Zikang Ding

Zikang Ding, Haomiao Yang, Meng Hao et al.

Backdoor attacks against pre-trained models (PTMs) have traditionally operated under an ``immediacy assumption,'' where malicious behavior manifests instantly upon trigger occurrence. This work revisits and challenges this paradigm by introducing \textit{\textbf{Delayed Backdoor Attacks (DBA)}}, a new class of threats in which activation is temporally decoupled from trigger exposure. We propose that this \textbf{temporal dimension} is the key to unlocking a previously infeasible class of attacks: those that use common, everyday words as triggers. To examine the feasibility of this paradigm, we design and implement a proof-of-concept prototype, termed \underline{D}elayed Backdoor Attacks Based on \underline{N}onlinear \underline{D}ecay (DND). DND embeds a lightweight, stateful logic module that postpones activation until a configurable threshold is reached, producing a distinct latency phase followed by a controlled outbreak. We derive a formal model to characterize this latency behavior and propose a dual-metric evaluation framework (ASR and ASR$_{delay}$) to empirically measure the delay effect. Extensive experiments on four (natural language processing)NLP benchmarks validate the core capabilities of DND: it remains dormant for a controllable duration, sustains high clean accuracy ($\ge$94\%), and achieves near-perfect post-activation attack success rates ($\approx$99\%, The average of other methods is below 95\%.). Moreover, DND exhibits resilience against several state-of-the-art defenses. This study provides the first empirical evidence that the temporal dimension constitutes a viable yet unprotected attack surface in PTMs, underscoring the need for next-generation, stateful, and time-aware defense mechanisms.

Zikang Ding, Junhao Li, Suling Wu et al.

Model watermarking utilizes internal representations to protect the ownership of large language models (LLMs). However, these features inevitably undergo complex distortions during realistic model modifications such as fine-tuning, quantization, or knowledge distillation, making reliable extraction extremely challenging. Despite extensive research on model-side watermarking, existing methods still lack sufficient robustness against parameter-level perturbations. To address this gap, we propose \texttt{\textbf{Functional Subspace Watermarking (FSW)}}, a framework that anchors ownership signals into a low-dimensional functional backbone. Specifically, we first solve a generalized eigenvalue problem to extract a stable functional subspace for watermark injection, while introducing an adaptive spectral truncation strategy to achieve an optimal balance between robustness and model utility. Furthermore, a vector consistency constraint is incorporated to ensure that watermark injection does not compromise the original semantic performance. Extensive experiments across various LLM architectures and datasets demonstrate that our method achieves superior detection accuracy and statistical verifiability under multiple model attacks, maintaining robustness that outperforms existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods.