Yixu Wang

Yixu Wang, Jiaxin Song, Yifeng Gao et al.

As Video Large Multimodal Models (VLMMs) rapidly advance, their inherent complexity introduces significant safety challenges, particularly the issue of mismatched generalization where static safety alignments fail to transfer to dynamic video contexts. We introduce SafeVid, a framework designed to instill video-specific safety principles in VLMMs. SafeVid uniquely transfers robust textual safety alignment capabilities to the video domain by employing detailed textual video descriptions as an interpretive bridge, facilitating LLM-based rule-driven safety reasoning. This is achieved through a closed-loop system comprising: 1) generation of SafeVid-350K, a novel 350,000-pair video-specific safety preference dataset; 2) targeted alignment of VLMMs using Direct Preference Optimization (DPO); and 3) comprehensive evaluation via our new SafeVidBench benchmark. Alignment with SafeVid-350K significantly enhances VLMM safety, with models like LLaVA-NeXT-Video demonstrating substantial improvements (e.g., up to 42.39%) on SafeVidBench. SafeVid provides critical resources and a structured approach, demonstrating that leveraging textual descriptions as a conduit for safety reasoning markedly improves the safety alignment of VLMMs. We have made SafeVid-350K dataset (https://huggingface.co/datasets/yxwang/SafeVid-350K) publicly available.

Lingyu Li, Yang Yao, Yixu Wang et al.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

Yunhao Chen, Xin Wang, Juncheng Li et al.

Automated red teaming frameworks for Large Language Models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, yet they share a fundamental limitation: their jailbreak logic is confined to selecting, combining, or refining pre-existing attack strategies. This binds their creativity and leaves them unable to autonomously invent entirely new attack mechanisms. To overcome this gap, we introduce \textbf{EvoSynth}, an autonomous framework that shifts the paradigm from attack planning to the evolutionary synthesis of jailbreak methods. Instead of refining prompts, EvoSynth employs a multi-agent system to autonomously engineer, evolve, and execute novel, code-based attack algorithms. Crucially, it features a code-level self-correction loop, allowing it to iteratively rewrite its own attack logic in response to failure. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that EvoSynth not only establishes a new state-of-the-art by achieving an 85.5\% Attack Success Rate (ASR) against highly robust models like Claude-Sonnet-4.5, but also generates attacks that are significantly more diverse than those from existing methods. We release our framework to facilitate future research in this new direction of evolutionary synthesis of jailbreak methods. Code is available at: https://github.com/dongdongunique/EvoSynth.

Xingjun Ma, Yifeng Gao, Yixu Wang et al.

The rapid advancement of large models, driven by their exceptional abilities in learning and generalization through large-scale pre-training, has reshaped the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These models are now foundational to a wide range of applications, including conversational AI, recommendation systems, autonomous driving, content generation, medical diagnostics, and scientific discovery. However, their widespread deployment also exposes them to significant safety risks, raising concerns about robustness, reliability, and ethical implications. This survey provides a systematic review of current safety research on large models, covering Vision Foundation Models (VFMs), Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Pre-training (VLP) models, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), Diffusion Models (DMs), and large-model-powered Agents. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We present a comprehensive taxonomy of safety threats to these models, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, backdoor attacks, jailbreak and prompt injection attacks, energy-latency attacks, data and model extraction attacks, and emerging agent-specific threats. (2) We review defense strategies proposed for each type of attacks if available and summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks for safety research. (3) Building on this, we identify and discuss the open challenges in large model safety, emphasizing the need for comprehensive safety evaluations, scalable and effective defense mechanisms, and sustainable data practices. More importantly, we highlight the necessity of collective efforts from the research community and international collaboration. Our work can serve as a useful reference for researchers and practitioners, fostering the ongoing development of comprehensive defense systems and platforms to safeguard AI models.

Yixu Wang, Tianle Gu, Yan Teng et al.

Model extraction attacks are one type of inference-time attacks that approximate the functionality and performance of a black-box victim model by launching a certain number of queries to the model and then leveraging the model's predictions to train a substitute model. These attacks pose severe security threats to production models and MLaaS platforms and could cause significant monetary losses to the model owners. A body of work has proposed to defend machine learning models against model extraction attacks, including both active defense methods that modify the model's outputs or increase the query overhead to avoid extraction and passive defense methods that detect malicious queries or leverage watermarks to perform post-verification. In this work, we introduce a new defense paradigm called attack as defense which modifies the model's output to be poisonous such that any malicious users that attempt to use the output to train a substitute model will be poisoned. To this end, we propose a novel lightweight backdoor attack method dubbed HoneypotNet that replaces the classification layer of the victim model with a honeypot layer and then fine-tunes the honeypot layer with a shadow model (to simulate model extraction) via bi-level optimization to modify its output to be poisonous while remaining the original performance. We empirically demonstrate on four commonly used benchmark datasets that HoneypotNet can inject backdoors into substitute models with a high success rate. The injected backdoor not only facilitates ownership verification but also disrupts the functionality of substitute models, serving as a significant deterrent to model extraction attacks.

Yifeng Gao, Yifan Ding, Hongyu Su et al.

As AI-generated video becomes increasingly pervasive across media platforms, the ability to reliably distinguish synthetic content from authentic footage has become both urgent and essential. Existing approaches have primarily treated this challenge as a binary classification task, offering limited insight into where or why a model identifies a video as AI-generated. However, the core challenge extends beyond simply detecting subtle artifacts; it requires providing fine-grained, persuasive evidence that can convince auditors and end-users alike. To address this critical gap, we introduce DAVID-X, the first dataset to pair AI-generated videos with detailed defect-level, temporal-spatial annotations and written rationales. Leveraging these rich annotations, we present DAVID-XR1, a video-language model designed to deliver an interpretable chain of visual reasoning-including defect categorization, temporal-spatial localization, and natural language explanations. This approach fundamentally transforms AI-generated video detection from an opaque black-box decision into a transparent and verifiable diagnostic process. We demonstrate that a general-purpose backbone, fine-tuned on our compact dataset and enhanced with chain-of-thought distillation, achieves strong generalization across a variety of generators and generation modes. Our results highlight the promise of explainable detection methods for trustworthy identification of AI-generated video content.