Katherine M. Collins

Katherine M. Collins, Catherine Wong, Jiahai Feng et al. · mit

Human language offers a powerful window into our thoughts -- we tell stories, give explanations, and express our beliefs and goals through words. Abundant evidence also suggests that language plays a developmental role in structuring our learning. Here, we ask: how much of human-like thinking can be captured by learning statistical patterns in language alone? We first contribute a new challenge benchmark for comparing humans and distributional large language models (LLMs). Our benchmark contains two problem-solving domains (planning and explanation generation) and is designed to require generalization to new, out-of-distribution problems expressed in language. We find that humans are far more robust than LLMs on this benchmark. Next, we propose a hybrid Parse-and-Solve model, which augments distributional LLMs with a structured symbolic reasoning module. We find that this model shows more robust adaptation to out-of-distribution planning problems, demonstrating the promise of hybrid AI models for more human-like reasoning.

Lance Ying, Katherine M. Collins, Megan Wei et al. · cambridge, mit

Human beings are social creatures. We routinely reason about other agents, and a crucial component of this social reasoning is inferring people's goals as we learn about their actions. In many settings, we can perform intuitive but reliable goal inference from language descriptions of agents, actions, and the background environments. In this paper, we study this process of language driving and influencing social reasoning in a probabilistic goal inference domain. We propose a neuro-symbolic model that carries out goal inference from linguistic inputs of agent scenarios. The "neuro" part is a large language model (LLM) that translates language descriptions to code representations, and the "symbolic" part is a Bayesian inverse planning engine. To test our model, we design and run a human experiment on a linguistic goal inference task. Our model closely matches human response patterns and better predicts human judgements than using an LLM alone.

Ilia Sucholutsky, Lukas Muttenthaler, Adrian Weller et al. · berkeley, cambridge

Biological and artificial information processing systems form representations of the world that they can use to categorize, reason, plan, navigate, and make decisions. How can we measure the similarity between the representations formed by these diverse systems? Do similarities in representations then translate into similar behavior? If so, then how can a system's representations be modified to better match those of another system? These questions pertaining to the study of representational alignment are at the heart of some of the most promising research areas in contemporary cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. In this Perspective, we survey the exciting recent developments in representational alignment research in the fields of cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. Despite their overlapping interests, there is limited knowledge transfer between these fields, so work in one field ends up duplicated in another, and useful innovations are not shared effectively. To improve communication, we propose a unifying framework that can serve as a common language for research on representational alignment, and map several streams of existing work across fields within our framework. We also lay out open problems in representational alignment where progress can benefit all three of these fields. We hope that this paper will catalyze cross-disciplinary collaboration and accelerate progress for all communities studying and developing information processing systems.

Katherine M. Collins, Albert Q. Jiang, Simon Frieder et al. · cambridge

There is much excitement about the opportunity to harness the power of large language models (LLMs) when building problem-solving assistants. However, the standard methodology of evaluating LLMs relies on static pairs of inputs and outputs, and is insufficient for making an informed decision about which LLMs and under which assistive settings can they be sensibly used. Static assessment fails to account for the essential interactive element in LLM deployment, and therefore limits how we understand language model capabilities. We introduce CheckMate, an adaptable prototype platform for humans to interact with and evaluate LLMs. We conduct a study with CheckMate to evaluate three language models (InstructGPT, ChatGPT, and GPT-4) as assistants in proving undergraduate-level mathematics, with a mixed cohort of participants from undergraduate students to professors of mathematics. We release the resulting interaction and rating dataset, MathConverse. By analysing MathConverse, we derive a taxonomy of human behaviours and uncover that despite a generally positive correlation, there are notable instances of divergence between correctness and perceived helpfulness in LLM generations, amongst other findings. Further, we garner a more granular understanding of GPT-4 mathematical problem-solving through a series of case studies, contributed by expert mathematicians. We conclude with actionable takeaways for ML practitioners and mathematicians: models that communicate uncertainty respond well to user corrections, and are more interpretable and concise may constitute better assistants. Interactive evaluation is a promising way to navigate the capability of these models; humans should be aware of language models' algebraic fallibility and discern where they are appropriate to use.

Katherine M. Collins, Ilia Sucholutsky, Umang Bhatt et al. · mit

What do we want from machine intelligence? We envision machines that are not just tools for thought, but partners in thought: reasonable, insightful, knowledgeable, reliable, and trustworthy systems that think with us. Current artificial intelligence (AI) systems satisfy some of these criteria, some of the time. In this Perspective, we show how the science of collaborative cognition can be put to work to engineer systems that really can be called ``thought partners,'' systems built to meet our expectations and complement our limitations. We lay out several modes of collaborative thought in which humans and AI thought partners can engage and propose desiderata for human-compatible thought partnerships. Drawing on motifs from computational cognitive science, we motivate an alternative scaling path for the design of thought partners and ecosystems around their use through a Bayesian lens, whereby the partners we construct actively build and reason over models of the human and world.

Umang Bhatt, Valerie Chen, Katherine M. Collins et al. · cambridge, cmu

Individual human decision-makers may benefit from different forms of support to improve decision outcomes, but when each form of support will yield better outcomes? In this work, we posit that personalizing access to decision support tools can be an effective mechanism for instantiating the appropriate use of AI assistance. Specifically, we propose the general problem of learning a decision support policy that, for a given input, chooses which form of support to provide to decision-makers for whom we initially have no prior information. We develop $\texttt{Modiste}$, an interactive tool to learn personalized decision support policies. $\texttt{Modiste}$ leverages stochastic contextual bandit techniques to personalize a decision support policy for each decision-maker and supports extensions to the multi-objective setting to account for auxiliary objectives like the cost of support. We find that personalized policies outperform offline policies, and, in the cost-aware setting, reduce the incurred cost with minimal degradation to performance. Our experiments include various realistic forms of support (e.g., expert consensus and predictions from a large language model) on vision and language tasks. Our human subject experiments validate our computational experiments, demonstrating that personalization can yield benefits in practice for real users, who interact with $\texttt{Modiste}$.

Matthew Barker, Emma Kallina, Dhananjay Ashok et al. · cambridge, cmu

Even though machine learning (ML) pipelines affect an increasing array of stakeholders, there is little work on how input from stakeholders is recorded and incorporated. We propose FeedbackLogs, addenda to existing documentation of ML pipelines, to track the input of multiple stakeholders. Each log records important details about the feedback collection process, the feedback itself, and how the feedback is used to update the ML pipeline. In this paper, we introduce and formalise a process for collecting a FeedbackLog. We also provide concrete use cases where FeedbackLogs can be employed as evidence for algorithmic auditing and as a tool to record updates based on stakeholder feedback.

Katherine M. Collins, Umang Bhatt, Adrian Weller · cambridge

The labels used to train machine learning (ML) models are of paramount importance. Typically for ML classification tasks, datasets contain hard labels, yet learning using soft labels has been shown to yield benefits for model generalization, robustness, and calibration. Earlier work found success in forming soft labels from multiple annotators' hard labels; however, this approach may not converge to the best labels and necessitates many annotators, which can be expensive and inefficient. We focus on efficiently eliciting soft labels from individual annotators. We collect and release a dataset of soft labels (which we call CIFAR-10S) over the CIFAR-10 test set via a crowdsourcing study (N=248). We demonstrate that learning with our labels achieves comparable model performance to prior approaches while requiring far fewer annotators -- albeit with significant temporal costs per elicitation. Our elicitation methodology therefore shows nuanced promise in enabling practitioners to enjoy the benefits of improved model performance and reliability with fewer annotators, and serves as a guide for future dataset curators on the benefits of leveraging richer information, such as categorical uncertainty, from individual annotators.

Katherine M. Collins, Matthew Barker, Mateo Espinosa Zarlenga et al. · cambridge

Placing a human in the loop may abate the risks of deploying AI systems in safety-critical settings (e.g., a clinician working with a medical AI system). However, mitigating risks arising from human error and uncertainty within such human-AI interactions is an important and understudied issue. In this work, we study human uncertainty in the context of concept-based models, a family of AI systems that enable human feedback via concept interventions where an expert intervenes on human-interpretable concepts relevant to the task. Prior work in this space often assumes that humans are oracles who are always certain and correct. Yet, real-world decision-making by humans is prone to occasional mistakes and uncertainty. We study how existing concept-based models deal with uncertain interventions from humans using two novel datasets: UMNIST, a visual dataset with controlled simulated uncertainty based on the MNIST dataset, and CUB-S, a relabeling of the popular CUB concept dataset with rich, densely-annotated soft labels from humans. We show that training with uncertain concept labels may help mitigate weaknesses of concept-based systems when handling uncertain interventions. These results allow us to identify several open challenges, which we argue can be tackled through future multidisciplinary research on building interactive uncertainty-aware systems. To facilitate further research, we release a new elicitation platform, UElic, to collect uncertain feedback from humans in collaborative prediction tasks.

Mateo Espinosa Zarlenga, Katherine M. Collins, Krishnamurthy Dvijotham et al. · cambridge

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) tackle the opacity of neural architectures by constructing and explaining their predictions using a set of high-level concepts. A special property of these models is that they permit concept interventions, wherein users can correct mispredicted concepts and thus improve the model's performance. Recent work, however, has shown that intervention efficacy can be highly dependent on the order in which concepts are intervened on and on the model's architecture and training hyperparameters. We argue that this is rooted in a CBM's lack of train-time incentives for the model to be appropriately receptive to concept interventions. To address this, we propose Intervention-aware Concept Embedding models (IntCEMs), a novel CBM-based architecture and training paradigm that improves a model's receptiveness to test-time interventions. Our model learns a concept intervention policy in an end-to-end fashion from where it can sample meaningful intervention trajectories at train-time. This conditions IntCEMs to effectively select and receive concept interventions when deployed at test-time. Our experiments show that IntCEMs significantly outperform state-of-the-art concept-interpretable models when provided with test-time concept interventions, demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach.

Zeju Qiu, Weiyang Liu, Haiwen Feng et al.

Against the backdrop of enthusiasm for large language models (LLMs), there is a growing need to scientifically assess their capabilities and shortcomings. This is nontrivial in part because it is difficult to find tasks which the models have not encountered during training. Utilizing symbolic graphics programs, we propose a domain well-suited to test multiple spatial-semantic reasoning skills of LLMs. Popular in computer graphics, these programs procedurally generate visual data. While LLMs exhibit impressive skills in general program synthesis and analysis, symbolic graphics programs offer a new layer of evaluation: they allow us to test an LLM's ability to answer semantic questions about the images or 3D geometries without a vision encoder. To semantically understand the symbolic programs, LLMs would need to possess the ability to "imagine" and reason how the corresponding graphics content would look with only the symbolic description of the local curvatures and strokes. We use this task to evaluate LLMs by creating a large benchmark for the semantic visual understanding of symbolic graphics programs, built procedurally with minimal human effort. Particular emphasis is placed on transformations of images that leave the image level semantics invariant while introducing significant changes to the underlying program. We evaluate commercial and open-source LLMs on our benchmark to assess their ability to reason about visual output of programs, finding that LLMs considered stronger at reasoning generally perform better. Lastly, we introduce a novel method to improve this ability -- Symbolic Instruction Tuning (SIT), in which the LLM is finetuned with pre-collected instruction data on symbolic graphics programs. Interestingly, we find that SIT not only improves LLM's understanding on symbolic programs, but it also improves general reasoning ability on various other benchmarks.

Katherine M. Collins, Umang Bhatt, Weiyang Liu et al. · cambridge

Aligning model representations to humans has been found to improve robustness and generalization. However, such methods often focus on standard observational data. Synthetic data is proliferating and powering many advances in machine learning; yet, it is not always clear whether synthetic labels are perceptually aligned to humans -- rendering it likely model representations are not human aligned. We focus on the synthetic data used in mixup: a powerful regularizer shown to improve model robustness, generalization, and calibration. We design a comprehensive series of elicitation interfaces, which we release as HILL MixE Suite, and recruit 159 participants to provide perceptual judgments along with their uncertainties, over mixup examples. We find that human perceptions do not consistently align with the labels traditionally used for synthetic points, and begin to demonstrate the applicability of these findings to potentially increase the reliability of downstream models, particularly when incorporating human uncertainty. We release all elicited judgments in a new data hub we call H-Mix.

Matthew Barker, Katherine M. Collins, Krishnamurthy Dvijotham et al. · cambridge

Concept-based models perform prediction using a set of concepts that are interpretable to stakeholders. However, such models often involve a fixed, large number of concepts, which may place a substantial cognitive load on stakeholders. We propose Selective COncept Models (SCOMs) which make predictions using only a subset of concepts and can be customised by stakeholders at test-time according to their preferences. We show that SCOMs only require a fraction of the total concepts to achieve optimal accuracy on multiple real-world datasets. Further, we collect and release a new dataset, CUB-Sel, consisting of human concept set selections for 900 bird images from the popular CUB dataset. Using CUB-Sel, we show that humans have unique individual preferences for the choice of concepts they prefer to reason about, and struggle to identify the most theoretically informative concepts. The customisation and concept selection provided by SCOM improves the efficiency of interpretation and intervention for stakeholders.

Cedegao E. Zhang, Katherine M. Collins, Adrian Weller et al.

Mathematics is one of the most powerful conceptual systems developed and used by the human species. Dreams of automated mathematicians have a storied history in artificial intelligence (AI). Rapid progress in AI, particularly propelled by advances in large language models (LLMs), has sparked renewed, widespread interest in building such systems. In this work, we reflect on these goals from a \textit{cognitive science} perspective. We call attention to several classical and ongoing research directions from cognitive science, which we believe are valuable for AI practitioners to consider when seeking to build truly human (or superhuman)-level mathematical systems. We close with open discussions and questions that we believe necessitate a multi-disciplinary perspective -- cognitive scientists working in tandem with AI researchers and mathematicians -- as we move toward better mathematical AI systems which not only help us push the frontier of the mathematics, but also offer glimpses into how we as humans are even capable of such great cognitive feats.

Cedegao E. Zhang, Katherine M. Collins, Lionel Wong et al.

People can evaluate features of problems and their potential solutions well before we can effectively solve them. When considering a game we have never played, for instance, we might infer whether it is likely to be challenging, fair, or fun simply from hearing the game rules, prior to deciding whether to invest time in learning the game or trying to play it well. Many studies of game play have focused on optimality and expertise, characterizing how people and computational models play based on moderate to extensive search and after playing a game dozens (if not thousands or millions) of times. Here, we study how people reason about a range of simple but novel Connect-N style board games. We ask people to judge how fair and how fun the games are from very little experience: just thinking about the game for a minute or so, before they have ever actually played with anyone else, and we propose a resource-limited model that captures their judgments using only a small number of partial game simulations and almost no look-ahead search.

Shubhra Mishra, Yuka Machino, Gabriel Poesia et al.

The evolution of mathematics has been guided in part by interestingness. From researchers choosing which problems to tackle next, to students deciding which ones to engage with, people's choices are often guided by judgments about how interesting or challenging problems are likely to be. As AI systems, such as LLMs, increasingly participate in mathematics with people -- whether for advanced research or education -- it becomes important to understand how well their judgments align with human ones. Our work examines this alignment through two empirical studies of human and LLM assessment of mathematical interestingness and difficulty, spanning a range of mathematical experience. We study two groups: participants from a crowdsourcing platform and International Math Olympiad competitors. We show that while many LLMs appear to broadly agree with human notions of interestingness, they mostly do not capture the distribution observed in human judgments. Moreover, most LLMs only somewhat align with why humans find certain math problems interesting, showing weak correlation with human-selected interestingness rationales. Together, our findings highlight both the promises and limitations of current LLMs in capturing human interestingness judgments for mathematical AI thought partnerships.

Sanyam Kapoor, Nate Gruver, Manley Roberts et al.

When using large language models (LLMs) in high-stakes applications, we need to know when we can trust their predictions. Some works argue that prompting high-performance LLMs is sufficient to produce calibrated uncertainties, while others introduce sampling methods that can be prohibitively expensive. In this work, we first argue that prompting on its own is insufficient to achieve good calibration and then show that fine-tuning on a small dataset of correct and incorrect answers can create an uncertainty estimate with good generalization and small computational overhead. We show that a thousand graded examples are sufficient to outperform baseline methods and that training through the features of a model is necessary for good performance and tractable for large open-source models when using LoRA. We also investigate the mechanisms that enable reliable LLM uncertainty estimation, finding that many models can be used as general-purpose uncertainty estimators, applicable not just to their own uncertainties but also the uncertainty of other models. Lastly, we show that uncertainty estimates inform human use of LLMs in human-AI collaborative settings through a user study.

Simon Frieder, Jonas Bayer, Katherine M. Collins et al.

The suite of datasets commonly used to train and evaluate the mathematical capabilities of AI-based mathematical copilots (primarily large language models) exhibit several shortcomings. These limitations include a restricted scope of mathematical complexity, typically not exceeding lower undergraduate-level mathematics, binary rating protocols and other issues, which makes comprehensive proof-based evaluation suites difficult. We systematically explore these limitations and contend that enhancing the capabilities of large language models, or any forthcoming advancements in AI-based mathematical assistants (copilots or "thought partners"), necessitates a paradigm shift in the design of mathematical datasets and the evaluation criteria of mathematical ability: It is necessary to move away from result-based datasets (theorem statement to theorem proof) and convert the rich facets of mathematical research practice to data LLMs can train on. Examples of these are mathematical workflows (sequences of atomic, potentially subfield-dependent tasks that are often performed when creating new mathematics), which are an important part of the proof-discovery process. Additionally, we advocate for mathematical dataset developers to consider the concept of "motivated proof", introduced by G. Pólya in 1949, which can serve as a blueprint for datasets that offer a better proof learning signal, alleviating some of the mentioned limitations. Lastly, we introduce math datasheets for datasets, extending the general, dataset-agnostic variants of datasheets: We provide a questionnaire designed specifically for math datasets that we urge dataset creators to include with their datasets. This will make creators aware of potential limitations of their datasets while at the same time making it easy for readers to assess it from the point of view of training and evaluating mathematical copilots.

Lance Ying, Katherine M. Collins, Prafull Sharma et al.

Human intelligence exhibits a remarkable capacity for rapid adaptation and effective problem-solving in novel and unfamiliar contexts. We argue that this profound adaptability is fundamentally linked to the efficient construction and refinement of internal representations of the environment, commonly referred to as world models, and we refer to this adaptation mechanism as world model induction. However, current understanding and evaluation of world models in artificial intelligence (AI) remains narrow, often focusing on static representations learned from training on massive corpora of data, instead of the efficiency and efficacy in learning these representations through interaction and exploration within a novel environment. In this Perspective, we provide a view of world model induction drawing on decades of research in cognitive science on how humans learn and adapt so efficiently; we then call for a new evaluation framework for assessing adaptive world models in AI. Concretely, we propose a new benchmarking paradigm based on suites of carefully designed games with genuine, deep and continually refreshing novelty in the underlying game structures -- we refer to this class of games as novel games. We detail key desiderata for constructing these games and propose appropriate metrics to explicitly challenge and evaluate the agent's ability for rapid world model induction. We hope that this new evaluation framework will inspire future evaluation efforts on world models in AI and provide a crucial step towards developing AI systems capable of human-like rapid adaptation and robust generalization -- a critical component of artificial general intelligence.

Lujain Ibrahim, Katherine M. Collins, Sunnie S. Y. Kim et al. · stanford

Large language models (LLMs) distinguish themselves from previous technologies by functioning as collaborative "thought partners," capable of engaging more fluidly in natural language. As LLMs increasingly influence consequential decisions across diverse domains from healthcare to personal advice, the risk of overreliance - relying on LLMs beyond their capabilities - grows. This position paper argues that measuring and mitigating overreliance must become central to LLM research and deployment. First, we consolidate risks from overreliance at both the individual and societal levels, including high-stakes errors, governance challenges, and cognitive deskilling. Then, we explore LLM characteristics, system design features, and user cognitive biases that - together - raise serious and unique concerns about overreliance in practice. We also examine historical approaches for measuring overreliance, identifying three important gaps and proposing three promising directions to improve measurement. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies that the AI research community can pursue to ensure LLMs augment rather than undermine human capabilities.

Ilia Sucholutsky, Katherine M. Collins, Nori Jacoby et al.

LLMs are already transforming the study of individual cognition, but their application to studying collective cognition has been underexplored. We lay out how LLMs may be able to address the complexity that has hindered the study of collectives and raise possible risks that warrant new methods.

Katherine M. Collins, Umang Bhatt, Ilia Sucholutsky

Humans learn about the world, and how to act in the world, in many ways: from individually conducting experiments to observing and reproducing others' behavior. Different learning strategies come with different costs and likelihoods of successfully learning more about the world. The choice that any one individual makes of how to learn can have an impact on the collective understanding of a whole population if people learn from each other. Alan Rogers developed simulations of a population of agents to study these network phenomena where agents could individually or socially learn amidst a dynamic, uncertain world and uncovered a confusing result: the availability of cheap social learning yielded no benefit to population fitness over individual learning. This paradox spawned decades of work trying to understand and uncover factors that foster the relative benefit of social learning that centuries of human behavior suggest exists. What happens in such network models now that humans can socially learn from AI systems that are themselves socially learning from us? We revisit Rogers' Paradox in the context of human-AI interaction to probe a simplified network of humans and AI systems learning together about an uncertain world. We propose and examine the impact of several learning strategies on the quality of the equilibrium of a society's 'collective world model'. We consider strategies that can be undertaken by various stakeholders involved in a single human-AI interaction: human, AI model builder, and society or regulators around the interaction. We then consider possible negative feedback loops that may arise from humans learning socially from AI: that learning from the AI may impact our own ability to learn about the world. We close with open directions into studying networks of human and AI systems that can be explored in enriched versions of our simulation framework.

Lance Ying, Daniel Xu, Alicia Zhang et al.

People regularly make inferences about objects in the world that they cannot see by flexibly integrating information from multiple sources: auditory and visual cues, language, and our prior beliefs and knowledge about the scene. How are we able to so flexibly integrate many sources of information to make sense of the world around us, even if we have no direct knowledge? In this work, we propose a neurosymbolic model that uses neural networks to parse open-ended multimodal inputs and then applies a Bayesian model to integrate different sources of information to evaluate different hypotheses. We evaluate our model with a novel object guessing game called ``What's in the Box?'' where humans and models watch a video clip of an experimenter shaking boxes and then try to guess the objects inside the boxes. Through a human experiment, we show that our model correlates strongly with human judgments, whereas unimodal ablated models and large multimodal neural model baselines show poor correlation.

Kerem Oktar, Katherine M. Collins, Jose Hernandez-Orallo et al.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems have historically been used as tools that execute narrowly defined tasks. Yet recent advances in AI have unlocked possibilities for a new class of models that genuinely collaborate with humans in complex reasoning, from conceptualizing problems to brainstorming solutions. Such AI thought partners enable novel forms of collaboration and extended cognition, yet they also pose major risks-including and beyond risks of typical AI tools and agents. In this commentary, we systematically identify risks of AI thought partners through a novel framework that identifies risks at multiple levels of analysis, including Real-time, Individual, and Societal risks arising from collaborative cognition (RISc). We leverage this framework to propose concrete metrics for risk evaluation, and finally suggest specific mitigation strategies for developers and policymakers. As AI thought partners continue to proliferate, these strategies can help prevent major harms and ensure that humans actively benefit from productive thought partnerships.

Katherine M. Collins, Najoung Kim, Yonatan Bitton et al.

Human feedback plays a critical role in learning and refining reward models for text-to-image generation, but the optimal form the feedback should take for learning an accurate reward function has not been conclusively established. This paper investigates the effectiveness of fine-grained feedback which captures nuanced distinctions in image quality and prompt-alignment, compared to traditional coarse-grained feedback (for example, thumbs up/down or ranking between a set of options). While fine-grained feedback holds promise, particularly for systems catering to diverse societal preferences, we show that demonstrating its superiority to coarse-grained feedback is not automatic. Through experiments on real and synthetic preference data, we surface the complexities of building effective models due to the interplay of model choice, feedback type, and the alignment between human judgment and computational interpretation. We identify key challenges in eliciting and utilizing fine-grained feedback, prompting a reassessment of its assumed benefits and practicality. Our findings -- e.g., that fine-grained feedback can lead to worse models for a fixed budget, in some settings; however, in controlled settings with known attributes, fine grained rewards can indeed be more helpful -- call for careful consideration of feedback attributes and potentially beckon novel modeling approaches to appropriately unlock the potential value of fine-grained feedback in-the-wild.

Katherine M. Collins, Valerie Chen, Ilia Sucholutsky et al.

Language models are transforming the ways that their users engage with the world. Despite impressive capabilities, over-consumption of language model outputs risks propagating unchecked errors in the short-term and damaging human capabilities for critical thinking in the long-term. How can we develop scaffolding around language models to curate more appropriate use? We propose selective frictions for language model experiences, inspired by behavioral science interventions, to dampen misuse. Frictions involve small modifications to a user's experience, e.g., the addition of a button impeding model access and reminding a user of their expertise relative to the model. Through a user study with real humans, we observe shifts in user behavior from the imposition of a friction over LLMs in the context of a multi-topic question-answering task as a representative task that people may use LLMs for, e.g., in education and information retrieval. We find that frictions modulate over-reliance by driving down users' click rates while minimally affecting accuracy for those topics. Yet, frictions may have unintended effects. We find marked differences in users' click behaviors even on topics where frictions were not provisioned. Our contributions motivate further study of human-AI behavioral interaction to inform more effective and appropriate LLM use.

Ilia Sucholutsky, Katherine M. Collins, Maya Malaviya et al.

A good teacher should not only be knowledgeable, but should also be able to communicate in a way that the student understands -- to share the student's representation of the world. In this work, we introduce a new controlled experimental setting, GRADE, to study pedagogy and representational alignment. We use GRADE through a series of machine-machine and machine-human teaching experiments to characterize a utility curve defining a relationship between representational alignment, teacher expertise, and student learning outcomes. We find that improved representational alignment with a student improves student learning outcomes (i.e., task accuracy), but that this effect is moderated by the size and representational diversity of the class being taught. We use these insights to design a preliminary classroom matching procedure, GRADE-Match, that optimizes the assignment of students to teachers. When designing machine teachers, our results suggest that it is important to focus not only on accuracy, but also on representational alignment with human learners.

Yilun Du, Katherine M. Collins, Joshua B. Tenenbaum et al.

Deep neural networks have been used widely to learn the latent structure of datasets, across modalities such as images, shapes, and audio signals. However, existing models are generally modality-dependent, requiring custom architectures and objectives to process different classes of signals. We leverage neural fields to capture the underlying structure in image, shape, audio and cross-modal audiovisual domains in a modality-independent manner. We cast our task as one of learning a manifold, where we aim to infer a low-dimensional, locally linear subspace in which our data resides. By enforcing coverage of the manifold, local linearity, and local isometry, our model -- dubbed GEM -- learns to capture the underlying structure of datasets across modalities. We can then travel along linear regions of our manifold to obtain perceptually consistent interpolations between samples, and can further use GEM to recover points on our manifold and glean not only diverse completions of input images, but cross-modal hallucinations of audio or image signals. Finally, we show that by walking across the underlying manifold of GEM, we may generate new samples in our signal domains. Code and additional results are available at https://yilundu.github.io/gem/.

Tuan Anh Le, Katherine M. Collins, Luke Hewitt et al.

Modeling complex phenomena typically involves the use of both discrete and continuous variables. Such a setting applies across a wide range of problems, from identifying trends in time-series data to performing effective compositional scene understanding in images. Here, we propose Hybrid Memoised Wake-Sleep (HMWS), an algorithm for effective inference in such hybrid discrete-continuous models. Prior approaches to learning suffer as they need to perform repeated expensive inner-loop discrete inference. We build on a recent approach, Memoised Wake-Sleep (MWS), which alleviates part of the problem by memoising discrete variables, and extend it to allow for a principled and effective way to handle continuous variables by learning a separate recognition model used for importance-sampling based approximate inference and marginalization. We evaluate HMWS in the GP-kernel learning and 3D scene understanding domains, and show that it outperforms current state-of-the-art inference methods.