Steven A. Gabriel

Stephanie Allen, John P. Dickerson, Steven A. Gabriel

As demonstrated by Ratliff et al. (2014), inverse optimization can be used to recover the objective function parameters of players in multi-player Nash games. These games involve the optimization problems of multiple players in which the players can affect each other in their objective functions. In generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs), a player's set of feasible actions is also impacted by the actions taken by other players in the game; see Facchinei and Kanzow (2010) for more background on this problem. One example of such impact comes in the form of joint/"coupled" constraints as referenced by Rosen (1965), Harker (1991), and Facchinei et al. (2007) which involve other players' variables in the constraints of the feasible region. We extend the framework of Ratliff et al. (2014) to find inverse optimization solutions for the class of GNEPs with joint constraints. The resulting formulation is then applied to a simulated multi-player transportation problem on a road network. Also, we provide some theoretical results related to this transportation problem regarding runtime of the extended framework as well as uniqueness and non-uniqueness of solutions to our simulation experiments. We see that our model recovers parameterizations that produce the same flow patterns as the original parameterizations and that this holds true across multiple networks, different assumptions regarding players' perceived costs, and the majority of restrictive capacity settings and the associated numbers of players. Code for the project can be found at: https://github.com/sallen7/IO_GNEP.

Torine R. Herstad, Jalal Kazempour, Lesia Mitridati et al.

Stochastic resources such as wind farms, electric vehicle aggregators, and demand-side assets are increasingly participating as reserve providers in ancillary service markets. To manage delivery uncertainty, system operators impose minimum reliability thresholds on such providers. Energinet, the Danish transmission system operator (TSO), has pioneered this approach through the P90 requirement, requiring stochastic providers to make accepted reserve capacity bids available with at least 90% probability. Yet this threshold is set by regulatory convention, not optimization: no existing framework treats it as a design variable or characterizes the cost-reliability trade-off it governs. This paper closes that gap. We develop a bilevel optimization framework in which the TSO in the upper level sets the reliability threshold endogenously while providers in the lower levels respond through reliability-constrained bidding, with chance constraints reformulated analytically using a Weibull tail distribution. Applied to the Nordic frequency containment reserve for disturbances (FCR-D) market, the cost-optimal threshold lies below P90 in the studied cases, with cost reductions by up to 14.5% relative to the fixed standard. Dynamic hourly thresholds yield a further reduction of up to 2.4%, suggesting efficiency gains may increase in larger and more diverse reserve markets.