Wenbo Wang

Idan Achituve, Wenbo Wang, Ethan Fetaya et al.

Vertical distributed learning exploits the local features collected by multiple learning workers to form a better global model. However, the exchange of data between the workers and the model aggregator for parameter training incurs a heavy communication burden, especially when the learning system is built upon capacity-constrained wireless networks. In this paper, we propose a novel hierarchical distributed learning framework, where each worker separately learns a low-dimensional embedding of their local observed data. Then, they perform communication efficient distributed max-pooling for efficiently transmitting the synthesized input to the aggregator. For data exchange over a shared wireless channel, we propose an opportunistic carrier sensing-based protocol to implement the max-pooling operation for the output data from all the learning workers. Our simulation experiments show that the proposed learning framework is able to achieve almost the same model accuracy as the learning model using the concatenation of all the raw outputs from the learning workers, while requiring a communication load that is independent of the number of workers.

Rui Zhu, Yuexing Peng, George C. Alexandropoulos et al.

The Method of Moments (MoM) is constrained by the usage of static, geometry-defined basis functions, such as the Rao-Wilton-Glisson (RWG) basis. This letter reframes electromagnetic modeling around a learnable basis representation rather than solving for the coefficients over a fixed basis. We first show that the RWG basis is essentially a static and piecewise-linear realization of the Kolmogorov-Arnold representation theorem. Inspired by this insight, we propose PhyKAN, a physics-informed Kolmogorov-Arnold Network (KAN) that generalizes RWG into a learnable and adaptive basis family. Derived from the EFIE, PhyKAN integrates a local KAN branch with a global branch embedded with Green's function priors to preserve physical consistency. It is demonstrated that, across canonical geometries, PhyKAN achieves sub-0.01 reconstruction errors as well as accurate, unsupervised radar cross section predictions, offering an interpretable, physics-consistent bridge between classical solvers and modern neural network models for electromagnetic modeling.

Joash Lee, Wenbo Wang, Dusit Niyato

We consider the problem of demand-side energy management, where each household is equipped with a smart meter that is able to schedule home appliances online. The goal is to minimize the overall cost under a real-time pricing scheme. While previous works have introduced centralized approaches in which the scheduling algorithm has full observability, we propose the formulation of a smart grid environment as a Markov game. Each household is a decentralized agent with partial observability, which allows scalability and privacy-preservation in a realistic setting. The grid operator produces a price signal that varies with the energy demand. We propose an extension to a multi-agent, deep actor-critic algorithm to address partial observability and the perceived non-stationarity of the environment from the agent's viewpoint. This algorithm learns a centralized critic that coordinates training of decentralized agents. Our approach thus uses centralized learning but decentralized execution. Simulation results show that our online deep reinforcement learning method can reduce both the peak-to-average ratio of total energy consumed and the cost of electricity for all households based purely on instantaneous observations and a price signal.

Wenbo Wang, Amir Leshem, Dusit Niyato et al.

We study a decentralized channel allocation problem in an ad-hoc Internet of Things network underlaying on the spectrum licensed to a primary cellular network. In the considered network, the impoverished channel sensing/probing capability and computational resource on the IoT devices make them difficult to acquire the detailed Channel State Information (CSI) for the shared multiple channels. In practice, the unknown patterns of the primary users' transmission activities and the time-varying CSI (e.g., due to small-scale fading or device mobility) also cause stochastic changes in the channel quality. Decentralized IoT links are thus expected to learn channel conditions online based on partial observations, while acquiring no information about the channels that they are not operating on. They also have to reach an efficient, collision-free solution of channel allocation with limited coordination. Our study maps this problem into a contextual multi-player, multi-armed bandit game, and proposes a purely decentralized, three-stage policy learning algorithm through trial-and-error. Theoretical analyses shows that the proposed scheme guarantees the IoT links to jointly converge to the social optimal channel allocation with a sub-linear (i.e., polylogarithmic) regret with respect to the operational time. Simulations demonstrate that it strikes a good balance between efficiency and network scalability when compared with the other state-of-the-art decentralized bandit algorithms.

Wang Wenbo, Gao Yang, Huang Heyan et al.

A quality abstractive summary should not only copy salient source texts as summaries but should also tend to generate new conceptual words to express concrete details. Inspired by the popular pointer generator sequence-to-sequence model, this paper presents a concept pointer network for improving these aspects of abstractive summarization. The network leverages knowledge-based, context-aware conceptualizations to derive an extended set of candidate concepts. The model then points to the most appropriate choice using both the concept set and original source text. This joint approach generates abstractive summaries with higher-level semantic concepts. The training model is also optimized in a way that adapts to different data, which is based on a novel method of distantly-supervised learning guided by reference summaries and testing set. Overall, the proposed approach provides statistically significant improvements over several state-of-the-art models on both the DUC-2004 and Gigaword datasets. A human evaluation of the model's abstractive abilities also supports the quality of the summaries produced within this framework.

Zhengwei Ni, Wenbo Wang, Dong In Kim et al.

With the development of decentralized consensus protocols, permissionless blockchains have been envisioned as a promising enabler for the general-purpose transaction-driven, autonomous systems. However, most of the prevalent blockchain networks are built upon the consensus protocols under the crypto-puzzle framework known as proof-of-work. Such protocols face the inherent problem of transaction-processing bottleneck, as the networks achieve the decentralized consensus for transaction confirmation at the cost of very high latency. In this paper, we study the problem of consensus formation in a system of multiple throughput-scalable blockchains with sharded consensus. Specifically, the protocol design of sharded consensus not only enables parallelizing the process of transaction validation with sub-groups of processors, but also introduces the Byzantine consensus protocols for accelerating the consensus processes. By allowing different blockchains to impose different levels of processing fees and to have different transaction-generating rate, we aim to simulate the multi-service provision eco-systems based on blockchains in real world. We focus on the dynamics of blockchain-selection in the condition of a large population of consensus processors. Hence, we model the evolution of blockchain selection by the individual processors as an evolutionary game. Both the theoretical and the numerical analysis are provided regarding the evolutionary equilibria and the stability of the processors' strategies in a general case.

Wenbo Wang, Dinh Thai Hoang, Peizhao Hu et al.

The past decade has witnessed the rapid evolution in blockchain technologies, which has attracted tremendous interests from both the research communities and industries. The blockchain network was originated from the Internet financial sector as a decentralized, immutable ledger system for transactional data ordering. Nowadays, it is envisioned as a powerful backbone/framework for decentralized data processing and data-driven self-organization in flat, open-access networks. In particular, the plausible characteristics of decentralization, immutability and self-organization are primarily owing to the unique decentralized consensus mechanisms introduced by blockchain networks. This survey is motivated by the lack of a comprehensive literature review on the development of decentralized consensus mechanisms in blockchain networks. In this survey, we provide a systematic vision of the organization of blockchain networks. By emphasizing the unique characteristics of incentivized consensus in blockchain networks, our in-depth review of the state-of-the-art consensus protocols is focused on both the perspective of distributed consensus system design and the perspective of incentive mechanism design. From a game-theoretic point of view, we also provide a thorough review on the strategy adoption for self-organization by the individual nodes in the blockchain backbone networks. Consequently, we provide a comprehensive survey on the emerging applications of the blockchain networks in a wide range of areas. We highlight our special interest in how the consensus mechanisms impact these applications. Finally, we discuss several open issues in the protocol design for blockchain consensus and the related potential research directions.

Shaohan Feng, Wenbo Wang, Zehui Xiong et al.

Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular, we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risks due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market, which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, the cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the infrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the service price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of the blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider also purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself from the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we model the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game.

Zehui Xiong, Shaohan Feng, Wenbo Wang et al.

The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our proposed model.