Jidong Qin

Jeremy Qin, Bang Liu, Quoc Dinh Nguyen

Black-box large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in various environments, making it essential for these models to effectively convey their confidence and uncertainty, especially in high-stakes settings. However, these models often exhibit overconfidence, leading to potential risks and misjudgments. Existing techniques for eliciting and calibrating LLM confidence have primarily focused on general reasoning datasets, yielding only modest improvements. Accurate calibration is crucial for informed decision-making and preventing adverse outcomes but remains challenging due to the complexity and variability of tasks these models perform. In this work, we investigate the miscalibration behavior of black-box LLMs within the healthcare setting. We propose a novel method, \textit{Atypical Presentations Recalibration}, which leverages atypical presentations to adjust the model's confidence estimates. Our approach significantly improves calibration, reducing calibration errors by approximately 60\% on three medical question answering datasets and outperforming existing methods such as vanilla verbalized confidence, CoT verbalized confidence and others. Additionally, we provide an in-depth analysis of the role of atypicality within the recalibration framework.

Jeremy Qin, Maksym Andriushchenko

Forecasting has become a natural benchmark for reasoning under uncertainty. Yet existing evaluations of large language models remain limited to judgmental tasks in simple formats, such as binary or multiple-choice questions. In practice, however, forecasting spans a far broader scope. Across domains such as economics, public health, and social demographics, decisions hinge on numerical estimates over continuous quantities, a capability that current benchmarks do not capture. Evaluating such estimates requires a format that makes uncertainty explicit and testable. We propose prediction intervals as a natural and rigorous interface for this purpose. They demand scale awareness, internal consistency across confidence levels, and calibration over a continuum of outcomes, making them a more suitable evaluation format than point estimates for numerical forecasting. To assess this capability, we introduce a new benchmark QuantSightBench, and evaluate frontier models under multiple settings, assessing both empirical coverage and interval sharpness. Our results show that none of the 11 evaluated frontier and open-weight models achieves the 90\% coverage target, with the top performers Gemini 3.1 Pro (79.1\%), Grok 4 (76.4\%), and GPT-5.4 (75.3\%) all falling at least 10 percentage points short. Calibration degrades sharply at extreme magnitudes, revealing systematic overconfidence across all evaluated models.

Lena Libon, Ben Rank, Jehyeok Yeon et al.

As AI agents begin to automate AI R&D, we need ways to assess whether their outputs are safe to deploy, even when the agents themselves may be untrusted. AI control offers one such approach: rather than trusting the agent, it treats it as a potential adversary and uses a monitor to detect covert sabotage before deployment. We evaluate AI control for automated AI R&D with ResearchArena, a framework spanning four long-horizon tasks: safety post-training, capabilities post-training, CUDA-kernel optimization, and inference-server optimization. Because the deliverable in AI R&D is an artifact that will be deployed and run, we pair each main task with two kinds of hidden side task: an embedded side task that sabotages the submitted model, adapter, kernel, or server itself, and an independent side task that takes a covert out-of-scope action in the sandbox while leaving the artifact honest. We evaluate frontier agents at both sabotage and monitoring, across four monitor types that vary along two axes: whether the monitor may execute and probe the produced artifact, and whether it sees the agent's chain-of-thought. We find that sabotage hidden in the training data is the hardest to catch, flagged fewer than half the time. Letting the monitor run experiments on the artifact, rather than only read the trajectory, helps, but it is not enough: monitors still miss embedded sabotage by inspecting only the surface, by noticing the anomaly but explaining it away, or by probing the artifact with the wrong test. We release ResearchArena as a modular framework for evaluating sabotage and control in automated AI R&D.