Amir Dembo

Naomi Sagan, Amir Dembo, Matthew Ho et al.

We study a family of processes generated according to sequential probability assignments induced by the LZ78 universal compressor. We characterize entropic and distributional properties such as their entropy and relative entropy rates, finite-state compressibility and log loss of their realizations, and the empirical distributions that they induce. Though not quite stationary, these sources are "almost stationary and ergodic;" similar to stationary and ergodic processes, they satisfy a Shannon-McMillan-Breiman-type property: the normalized log probability of their realizations converges almost surely to their entropy rate. Further, they are locally "almost i.i.d." in the sense that the finite-dimensional empirical distributions of their realizations converge almost surely to a deterministic i.i.d. law. However, unlike stationary ergodic sources, the finite-state compressibility of their realizations is almost surely strictly larger than their entropy rate by a "Jensen gap". We present simulations demonstrating the theoretical results. These sources allow to gauge the performance of sequential probability models, both classical and deep learning-based, on non-Markovian non-stationary data. As such, we apply realizations of the LZ78 source to the study of in-context learning in transformer models.

Amir Dembo, Sreeram Kannan, Ertem Nusret Tas et al.

Nakamoto invented the longest chain protocol, and claimed its security by analyzing the private double-spend attack, a race between the adversary and the honest nodes to grow a longer chain. But is it the worst attack? We answer the question in the affirmative for three classes of longest chain protocols, designed for different consensus models: 1) Nakamoto's original Proof-of-Work protocol; 2) Ouroboros and SnowWhite Proof-of-Stake protocols; 3) Chia Proof-of-Space protocol. As a consequence, exact characterization of the maximum tolerable adversary power is obtained for each protocol as a function of the average block time normalized by the network delay. The security analysis of these protocols is performed in a unified manner by a novel method of reducing all attacks to a race between the adversary and the honest nodes.