Zhifeng Jiang

Zhifeng Jiang, Zhihua Jin, Guoliang He

System prompts are widely used to guide the outputs of large language models (LLMs). These prompts often contain business logic and sensitive information, making their protection essential. However, adversarial and even regular user queries can exploit LLM vulnerabilities to expose these hidden prompts. To address this issue, we propose PromptKeeper, a defense mechanism designed to safeguard system prompts by tackling two core challenges: reliably detecting leakage and mitigating side-channel vulnerabilities when leakage occurs. By framing detection as a hypothesis-testing problem, PromptKeeper effectively identifies both explicit and subtle leakage. Upon leakage detected, it regenerates responses using a dummy prompt, ensuring that outputs remain indistinguishable from typical interactions when no leakage is present. PromptKeeper ensures robust protection against prompt extraction attacks via either adversarial or regular queries, while preserving conversational capability and runtime efficiency during benign user interactions.

Zhifeng Jiang, Wei Wang, Bo Li et al.

The increasing demand for privacy-preserving collaborative learning has given rise to a new computing paradigm called federated learning (FL), in which clients collaboratively train a machine learning (ML) model without revealing their private training data. Given an acceptable level of privacy guarantee, the goal of FL is to minimize the time-to-accuracy of model training. Compared with distributed ML in data centers, there are four distinct challenges to achieving short time-to-accuracy in FL training, namely the lack of information for optimization, the tradeoff between statistical and system utility, client heterogeneity, and large configuration space. In this paper, we survey recent works in addressing these challenges and present them following a typical training workflow through three phases: client selection, configuration, and reporting. We also review system works including measurement studies and benchmarking tools that aim to support FL developers.

Zhifeng Jiang, Wei Wang, Yang Liu

Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a promising privacy-preserving technique for cross-silo federated learning (FL), where organizations perform collaborative model training on decentralized data. Despite the strong privacy guarantee, general HE schemes result in significant computation and communication overhead. Prior works employ batch encryption to address this problem, but it is still suboptimal in mitigating communication overhead and is incompatible with sparsification techniques. In this paper, we propose FLASHE, an HE scheme tailored for cross-silo FL. To capture the minimum requirements of security and functionality, FLASHE drops the asymmetric-key design and only involves modular addition operations with random numbers. Depending on whether to accommodate sparsification techniques, FLASHE is optimized in computation efficiency with different approaches. We have implemented FLASHE as a pluggable module atop FATE, an industrial platform for cross-silo FL. Compared to plaintext training, FLASHE slightly increases the training time by $\leq6\%$, with no communication overhead.