persuaders are still preliminary. Notably, while humans are skilled in modeling their opponent's thoughts and opinions proactively and dynamically, current LLMs struggle with such Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning, resulting in limited diversity and opponent awareness. To address this limitation, we introduce Theory of Mind Augmented Persuader (ToMAP), a novel approach for building more flexible persuader agents by incorporating two theory of mind modules that enhance the persuader's awareness and analysis of the opponent's mental state. Specifically, we begin by prompting the persuader to consider possible objections to the target central claim, and then use a text encoder paired with a trained MLP classifier to predict the opponent's current stance on these counterclaims. Our carefully designed reinforcement learning schema enables the persuader learns how to analyze opponent-related information and utilize it to generate more effective arguments. Experiments show that the ToMAP persuader, while containing only 3B parameters, outperforms much larger baselines, like GPT-4o, with a relative gain of 39.4% across multiple persuadee models and diverse corpora. Notably, ToMAP exhibits complex reasoning chains and reduced repetition during training, which leads to more diverse and effective arguments. The opponent-aware feature of ToMAP also makes it suitable for long conversations and enables it to employ more logical and opponent-aware strategies. These results underscore our method's effectiveness and highlight its potential for developing more persuasive language agents. Code is available at: https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/ToMAP.

Kunlun Zhu, Zijia Liu, Bingxuan Li et al.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents, which integrate planning, memory, reflection, and tool-use modules, have shown promise in solving complex, multi-step tasks. Yet their sophisticated architectures amplify vulnerability to cascading failures, where a single root-cause error propagates through subsequent decisions, leading to task failure. Current systems lack a framework that can comprehensively understand agent error in a modular and systemic way, and therefore fail to detect these errors accordingly. We address this gap with three contributions. First, we introduce the AgentErrorTaxonomy, a modular classification of failure modes spanning memory, reflection, planning, action, and system-level operations. Second, we construct AgentErrorBench, the first dataset of systematically annotated failure trajectories from ALFWorld, GAIA, and WebShop, grounding error analysis in real-world agent rollouts. Third, we propose AgentDebug, a debugging framework that isolates root-cause failures and provides corrective feedback, enabling agents to recover and iteratively improve. Experiments on AgentErrorBench show that AgentDebug achieves 24% higher all-correct accuracy and 17% higher step accuracy compared to the strongest baseline. Beyond detection, the targeted feedback generated by AgentDebug enables LLM agents to iteratively recover from failures, yielding up to 26% relative improvements in task success across ALFWorld, GAIA, and WebShop. These results establish principled debugging as a pathway to more reliable and adaptive LLM agents. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/AgentDebug

Xiaolei Ru, Xiaowei Cao, Zijia Liu et al.

Adversarial robustness is essential for security and reliability of machine learning systems. However, adversarial robustness enhanced by defense algorithms is easily erased as the neural network's weights update to learn new tasks. To address this vulnerability, it is essential to improve the capability of neural networks in terms of robust continual learning. Specially, we propose a novel gradient projection technique that effectively stabilizes sample gradients from previous data by orthogonally projecting back-propagation gradients onto a crucial subspace before using them for weight updates. This technique can maintaining robustness by collaborating with a class of defense algorithms through sample gradient smoothing. The experimental results on four benchmarks including Split-CIFAR100 and Split-miniImageNet, demonstrate that the superiority of the proposed approach in mitigating rapidly degradation of robustness during continual learning even when facing strong adversarial attacks.