Chiara Galdi

Chiara Galdi, Michele Panariello, Massimiliano Todisco et al.

We introduce 2D-Malafide, a novel and lightweight adversarial attack designed to deceive face deepfake detection systems. Building upon the concept of 1D convolutional perturbations explored in the speech domain, our method leverages 2D convolutional filters to craft perturbations which significantly degrade the performance of state-of-the-art face deepfake detectors. Unlike traditional additive noise approaches, 2D-Malafide optimises a small number of filter coefficients to generate robust adversarial perturbations which are transferable across different face images. Experiments, conducted using the FaceForensics++ dataset, demonstrate that 2D-Malafide substantially degrades detection performance in both white-box and black-box settings, with larger filter sizes having the greatest impact. Additionally, we report an explainability analysis using GradCAM which illustrates how 2D-Malafide misleads detection systems by altering the image areas used most for classification. Our findings highlight the vulnerability of current deepfake detection systems to convolutional adversarial attacks as well as the need for future work to enhance detection robustness through improved image fidelity constraints.

Anna Taylor, Michele Panariello, Massimiliano Todisco et al.

As the accuracy of speech deepfake detection improves with the use of self-supervised representations such as wav2vec 2.0 and HuBERT, understanding why the speech is classified as bona fide or deepfake remains an open challenge. In pursuit of more trustworthy and interpretable artificial intelligence, we introduce a phoneme-level analysis framework that connects model predictions to measurable phonetic units. Our post-hoc explainability method is generally applicable to a variety of speech deepfake detection systems based on convolutional neural networks since it leverages Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping in conjunction with speech recognition to generate saliency maps aligned with phonemes and pauses. This pipeline reveals statistically significant attack- and speaker-dependent phonetic cues associated with spoofed speech in terms that humans can understand. Experiments using ASVspoof 5 show comparable detection performance to similar architectures while providing linguistic interpretations across speakers and spoofing conditions.

Yangyang Qu, Todisco Massimiliano, Galdi Chiara et al.

Voice biometric systems can exhibit sex-related performance gaps even when overall verification accuracy is strong. We attribute these gaps to two practical mechanisms: (i) demographic shortcut learning, where speaker classification training exploits spurious correlations between sex and speaker identity, and (ii) feature entanglement, where sex-linked acoustic variation overlaps with identity cues and cannot be removed without degrading speaker discrimination. We propose Fair-Gate, a fairness-aware and interpretable risk-gating framework that addresses both mechanisms in a single pipeline. Fair-Gate applies risk extrapolation to reduce variation in speaker-classification risk across proxy sex groups, and introduces a local complementary gate that routes intermediate features into an identity branch and a sex branch. The gate provides interpretability by producing an explicit routing mask that can be inspected to understand which features are allocated to identity versus sex-related pathways. Experiments on VoxCeleb1 show that Fair-Gate improves the utility--fairness trade-off, yielding more sex-fair ASV performance under challenging evaluation conditions.